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On May 12, 2015, Senate Democrats delivered a surprise defeat to President 
Obama, blocking the advance of a bill designed to grant the President “Fast Track” 
authority to complete negotiation of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade 
agreement between the United States and eleven countries in North American and Asia 
(Milbank 2015). President Obama had been working with a coalition of pro-trade 
Republicans in the Senate on a bill to grant “Fast Track” authority, which is formally 
called Trade Promotion Authority. Fast track authority would grant the President an up-
or-down vote on the TPP when it is completed, rather than allowing the Senate to 
filibuster the treaty or offer amendments on specific aspects of the trade deal. Fast Track 
authority has been granted to several Presidents in the past, and the approval of Fast 
Track is seen as an essential condition for any eventual approval of the TPP by Congress. 
Having won the support of most Republicans, the May 12 defeat was delivered by the 
President’s own party. Senator Elizabeth Warren, an opponent of the TPP, lead the 
change against Fast Track, and Senate Democrats voted 44-1 against the President. 
Following a few more weeks of tense negotiations, the Administration was able to win 
the support of a total of fourteen Democrats, and on May 22, the Senate eventually 
passed Fast Track by a vote of 62-37 (CNN 2015). At the time of this writing in June 
2015, the President was in the process of negotiating with Representatives in the House 
to earn their support of Fast Track as well. The future of Fast Track authority and the TPP 
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are as yet unknown, but pushback against the TPP, especially from the President’s own 
party, is noteworthy. 
Opponents of the TPP have several complaints, including the extraordinary 
secrecy with which the TPP has been negotiated. The Wikileaks website has published 
several drafts of TPP chapters, but other than these leaks there has been no public 
disclosure of the details of the trade agreement over the past five years. The lack of 
transparency aside, many in the public and private domain criticize the TPP on it 
substantive merits. Many are concerned about the impact of the trade deal on American 
workers. In December 2012, twenty-four Senators sent the White House a letter asking 
the Obama administration to priorities workers’ rights during the negotiations over the 
TPP. Then, in April 2014, three US House members wrote an op-ed highlighting the 
potential ramifications the TPP would have on middle class Americans. Reflecting on job 
losses experienced after NAFTA was passed in 1993, Reps. George Miller (D-CA), Rosa 
DeLauro (D-CN), and Louise Slaughter (D-NY) said, “this agreement would force 
Americans to compete against workers from nations such as Vietnam, where the 
minimum wage is $2.75 a day” (Miller, Delauro, and Slaughter 2014). 
 Other Democratic opponents of TPP and Fast Track authority, Massachusetts 
Senator Elizabeth Warren chief among them, express concerns that the TPP could 
weaken the Dodd-Frank financial industry regulations, environmental and pollution 
regulations, and introduce a binding dispute settlement mechanism that might allow 
foreign companies to challenge US laws, weaken US regulations, and sue American 




Most relevant to this project, a good deal of push-back to the TPP has centered on 
intellectual property rights. The international trade regime has focused on intellectual 
property rights since the formation of the WTO in 1994. The WTO’S Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2, required all WTO members to protect intellectual property 
rights according to a set of minimum standards common in the United States and other 
industrialized countries. Since 1994, trade agreements have included the strengthening of 
intellectual property rights. The United States, along with the EU and other large wealthy 
countries routinely pressure trading partners to strengthen their IP protections even 
beyond the standards set forth in the TRIPS agreement, what opponents call “TRIPS-
plus” conditions. Drafts of the intellectual property chapter of the TPP were leaked on a 
couple of occasions, exposing the extensive IP rules the agreement would impose on all 
of its signatories. Several IPR scholars and advocates have suggested that these IP 
provisions are TRIPS-plus in nature, and would impose a heavy burden on TPP countries. 
Among other effects, they suggest this will increase the monopoly pricing ability of 
pharmaceutical companies, leading to higher drug costs (especially for HIV drugs) in the 
developing countries of the TPP (Democracy Now 2015; Fuller 2014; Lee 2013). The 
intellectual property portion of the TPP even persuaded Senator Ron Wyden – who had 
been the administration’s biggest supporter among Congressional Democrats – to vote 
against the approval of Fast Track authority. Wyden was more concerned about copyright 
provisions in the TPP that threaten net neutrality and support big-content providers at the 
expense of users and small creators, but nonetheless it was intellectual property 
provisions that cost the Administration its biggest supporter in the Senate (Wyden 2015).  
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Some IPR experts have compared the IP provisions in the TPP to the Stop Online 
Piracy Act (SOPA), which failed dramatically in Congress last year. Bill Watson, a trade 
scholar at the libertarian Cato Institute, said, “It’s impressive to me how well this chapter 
plays into fears that folks who are concerned about intellectual property expansion have 
about the TPP. It really seems to be their worst nightmare” (qtd. in Lee 2013). As Watson 
notes, the IP-related pushback to the TPP fits into an existing debate between supporters 
of stronger IPR and opponents of stronger IPR. For two decades this debate has taken 
place in public policy circles and among lobbyists, activists, NGOs, and scholars. These 
political campaigns have generated a research agenda in the fields of political science and 
international law examining the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) on access to 
lifesaving medicines in developing countries (F. M. Abbott 2005; Correa 2006; Sell 
2001, 2004, 2007). Growing out of the “access to medicines” movement, a second group 
of scholars have focused on the impact of intellectual property on access to knowledge 
resources, forming a new movement known as the “access to knowledge” (A2K) 
campaign (Chon 2005; Nicholson 2006; Rens, Prabhala, and Kawooya 2006). In the most 
general terms, these two research agendas argue that stronger IPR represent a burden to 
developing countries, ultimately restricting their access to lifesaving medicines and 
knowledge resources. They suggest developing countries should be wary of strong IPR 
regimes that will retard social and human development without sufficiently helping grow 
the economy. I discuss both of these literatures in detail in the next chapter. 
These research agendas join a much older literature in the field of economics 
which has examined the role of intellectual property rights in countries’ economic 
development (G. Grossman and Helpman 1992; Helpman 1993; Mansfield 1994; Maskus 
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2000a; Maskus and Penubarti 1995; Schneider 2005). Some in the economics field agree 
that stronger IPR represent a burden to developing countries, but the overwhelming 
consensus within economics is that stronger IPR are a boon for economic development 
and an overall positive choice for developing countries to make. 
 
1.1   The Purpose and Significance of this Research 
 
Unfortunately there has been little dialogue between the political science 
literature, which is largely critical of strong IPR, and the economics literature, which is 
largely supportive of strong IPR. The central question propelling this project is not which 
of these arguments about IPR is correct. In fact, I argue that both stories are right: IPR 
has both potential positive impacts on economic development and potential negative 
impacts on human development.1  The question I hope to answer is whether the benefits 
of adopting strong IPR outweigh the costs, and under what conditions we might expect 
the benefits to outweigh the costs. 
My expectation going into the project is that both narratives regarding IPR are 
correct. Economists are correct that stronger IPR stimulate economic growth through 
innovation, FDI, and technology transfer. Likewise, IPR skeptics are correct that stronger 
IPR drive up the prices of medicines, medical inputs, textbooks, learning resources, and 
other educational inputs, increasing the cost of both medical treatment and attending 
school, and leading to worse overall health and education outcomes. Since economic 
                                                          
1 In the literature on non-economic development, some scholars use the term “human development” and 
others use the term “social development”. These terms are largely interchangeable, but for the sake of 
consistency I use the term “human development” throughout this project to refer to all forms of non-
economic development, especially the three social outcomes at the center of the project.  
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growth can create additional resources, which can then be used to improve health and 
education, the statistical analyses presented in this project can be seen as a test of which 
effect of IPR is larger. Do stronger IPR generate sufficient economic growth to see 
overall improvements in health and education, or is the increased cost of health and 
education larger, resulting in overall decline in health and education outcomes. This is a 
question I hope to answer. I also expect that the relationship between IPR and social 
outcomes is more complicated than either side of this debate admits. Political and 
institutional factors surely matter, and in Chapter 6 I attempt to explore those factors 
through a case study. 
Therefore, my principal contribution to this debate, and to the political science 
literature, is to empirically examine the relationship between IPR and social outcomes, 
especially health, education, and income inequality. I chose health and education because 
these are the social outcomes at the heart of the access to medicines and access to 
knowledge campaigns. I chose income inequality as a third social outcome because of its 
relationship to IPR, to health, and to education. Inequality has a complex relationship to 
both IPR and the other social outcomes, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 5.  
The access to medicines and access to knowledge literatures have generally 
offered only anecdotal and single-case examinations of the link between IPR and the 
prices of drugs and knowledge resources, which represents one of the largest gaps in the 
literature. This project seeks to fill that gap by presenting the first large-N cross-national, 
time series study of the impact of IPR on health and education outcomes, as well as 
income inequality levels.  
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 This project also contributes to the discussion of IPR in the literature by pointing 
out that IPR reform, and the impact of IPR on human development, always occur within a 
political context. Too often both the pro-IPR and the anti-IPR arguments ignore politics 
and the context in which IPR reform occurs. When scholars, activists, or other 
commentators ignore the reasons countries adopt stronger IPR, the ancillary political and 
trade benefits that come with IPR reform, and the impact politics have on the 
implementation and enforcement of IPR, they miss critically important factors in 
understanding the relationship between IPR and human outcomes.  
In addition to a contribution to the political science literature and our collective 
understanding of the role IPR play in development, I believe this project has significant 
public policy implications, especially for developing countries. Sorting through 
competing theoretical arguments about how stronger IPR affect one’s country is a 
difficult task. Empirical evidence of the role IPR plays in human development will 
inform the public policy process and give developing countries important information. As 
developing countries face mounting pressure to strengthen their IPR, both from business 
interests within the country and political pressure from outside, understanding whether 
the benefits of strong IPR outweigh the costs may help them create IP regimes that meet 
their developmental needs. For instance, if strong IPR generate worse macro-level health, 
education, and inequality outcomes in least-developed countries but not in middle-
income and developed states, countries may postpone IPR reforms until they reach a 
certain level of development, and then adopt them eagerly. On the other hand, if the 
economic benefits outweigh the costs, even in the least developed nations, earlier 




1.2   Research Design 
 
 This project employs a mixed methodology, with three large-N statistical chapters 
and a detailed case study of the Kingdom of Jordan. The quantitative analysis allows me 
to explore the relationship between IPR and health, education, and inequality across a 
diverse group of countries at all levels of development. The goal for these chapters is to 
provide the first large-N analysis of this relationship, and to explore the balance between 
the benefits and costs of strong IPR in developed vs. developing states. As noted above, 
all existing research on the social and human impacts of IPR has come in the form of 
single case studies or anecdotal and descriptive evidence. The quantitative chapters bring 
a higher level of empirical rigor to the study of these relationships, and provide more 
generalizable conclusions.  
 The challenge for studying the impact of IPR on health, education, and inequality 
through statistical tools is that these relationships are theoretically complex, and large-N 
data on all the important intervening factors is limited. I discuss the data limitations in 
detail in each empirical chapter. As a result of these data limitations the quantitative 
chapters are suggestive rather than conclusive. I argue that one important factor 
intervening in the relationship between IPR and social outcomes is process. The process 
of IPR reform, the motivations behind IPR reform, and the institutions involved in the 
adoption and enforcement of IPR partially determine the extent to which stronger IPR 
negatively influence these outcomes. These factors are not captured in the large-N data 
that is available, and they are the focus of the case study in Chapter 6. The goal of the 
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case study is to bring politics back in, and to examine how the political context of IPR 
reform matters. To that end, I have selected the Kingdom of Jordan as an ideal case to 
examine. 
 Jordan is an appropriate case for a number of reasons. First, Jordan reformed its 
intellectual property law between 1997 and 2001. It was one of the first countries in the 
Middle East to adopt strong IP protections, and it made these reforms within a relatively 
short period of time. The condensed timeline makes it easier to examine the impact of 
IPR reform. Second, Jordan is a middle-income developing country. Many of those 
writing in the “access to medicines” and “access to knowledge” campaigns argue that 
strong IPR will have the largest negative impact on developing countries. Choosing a 
developing country for the test case allows for a “most likely” scenario, and avoids one 
potential line of criticism from IPR skeptics. Furthermore, one might argue that the least 
developed countries of the world have so little intellectual property to protect that any 
strengthening of IPR could only benefit foreign firms. As a middle income country 
Jordan has enough economic activity and knowledge economy to theoretically benefit 
from strong IPR. Finally, Jordan’s decision to strengthen its IPR law could have been 
endogenous or exogenous. The reforms came at a time when Jordan was making other 
economic reforms intended to stimulate economic growth and local industries. The 
choice to strengthen IPR could have been an economic decision meant to increase local 
innovation and foreign direct investment. At the same time, however, Jordan was in the 
process of joining the WTO and signing bilateral free trade agreements with the US and 
EU. The choice to strengthen IPR could equally have been a political decision 
acquiescing to the demands of powerful developed states. By examining the process of 
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IPR reform in Jordan, we can determine whether the impetus for IPR reform was, in fact, 
exogenous or endogenous, and whether the endogeneity of the decision affected the 
impact of IPR on health, education, and inequality.  Thus, examining Jordan will allow 
me to explore the process of IPR reform and the role of political and institutional factors. 
 
1.3   The Plan of this Study 
 
 In Chapter 2, I establish the theoretical links between intellectual property rights 
and human development, particularly regarding health, education, and inequality. I offer 
background on intellectual property rights; review the history of the development 
literature; discuss the developmental impacts of intellectual property rights and the 
determinants of public health, education, and income inequality; and provide a theoretical 
link between IPR and each set of outcomes. 
 Chapter 3 presents the statistical analysis for health. I explore the impact of IPR 
on two key indicators of health: life expectancy rates and mortality rates.  
 Chapter 4 presents the statistical analysis for education. Here, I examine the 
impact of IPR on three sets of educational outcomes for various levels of education: 
enrollments, school life expectancy, and completion rates. 
 Chapter 5 presents the statistical analysis for income inequality. I explore the 
impact of IPR on two measures of inequality: the Gini index and the Palma ratio. The 
Gini index is likely familiar to the reader, and the Palma ratio is a relatively new way to 
operationalize income inequality. The Palma ratio is the share of income held by the top 
10% of households to the share of the income held by the bottom 40% of households. In 
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the chapter I discuss the origin, construction, and theoretical significance of the Palma 
ratio as an inequality statistic.  
 In Chapter 6, I supplement the statistical models with a single case study. By 
examining IPR reform in Jordan, the chapter makes the case that the process of IPR 
reform, the political motivations behind reform, and the institutional players responsible 
for regulating and enforcing stronger IPR partially determine the impact of IPR on social 
outcomes. 
Chapter 7 concludes with a brief summary of the findings and recommendations 





Linking Intellectual Property Rights to Human Development 
 
This chapter focuses on the relationship between intellectual property rights and 
human development. Existing scholarly research offers two schools of thought regarding 
the role of intellectual property rights in the process of international development. On the 
one hand, economists and supporters of intellectual property rights argue that stronger 
IPR are a boon for economic development, and that developing countries would do well 
to adopt stronger intellectual property protections. On the other hand, some scholars, 
NGOs, and activists have been critical of intellectual property rights, arguing that 
stronger IPR are harmful to developing countries. While each side of the debate has 
offered some evidence in support of its position, there is too little dialogue between the 
schools of thought and too little empirical analysis to examine the true impact of IPR on 
health, education, and income inequality. The overall goal of this project is to fill that 
gap. 
This chapter examines the debate, setting the stage for the analysis that follows. I 
begin first with a discussion of the definition and history of intellectual property rights. 
The second section focuses on international development as a concept, the expansion of 
development to include social outcomes, and the history of scholarship on the topic. In 
the third section, I discuss what we currently know about the developmental impacts of 
intellectual property rights and the debate between IPR supporters and IPR skeptics 
which has taken place among policymakers, activists, industry leaders, and academics. 
The fourth section discusses what we know about the determinants of health, education, 
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and income inequality, the human development outcomes at the heart of the project. This 
information will be critical if I am to isolate the impact of IPR on each outcome. In the 
final section, I provide a theoretical link between IPR and each outcome from both the 
pro-IPR and anti-IPR perspectives.   
 
2.1   The Definition and History of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
 The term “intellectual property” refers to inventions, literary and artistic works, 
scientific discoveries, industrial designs, and trademarks. Intellectual property (IP) is 
generally divided into two categories. First, industrial property includes patents for 
inventions, trademarks, industrial designs, and geographic indications. Second, copyright 
covers literary works, films, music, artistic works, and architectural design. Intellectual 
property rights are legal protections that allow the inventors and creators of intellectual 
property to benefit from their own work or investment in a creation (WIPO 2004).  
 
2.1.1 Historical Notions of IP Rights 
 
Intellectual property rights have a long history. Some scholars point as far back as 
the first century Roman Empire, whose jurists publicly discussed notions of ownership 
for intellectual work, poetry, and art (Bugbee 1967). However the first modern patent 
system – one based on the objective evaluation of the novelty of an invention – dates 
back to the Venetian Republic in 1474 (Filippetti and Archibugi 2010). The British 
introduced patent laws in 1624 (The English Statute of Monopolies), the USA in 1836 
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(United States Patent Act), and the Germans in 1877 (the German Patent Act). Modern 
copyright law was also introduced first by the British in 1710 with the English Statute of 
Anne. IPR systems developed over time in Europe and America, but the spread of IPR 
law around the world truly began with the first two international conventions that 
recognized the importance of intellectual property: the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (1883) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (1886).2  
 
2.1.2 International IPR Governance and IPR Harmonization 
 
 The Paris Convention covered industrial property, including patents, trademarks, 
industrial designs, utility models, service marks, trade names, and geographical 
indications. The treaty provided that each contracting state must grant the same 
protection to nationals of other contracting states as it grants its own nationals – a 
principal known as national treatment. The Convention also provided for the right of 
priority in the case of patents, marks and industrial designs. When an inventor or creator 
files for a patent in one country, the right of priority grants them a period of time in 
which they may apply for protection in any other contracting country, guaranteeing that 
these subsequent applications will be considered as if they had been filed on the same day 
as the original filing. Finally, the convention lays down common rules for all contracting 
states regarding the process and granting of IP protections (Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property 1883).  
                                                          
2 For an exhaustive history of IPR, see (May and Sell 2006). 
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Similarly, the Berne Convention protected author’s rights over literary and artistic 
works. The Berne Convention established three basic principles of protection. The first is 
national treatment, as discussed above, which grants protection in all contracting states to 
works published in any contracting state. The second principal is known as automatic 
protection, which means that protection must not be conditional upon compliance with 
any formality. Works are protected by copyright as soon as they are created and must not 
be subject to any registration requirement. The third principal is known as independence 
of protection, which means that protection is not dependent on the existence of copyright 
protection in the country of origin of the work.  
In addition to these general principles, the Berne Convention establishes 
minimum standards giving exclusive rights to authors including the right to translate, the 
right to make adaptations, the right to perform in public, the right to recite, the right to 
communicate the work to the public, the right to broadcast the work, the right to make 
reproductions, and the right to use the work for audiovisual products. The Convention 
also provides for moral rights, or the right to claim authorship of the work. The 
Convention establishes the duration of protection to be 50 years after the author’s death, 
with some exceptions. Finally, the Convention allows for certain limitations of these 
rights, which would become the basis for future “fair use” policies (Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886). 
The Paris and Berne conventions established a baseline of protection for all types 
of intellectual property that was quite extensive, and these two conventions became the 
foundation on which the modern system of IPR is built. Both conventions have 
undergone several updates and revisions, and several new treaties have supplemented the 
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conventions. In 1893, the two secretariats set up to administer the Paris and Berne 
Conventions merged and formed the United International Bureaux for the Protection of 
Intellectual Property (BIRPI). In 1970 the BIRPI transformed into the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), which was given the mandate to promote the protection 
of intellectual property worldwide and ensure administrative cooperation among the 
intellectual property unions established by various international treaties (Convention 
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 1967). A few years 
later, in 1974, WIPO joined the United Nations as a specialized agency of the UN. In 
1978 the Patent Cooperation Treaty came into force, establishing a global patent filing 
system that allowed inventors and creators to file a single patent application and seek 
protection in over a hundred countries around the world (Patent Cooperation Treaty 
1978). Finally, the most recent development in the international IP regime is the 2007 
WIPO Development Agenda, which attempts to ensure that development issues are taken 
into consideration throughout WIPO’s work. WIPO is still in the process of fully 
implementing the Development Agenda, which focuses on providing technical assistance, 
capacity building, legislative and policy advice, and various IP strategies to developing 
countries.  
The evolution of the Paris and Berne conventions and the creation and 
development of WIPO has been a constant process of harmonization of IPR rules around 
the world. Rather than several IPR systems emerging to meet the needs of countries at 
various levels of development, the process has involved all countries adopting the same 
set of strong intellectual property protections. At the time they were adopted, these 
international IPR standards were not discussed widely among the population and average 
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citizens. IPR was viewed as an economic tool that would support innovation and allow 
industry to grow and internationalize, and little politics was involved in the creation of 
international IPR. 
Of course, politics has since entered the discussion, with economists and IPR 
supporters celebrating the convergence of IPR standards as a driver of economic growth 
and prosperity. Meanwhile, IPR skeptics criticize what they call a one-size-fits-all 
maximalist perspective on IPR that ignores the unique needs of developing nations. This 
debate over IPR runs throughout this project and is discussed more in section 2.3 of this 
chapter. 
 
2.1.3 IPR and TRIPS 
 
 Since 1994, WIPO has shared the international governance of intellectual 
property rights with the World Trade Organization. In the mid-1990s, when the global 
trading regime transitioned from the GATT to the WTO, the mandate and purview of the 
world’s multilateral trading system drastically widened. As a part of that process, 
negotiators at the Uruguay round crafted what has become the most significant piece of 
international public law governing intellectual property rights: the WTO’S Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The TRIPS agreement 
introduced IP rules into the multilateral trade regime for the first time. TRIPS covers 
several aspects of intellectual property, including how to give protection to intellectual 
property rights, how to enforce those rights, how to settle disputes between WTO 
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members, and how basic principles of the trading system and other IP agreements should 
be applied.  
TRIPS continued the harmonization process of IPR around the globe. All WTO 
members, including many that had never provided protection for intellectual property 
before, were required to do so. Developing countries were given extra time to come into 
compliance with the agreement, but by 2005 the requirements of TRIPS applied to all 
WTO member states. Much has been written about TRIPS, the powerful corporations of 
the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) of the WTO who are largely responsible for its 
existence, and its specific details and provisions (see for instance Correa 2000; Helfer 
2004; Matthews 2003; Yu 2006; Yusuf 2008).3 For our purposes it will suffice to say that 
TRIPS represents the first comprehensive and enforceable agreement on intellectual 
property, and it applies to a staggeringly diverse and increasingly comprehensive set of 
countries. 
Economists have examined the economic impact of IPR on developing countries 
for a long time. Recently, however, scholars have joined activists, NGOs, development 
agencies, and others in examining the human and social impact of IPR on developing 
countries. In the next section, I discuss the history of the development literature, and in 
the following section the developmental impacts of intellectual property rights.   
 
                                                          
3 See Braithwaite and Drahos. Global Business Regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
Also Sell. “TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines.” Liverpool Law Review. Vol. 28: 
41-75, 2007 and Sell. “The Quest for Global Governance in Intellectual Property and Public Health: 
Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions.” Temple Law Review. Vol. 77, 2004. 
 
As Susan Sell has noted, the Intellectual Property Committee, throughout the decade between 1985 and 
1995, included corporations such as Bristol-Myers Squibb, Digital Equipment Corporation, FMC, General 
Electric, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer, Procter & Gamble, Rockwell 
International, and Time Warner. See for more information: Sell. “TRIPS and the Access to Medicines 
Campaign.” Wisconsin Journal of International Law. Vol. 20, 2001-2002. 
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2.2   The Meaning and Measurement of “Development” 
 
If there ever was a cohesive academic field focused on the study of international 
development, it no longer exists. Over three decades ago, James Caporaso lamented, 
“Currently, the field of development is in disarray” (Caporaso 1980). That sentiment is 
even truer today. It would be impossible and unhelpful to attempt an exhaustive summary 
of the history of development studies. Instead, I will briefly discuss the history of the 
field as it moved from early development economics to a debate between modernization 
theory and dependency theory, and finally to a relative (Washington?) consensus under 
the moniker of neoclassicism. With that overall history in mind, I then discuss the more 
recent effort to broaden the research agenda beyond economic development to embrace 
‘human development’ and many non-economic objectives for developing countries.  
 A quick word about language is in order. The terms “neoclassicism” or 
“neoclassical economics” and “neoliberalism” are often confused or conflated. 
Neoclassical economics is a branch of economic theory that rejects the government 
interventionist policies of Keynesian economics and advocates for a return to the free 
market mentality of classical economic theory. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, has 
been used to refer to many different things. Typically, the term refers to a set of political 
economic policies that encourage free markets and limited government intervention, 
market liberalization, and free trade. Clearly these terms are related, and often they are 
used interchangeably. Other scholars treat “neoclassicism” as an economic theory and 
“neoliberalism” as a political theory, much like the difference between “socialism” and 
“communism”, where there political theory is essentially the implementation of the 
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economic theory. In this chapter, I use the term neoclassicism and neoclassical economics 
rather than neoliberalism. I do this primarily because I am situating the neoclassical 
consensus in the field of economics as a response to and in opposition to development 
economics built on Keynesian principles. That said, this economic consensus around free 
markets in developing countries is part and parcel to the neoliberal political consensus 
around free market policies, which we have often called the “Washington consensus.” In 
my opinion, the choice to use neoclassical rather than neoliberal is one of style rather 
than substance, but I want to be clear and consistent about the terminology used here.  
 
2.2.1 Development Economics 
 
 The field of development economics was the first systematic effort to address the 
situation of developing countries and explain why some countries remained poor while 
others became rich. Originating not in the developing world, but in the West among 
economists writing in the Keynesian tradition, development economics proposed that less 
developed countries were fundamentally different from developed countries and operated 
according to different economic principles. Rather than functioning according to classical 
economics, developing countries had excessive labor, low productivity, and subsistence 
wages that kept them from competing on the open market with more developed nations 
(A. W. Lewis 1954; Mandelbaum 1945; Nurkse 1953; Rosenstein-Rodan 1943). The 
inability of the least developed countries to compete with the industrialized world led 
development economists to recommend interventionist government policies in the 
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developing world with protectionist trade policies and import-substitution strategies to 
build productive capacity and protect native companies.4 
 Paul Rosenstein-Rodan advocated a world-wide development strategy which he 
called the “Big Push” – an effort to catapult the developing world through the various 
barriers to economic development and help them catch up with the rest of the world 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1943). This policy would encourage not only the interventionist state 
role within developing countries, but also a pro-development agenda amongst the 
already-developed countries. Rich countries would provide large foreign aid packages 
and assistance, as well as favorable terms of trade. The big push optimistically assumed 
that it was in everyone’s interest to promote development, and that the industrialized 
world would embrace the endeavor. 
 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, import-substitution policies had failed to 
generate substantial economic growth in the countries where they were implemented, and 
economists began looking for alternatives to development economics. The transition from 
the 60s to the 70s saw an evolution within economics of both theory and methodology. 
Formalization and econometric analysis began to replace the historical and descriptive 
writing of many development scholars such as Arthur Lewis and Albert Hirschman, 
while at the same time economic theory began to move away from the Keynesian 





                                                          
4 For the counter-argument, see (Gerschenkron 1962) on the advantages of “backwardness”. 
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2.2.2 Modernization Theory and Dependency Theory 
 
As development economics was on the downward arc in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, another economic school of thought developed around Walt Rostow’s theories, 
formalized in his 1960 book The Stages of Economic Growth (Rostow 1960). 
Modernization theory’s main point of departure from development economics was in 
treating all economies the same, under the rules of classical economics, rather than as 
fundamentally different types operating under different economic rules.  
Modernization theory argues that “development” is a process of moving from 
traditional society to modern society, and from traditional modes of economic activity to 
modern ones (Apter 1967; Eisenstadt 1966; Lerner 1958; McClelland 1967; Rostow 
1960). Through efficient production, free enterprise, and free trade, traditional societies 
would move down a linear path of development and eventually “take off” and catch up to 
the rich world. As was the case with development economics, modernization theory 
imagines an important role for the state in the process of development. Unlike 
development economics, however, modernization theory does not require fundamentally 
different economic policies in developing countries. The role and responsibility of the 
developed world is to provide expert advice, aid, and the ‘missing components’ of 
development such as capital and FDI, to assist in the process of modernization.  
 It is important to note that few adherents to modernization theory would self-
identify as part of this school. In many ways, modernization theory is an umbrella 
concept scholars have adopted, and under which we have placed various scholars who 
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may or may not welcome the label, so that we might compare them to a second school of 
thought: dependency theory. 
 While modernization theory operates at the domestic level of analysis, locating 
the cause of underdevelopment in the economic conditions of traditional societies, 
dependency theory locates the cause of underdevelopment at the international level. The 
dependency literature is large and diverse, but most dependency theorists suggest that the 
international capitalist system is to blame for underdevelopment (F. H. Cardoso 1979; 
Gunder Frank 1967; Palma 1978; Prebisch 1950). As Thomas Shannon puts it, 
dependency theorists argue that underdevelopment “is not a stalled stage of linear 
development” but rather a result of exploitation of the poor nations of the world by the 
rich (Shannon 1989). 
 Dependency theory has its roots in radical theory and Lenin’s critique of 
imperialism, but many dependency scholars have gone on to account for more recent 
developments (see for instance Kegley and Blanton 2010). Dependency theory is a much 
more diverse literature with lively debates between liberal reformers, Marxists, and 
World Systems Theorists. While no unified theory of dependency exists, most 
dependency theorists argue that the economic development of a state is due – at least in 
part – to outside political and economic influences, including other countries, 
multinational corporations, and global economic institutions. Most dependency theories 
also focus on the division of the world into rich countries and poor countries, and a 
persistent pattern of international economic behavior that reinforces rather than mitigates 
international inequality. Post-colonial developing nations have inherited a situation in 
which they export natural resources and raw materials while importing finished goods, 
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which leads to an economy that produces primary products with many competitors and 
limited demand. At the same time, multinational corporations from the developed world 
co-opt leaders and business elites in developing countries and aid in the rich world’s 
exploitation of the developing world. These trends create and maintain a system of 
dependence that help the rich get richer while the poor remain poor. 
 Immanuel Wallerstein blends dependency theory with Marxism to create World-
System Theory. Maintaining a focus on the world capitalist system and division of labor, 
Wallerstein describes the international system as containing three structural positions: an 
industrialized core of strong, industrialized, capitalist states; a periphery of weak states 
producing unfinished goods with low-skill, low-wage labor; and a semi-periphery in 
between of states attempting to move from the periphery into the core (Wallerstein 1974).  
 Modernization theory and dependency theory thus offer competing worldviews 
and competing theories about the root causes of underdevelopment and potential 
solutions for the developing world. Modernization theory offers a domestic-level, 
economic, and generally optimistic account where developing countries move along a 
linear path toward development. Meanwhile, dependency theory offers an international-
level, political and economic, generally pessimistic account of the rich world maintaining 
a system of exploitative dominance over the developing world.  While most of the 
scholarship and debate happens within each of these disparate schools of thought, a larger 






2.2.3 The Neoclassical Consensus 
 
The debate between modernization theory and dependency theory continues 
today, especially in the disciplines of political science and sociology. Within the field of 
economics, however, a relative consensus has emerged in the last few decades around a 
neoclassical model of development. According to neoclassical theory, underdevelopment 
is the result of government policies that distort economic incentives and inhibit market 
forces, which if left alone would lead to economic growth. While the early field of 
development economics blamed market failures for underdevelopment, neoclassical 
theorists point to government failures. Bad government policies have led to high inflation 
rates, large government debts, a lack of entrepreneurship, outright corruption, and the 
distortion of market incentives (Little 1982).  
While the modernization literature finds some of its roots in neoclassical 
economic theory, it is important to distinguish modernization theory from neoclassical 
approaches to development. The main difference involves the role of the state. Where 
modernization theory imagines a strong state with a technocratic bureaucracy pushing 
economic policies that will lead to development, neoclassical theory fundamentally 
rejects state intervention and points to government policies as the problem rather than the 
solution. For neoclassical theory, the best thing a developing country government can do 
is step aside, open markets, and reduce regulation. If they do so, economic growth will 





2.2.4 Human Development 
  
 The vast majority of scholarship on development through the late 1980s shared a 
singular focus on national income (or income per capita) as the variable of interest. 
Economic growth, understood as income growth, was assumed to be the end goal for 
developing countries and the factor most likely to improve the quality of life and living 
conditions in the developing world. Frustrated with this focus on income, Pakistani 
economist Mahbub ul Haq and others formulated an alternate approach to development at 
the United Nations that has become known as the Human Development Approach.  
 As of 1990, this concept of development has been used to produce annual human 
development reports under the auspices of the UN Development Program (UNDP). Nobel 
laureate Amartya Sen, as well as colleagues and students of Sen, have been at the 
forefront of scholarship on human development, focusing on human capabilities and 
freedoms that promote individual agency in the developing world. As Sen has put it, 
“Human development, as an approach, is concerned with what I take to be the basic 
development idea: namely, advancing the richness of human life, rather than the richness 
of the economy in which human beings live, which is only a part of it” (UNDP). 
 As part of the human development approach and through the human development 
report program, UNDP has created several composite indices that can be used as 
dependent or independent variables in the study of development. Created by Mahbub ul 
Haq and Amartya Sen, and introduced in the 1990 Human Development Report, the 
original index is the human development index (HDI), a composite measure of income, 
education, and health.  
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 Scholarship on human development has continued to evolve and spread, creating 
a diverse and growing subset of the development literature. What this body of work 
shares is the belief that a strict definition of development that looks only at income, or 
even at economic growth alone, does not provide sufficient insight into the process and 
challenges of development.  
 
2.2.5 Defining Development for This Project 
 
Of course it matters which definition of development one uses. Each 
understanding of development prescribes a different set of government and economic 
policies intended to generate growth. Each theory of development also understands the 
role of intellectual property rights in different ways. Development economists writing in 
the Keynesian tradition in the 1940s-1960s did not focus on intellectual property rights, 
but with their emphasis on protectionist trade policies, the protection of native industry, 
and import-substitution strategies, we can speculate on their view. Intellectual property 
rights would be seen by most in this school as a threat to developing states. Countries at 
lower levels of development do not generate significant intellectual property of their own, 
so strong IPR regimes are likely to benefit foreign firms more than domestic ones. As 
countries develop, this calculation shifts, but for most developing countries the 
Keynesian development economist would view strong IPR as a net negative. Dependency 
theorists are also likely to hold negative views of IPR, considering them a tool by which 
capitalist states keep poor countries dependent on innovations and products from the rich 
world. On the other hand, neoclassical theory (and modernization theory, which is 
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generally neoclassical in orientation) views IPR as an important economic tool for 
countries at all levels of development. Since neoclassicists argue that all countries require 
the same economic policies to generate growth, they view strong IPR as a benefit to even 
the least developed states. It is no surprise, then, that the push for harmonization of IPR 
across the world in the latter part of the 20th century has come on the heels of the 
neoclassical triumph in mainstream economic theory and in the global institutions 
responsible for trade and development.  
 It also matters whether one adopts a view of development that focuses exclusively 
on economic growth or a view that includes human and social outcomes as core measures 
of development. This project embraces the expanded definition that includes both 
economic and human development. If we are concerned about both economic and human 
development, we need a more nuanced view of the role of IPR. It is entirely possible that 
strong IPR are both good and bad for developing countries, and our focus should be on 
the balance between the positive and negative impacts of strong IPR on developing 
countries. To that end, the following section examines the developmental impacts of IPR 
through two narratives found in the literature: one that argues for strong IPR, and a 
second that argues against strong IPR.  
 
2.3   The Developmental Impacts of Intellectual Property Protection 
 
 Scholars, NGOs, and journalists have examined the impact of IPR on developing 
countries for many years. The existing literature on this issue can be viewed through two 
narratives: the first an optimistic view of stronger IPR as a tool for economic 
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development, and the second a pessimistic view of IPR as a barrier to human 
development. By and large, these two narratives have been presented as opposing 
viewpoints, but there has been very little direct dialogue between the schools of thought. 
The proponents of stronger IPR point to economic theory and some empirical support to 
show that IPR are powerful economic tools, but for the most part the empirics come from 
the developed world and focus exclusively on economic variables. The opponents of 
stronger IPR generally point to single-case descriptive examples of developing countries 
being harmed by IPR, focusing almost exclusively on social / human variables. What is 
missing is a large-N empirical examination of which narrative holds true for the majority 
of countries at all levels of development.  
It may also be the case that both narratives are true: stronger IPR may lead to 
economic growth while also hurting health and education outcomes. If there is such a 
tradeoff in which IPR are good for the economy but bad for human development, our 
focus must be on determining which side of the tradeoff is more important in the short 
and long term. This project seeks to fill some of these gaps. In this section, I briefly 
review the two opposing sides and their main arguments. 
An important caveat is needed. There is and has always been healthy debate not 
only between these theoretical approaches, but also within each school of thought. Within 
each approach scholars disagree on how IPR functions and how it impacts health, 
education, and inequality. The framework of two competing narratives is useful as a 
heuristic device, but it should not be mistaken for an argument that these two camps are 




2.3.1 Narrative I: IPR Are Good for Development 
 
For the most part, support for strong IPR has come from economists. This should 
hardly be surprising, given the fact that IPR regimes are fundamentally economic tools. 
They have two main functions: to promote investment in the development of new 
technology and to promote the dissemination of technology by encouraging producers to 
make their products and processes available to the public (Maskus 2000a, 2000b). 
Most economists make a theoretical case in support of IPR as a boon for 
development (for instance, Grossman and Helpman 1992; E. Helpman 1993; Mansfield 
1994; K. Maskus and Penubarti 1995; K. Maskus 2000; Schneider 2005). They focus on 
IPR as a driver of local innovation and an impetus for technology transfer through trade, 
foreign direct investment, and licensing of technology. Each of these benefits of IPR will 
lead to economic growth, as innovation, technology, and investment are used to increase 
economic activity and boost productivity. Since most economists view IPR as universally 
good for an economy, there is little discussion of potential negative impacts from “too 
much” IPR, or even a “sufficient” level of IPR. Instead, most economists argue what we 
might call “full protection” of IPR along the standards enshrined in the international IPR 
treaties discussed above.  
Since many developing countries lack domestic capacity for large scale 
innovation, IPR could benefit the developing world by encouraging research on products 
uniquely beneficial to the global South (Chen and Puttitanun 2005). Empirical tests of the 
impact of IPR on GDP/capita growth (Ginarte and Park 1997; Gould and Gruben 1996; 
Thompson and Rushing 1996, 1999), and foreign direct investment (Mansfield 1994; 
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Maskus 1998; Schneider 2005) generally confirm the positive relationship hypothesized 
between IPR strength and economic development.  
 
2.3.2 Narrative II: IPR Are Bad for Development 
 
Despite the Western economic orthodoxy in support of IPR, some economists 
have identified negative impacts. Strong IPR tend to increase the cost of imitation, a main 
economic driver in developing countries. Most least-developed countries have little 
intellectual property to protect since they have few resources available to spend on 
research and innovation. As a result, most domestic manufacturing is of products that 
imitate higher-quality imports (Maskus 2000b). As a result, countries at lower levels of 
development have usually preferred weaker intellectual property protections. As 
countries develop and begin creating their own intellectual property, domestic firms 
begin pushing for stronger IPR protections. 
Strong IPR can also lead to monopolistic behavior by foreign firms (Maskus 
2000a, 2000b). When developing countries lack the ability to produce domestic 
competitors to critical imported goods, foreign firms enjoy monopoly power in the 
market. Stronger IP regimes can strengthen the market power of ‘Northern’ innovating 
firms and raise prices in developing countries on patented products and products that 
depend on patented processes and/or inputs (Chen and Puttitanun 2005). 
In recent years, some political economists and political scientists, as well as 
international advocacy organizations, have joined the discussion, bringing new 
theoretical perspectives to the literature. Several scholars have framed the discussion in 
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terms of human rights (Cooper Dreyfuss 2010; Gana 1996; Helfer 2006; Okediji 2007; 
Walker 2001; P. K. Yu 2007).5 Much of this work looks to a human rights framework as 
a way to push back against IP regimes that are seen as detrimental to human 
development. An early treatment of the relationship by Ruth Gana is couched in the 
language of dependency theory (Gana 1996). Not only is Gana skeptical of intellectual 
property regulation, but she also frames the more general notion of technology transfer as 
being detrimental to development, suggesting it allows the owners of intellectual goods to 
control access to knowledge while extracting huge transactions costs and licensing fees. 
The promised fruits of this process – domestic innovation – were never realized. Gana 
frames the global movement to reform intellectual property rights as taking place within a 
colonial-development agenda that depicts development as linear with a specific model of 
IP protection that is a necessary condition for growth. 
Dependency theory is not a requirement, however, for a human rights approach to 
intellectual property. Simon Walker, former human rights officer at the UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, offers a slightly different argument focused on 
the impact of IPR on HIV/AIDS treatment (Walker 2001). Walker views HIV/AIDS as a 
drain on society’s productivity and resources, as households caring for sick family 
members see a reduction in income. The disease has also led to an erosion of the supply 
of teachers in many societies, and there is a similar link to health, agriculture, and 
business, as community leaders fall sick and die at alarming rates. IP policy that limits 
HIV/AIDS treatment may well contribute to these problems. 
Most of the literature linking IPR and human rights shares an emphasis on 
balancing the right to IP with a “right to development.” The authors all focus on self-
                                                          
5 See Okediji 2007 for a more complete review of the literature on human rights and intellectual property. 
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determination and a set of social objectives that they argue should be put at the same 
level of importance as economic objectives. While this body of work contributes to the 
discussion of IPR and development, each author stops short of any empirical evaluation 
of the impact of IPR on the social objectives they champion. 
Additionally, a great deal of work has been done on two particular social issues: 
access to essential medicines, and access to knowledge. These two research agendas 
argue that stronger IPR limit developing country access to life saving drugs and 
educational materials. 
Led by a network of NGOs including Oxfam International and Médecins Sans 
Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), as well as several key academics, the access to 
medicines campaign contends that IPR have been used to protect pharmaceutical profits 
at the expense of the developing world’s ability to acquire and use lifesaving drugs at 
affordable prices (F. M. Abbott 2005; Correa 2006; Malpani 2007; Sell 2001, 2004, 
2007).6 In particular, this literature focuses on the flexibilities built into the TRIPS 
agreement. These flexibilities would ostensibly allow developing countries to override 
pharmaceutical patents in the event of a public health emergency (such as the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic) or for public non-commercial use (such as government treatment programs). 
The access to medicines campaign has focused much attention on efforts by the United 
States and other developed countries to prevent the exercise of such flexibilities. 
Developed/innovating countries have done this by pushing IPR regulation that goes 
beyond TRIPS in regional and bilateral free trade agreements and through direct political 
                                                          
6 The access to medicines literature is large and sprawling, so these are just a few of the more important and 
more academic contributions. A more complete set of the NGO resources and publications can be found 
through the websites of Essential Action (http://www.essentialaction.org/access/), Oxfam International 
(http://www.oxfamamerica.org/campaigns/access-to-medicines), and MSF (http://www.msfaccess.org/).  
34 
 
pressure (TRIPS-Plus legislation). While this literature contributes to the conversation 
and highlights an important social and public health consequence of strengthened IPR, 
the work done by these authors does not offer systematic empirical evidence to 
demonstrate negative impacts of IPR regimes. The scholarship also does not make 
explicit links back to development at large to make claims about broader public health 
outcomes. 
The Access to Knowledge (A2K) campaign grew out of and has built upon the 
successes of the access to medicines campaign. A2K scholars maintain a focus on 
intellectual property, but switch from examining patents to a concern over copyright. 
Noting that education is a critical element of human development, A2K scholars argue 
that education, especially in the developing world, is hindered by limited access to 
educational materials (Chon 2005; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002; 
Nicholson 2006; Rens, Prabhala, and Kawooya 2006). To be sure, copyright is only one 
factor affecting access to educational materials, but in many cases it is an important 
factor. Likewise, IPR law is just one element of a country’s overall copyright 
environment, which also includes copyright-related practices, regulations, policies, cases 
and judicial attitudes (Schonwetter et al. 2010). Copyright grants exclusive rights to 
produce and distribute protected material. This is the case in all countries, however it 
creates a particularly acute situation in the developing world, where only a few firms 
control the market for educational resources. This leads to a situation of excessive pricing 
of textbooks and other material, resulting in a lack of affordability and limited access 
(Rens, Prabhala, and Kawooya 2006). 
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In addition to high prices, copyright protections contribute to unavailability and 
unsuitability of educational materials. Many developing countries provide such a limited 
market for educational resources that copyright holders lack the market incentive to 
provide their products at any price. Similarly, many citizens of developing countries are 
fluent only in indigenous languages. Already small markets become even smaller when 
local translations are needed. Copyright holders have little incentive to translate their 
product into local and regional languages, leading to a lack of suitable educational 
resources in many places (Rens, Prabhala, and Kawooya 2006). 
Scholars have also examined the relationship between IPR and the third social 
outcome: income inequality. Most of this work has been theoretical, with only a few 
empirical analyses. The theoretical work hypothesizes a few mechanisms by which 
stronger IPR could lead to worsened income inequality in developing countries. Stronger 
patent protections can worsen inequality by increasing the return to research and 
development and thus the wages of R&D workers, who are mostly skilled labor (Cozzi 
and Galli 2011). Stronger IPR may also increase income inequality indirectly through 
differences in income growth rates. Stronger IPR may lead to economic growth, and 
higher growth rates are associated with higher real interest rates. Higher interest rates 
increase the return on assets, and a higher return on assets benefits asset-wealthy 
households relative to asset-poor households. This leads to higher income growth for the 
rich and lower income growth for the poor (Chu and Peng 2009). 
To my knowledge there are only two empirical studies of the relationship between 
IPR and income inequality. Samuel Adams (2008) examined a cross section of 62 
developing countries from 1985 – 2001 and found that strengthening of IPR was 
36 
 
positively correlated with income inequality. That is to say, ceteris paribus, developing 
countries with stronger IPR have worse levels of income inequality (Adams 2008). 
Similarly, Swati Saini and Meeta Mehra (2014) examined 65 developed and developing 
countries from 1995-2001 and also found a positive relationship between stronger IPR 
and income inequality. They suggest that stronger IPR increased both the demand for and 
wages of skilled workers relative to unskilled labor, thus aggravating income inequality. 
They also found this impact was strongest in developing countries experiencing high 
growth rates. For the developed countries in the study, the opposite effect was present. 
Stronger IPR were associated with less income inequality (Saini and Mehra 2014).  
We are therefore left with the question: which narrative is correct? If both are 
right, which is more important for developing countries? I take at face value the 
economic argument that IPR facilitate foreign direct investment and technology transfer, 
and ultimately aid in economic growth. Economic theory on IPR clearly suggests a 
positive relationship between strengthening IPR and growth, and the empirical evidence 
of this relationship is compelling, although not conclusive. This project focuses instead 
on the human development impacts of IPR, and in particular on public health and 
education outcomes, as well as income inequality, which I argue is a third element of 
human development that is both important and closely related to the other two. In order to 
isolate the impact of IPR on health, education, and inequality, it is important to 






2.4   The Determinants of Public Health, Education, and Income Inequality 
 
 Turning attention to the human development outcomes at the heart of this project, 
the logical place to being is with a discussion of what we know about the determinants of 
public health, education, and income inequality. With a big picture understanding of the 
various factors affecting these social outcomes, the following chapters attempt to control 
for several key determinants in order to isolate the impact of IPR on each social outcome.  
 
2.4.1 Public Health 
 
Health outcomes and healthcare systems have been discussed in the development 
field since its beginning, and conventional wisdom held that public health outcomes were 
a function of the level of development in a given country. As nations developed, they 
would expect to see higher levels of overall health and wellbeing. The 2001 World 
Health Organization’s Commission on Macroeconomics and Health turned that accepted 
view on its head. The Commission argued that good health was not only a benefit of 
development, but that it was also indispensable to development (WHO 2001). Given this 
mutually reinforcing relationship, understanding the determinants of public health 
outcomes has been an important objective of development scholars.  
Early efforts operated at an individual level of analysis and focused on individual 
socioeconomic status as the principle driver of health in the developing world 
(Antonovsky 1967; Carroll, Smith, and Bennett 1996; Grosse 1980; Lynch 1996; Lynch 
et al. 1994; M. G. Marmot et al. 1991). Family incomes and educational attainment of the 
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parents – especially maternal education – were seen as the primary determinants of infant 
and child health. One’s own individual income level and educational attainment were 
seen as the primary determinants of adult health. Empirical evidence was scarce and 
contradictory, but until very recently most research focused on individual socioeconomic 
status. 
Several studies pointed to specific issues beyond socioeconomic status as primary 
factors, including the quality of basic infrastructure, the delivery of low cost technologies 
(Jamison and Mosley 1991), and maternal literacy (Grosse and Auffrey 1989). More 
recently, the WHO and several affiliated scholars have championed a social set of 
determinants of health (M. Marmot 2005; M. Marmot et al. 2008; M. Marmot and 
Wilkinson 1999; Wilkinson and Marmot 2003). Led by the WHO’s Commission on the 
Social Determinants of Health, this body of research argues that regardless of income, or 
at all levels of income, health follows a social gradient. The Commission identified a set 
of daily living conditions and power relationships that impact public health. Daily living 
conditions include early childhood development and education, living and working 
conditions, social protection policies, conditions for a flourishing older life, the 
environment, and social stratification (which determines differential access to and 
utilization of healthcare).  
Harder to define and measure, power relationships with distributional 
consequences include legitimacy and support for civil society, an accountable private 
sector, public interest and investment in collective action, gender equity, and 
empowerment and voice for all citizens (M. Marmot et al. 2008).  
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Related to the social determinants literature, recent work by Ronald Labonte 
focuses on globalization’s impact on health (Labonte 2009). The author identifies five 
main drivers of health outcomes, including (1) material deprivation (household income, 
income stability, inequality, education, access to services, demographic factors, and 
environmental contaminants); (2) progress in health technology (Labonte suggests this is 
proxied by coverage rate of immunization, oral rehydration, clinic-based delivery, and 
access to fresh water); (3) acute psychosocial stress (from social upheavals, 
unemployment, inability to fulfill ones obligations, changes in social hierarchy, 
widowhood/divorce/distress migration); (4) unhealthy lifestyles (including smoking, 
alcohol, and excess salt and saturated fat); and (5) income inequality, hierarchy, and 
social disintegration (factors that erode social cohesion, a lack of which hurts the 
diffusion of medical information, collective action, and taxation for the purposes of 
public health).  
The literature on the determinants of health outcomes in developing countries thus 
offers a set of factors this project attempts to account for in order to measure the effect of 
IPR on public health. To be sure, I will need to control for income and education, factors 
long associated with health status. To the extent they can be operationalized, controls for 
social determinants are also included in the analysis. Luckily, many of these factors will 
easily be controlled for by country fixed effects, since they do not change over time 
within a country, but others do change over time. In the analyses I report and the 
robustness checks I discuss, I have controlled for as many determinants of health 






In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, a small body of research that focused on the 
economic benefits of education in the United States was linked with literature on 
economic development, allowing scholars to talk about education’s impact on economic 
growth (Barro 1991; Lucas 1988; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992). As a result, many 
scholars began to argue that investment in education should be a policy priority in the 
developing world (Becker 1995; Hanushek 1995; UNDP 1990; World Bank 2001). For 
all countries, improved education brings a litany of benefits to society, including literacy, 
numeracy, scientific knowledge, thinking skills, social skills, personal and community 
values, and a level of prestige (Glewwe 2002). Most, if not all of these benefits have clear 
economic effects, allowing for higher worker productivity and economic efficiency, and 
allowing developing countries to take advantage of their stock of human capital. 
Drivers of educational outcomes in the developing world come from both the 
supply side and the demand side. The demand for education changes when households 
stop sending children to school because of cost/benefit calculations, economic 
constraints, perceptions of educational quality, gender issues, and accessibility of school 
facilities (Boissiere 2004). The supply side includes community and school factors that 
affect educational quality, including societal structure, community resources, school 
policies, educational resources, and school organization (Buchmann and Hannum 2001). 
The Coleman Report in the United States and the Plowden Report in the United 
Kingdom together created controversy by suggesting, for the first time, that demand-side 
factors – specifically family socioeconomic status – were more important than supply-
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side factors (Coleman and et. al. 1966; Peaker 1971). Conventional wisdom in the US 
and UK had been that school quality was the main driver of educational outcomes. These 
reports led to several articles examining determinants of education in developed and 
developing countries, with empirical support going both ways. Studying Uganda, Stephen 
Heyneman found that socioeconomic status was less important in Uganda than in the US 
in determining educational quality (Heyneman 1976). More recently, Deon Filmer and 
Lant Pritchett found support for the idea that household income is a good predictor of 
educational attainment across 35 developing countries (Filmer and Pritchett 1999). 
In addition to socioeconomic status, important demand-side factors include family 
structure and size, and family decision-making processes (Buchmann and Hannum 2001). 
For developing countries, female-headed households generally enjoy higher levels of 
educational attainment, and counter-intuitively, large families and families with more 
siblings also experience better educational outcomes. These results are consistent across a 
range of developing countries, but the relationships are opposite those in developed 
countries, where smaller families and male-headed households experience better 
educational results (Buchmann and Hannum 2001).  Family decision-making processes 
also seem to be important in the developing world, as some parents hold beliefs and 
preferences about childhood education that privilege male offspring over females. 
On the supply-side, World Bank researchers have identified five principal 
contributors to effective education in developing countries: (1) curriculum, (2) learning 
materials, (3) instructional time, (4) classroom teaching, and (5) students’ learning 
capacities (Boissiere 2004). Alternatively, Glewwe identifies just three key drivers of 
educational outcomes: the availability of textbooks, the use of educational radio, and the 
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reduction of class size (Glewwe 2002). Finally, in their review of the existing literature, 
Buchmann and Hannum conclude that material inputs such as textbooks, libraries, and 
teacher training have a big effect on educational outcomes, while more expensive inputs 
(such as science labs) and increasing teacher salary have lesser effects (Buchmann and 
Hannum 2001).  
Many of these supply-side factors are difficult to measure. For a project like this, 
where the analysis is happening at the country level, many supply-side factors will be all 
but impossible to include as control variables. Curriculum and instructional time, for 
instance, vary at the individual school or classroom level, and country-level data will not 
be available. To some extent, educational spending can serve as a proxy, as discussed 
later. Despite this limitation, we can identify several country-level demand and supply-
side determinants that are worth controlling for in order to isolate the impact of IPR on 
educational outcomes. These controls are discussed in greater detail in chapter four. 
 
2.4.3 Income Inequality 
 
Scholars have long studied the relationship between income inequality and 
economic development. The classical treatment of the relationship within the field of 
economics comes from Simon Kuznets, who suggested that inequality follows an inverse-
U shaped relationship as GDP increases. As an economy develops, Kuznets argued, 
inequality would first increase and then decrease over time, the hypothetical ‘Kuznets 
Curve’ (Adelman and Morris 1973; Loehr and Powelson 1981). While other economists 
have disputed the nature of this relationship (see, for instance, Bruno, Ravallion, and 
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Squire 1996), there is general consensus that income inequality is affected by economic 
development and has profound implications for countries at all levels of development. 
Both inflation and unemployment are associated with higher levels of income 
inequality (Birdsall 1998; E. Cardoso and Urani 1995), and several scholars argue that 
globalization and the spread of liberal economic policies also contribute to increased 
inequality in developing countries (Hurrell and Woods 1995; Reich 1992; Tonelson 
2000). As the movement of goods and capital around the globe increases, there is an 
increased separation between those who are well positioned to gain from globalization 
and those whose status is undermined by the process. In particular, increased trade and 
the liberalization of financial markets lead to higher levels of inequality while 
governments are powerless to help because they need to retain their position in export 
and capital markets, leading to what some have called a “race to the bottom” (Mishra 
1999; Page 1997). Whether or not this race to the bottom has been happening is the topic 
of much debate in the literature (Basinger and Hallerberg 2004; Davies and Vadlamannati 
2013; Holzinger and Sommerer 2011; Konisky 2007; Mehmet and Tavakoli 2003).  
Similarly, financial market liberalization privileges those with high incomes who 
have more to invest. At the same time, private businesses may find it necessary to trim 
wages and benefits to retain access to competitive global financial markets. All the while, 
financial openness allows footloose capital to avoid taxation, placing more of the burden 
of social programs on low-income groups (Galbraith 2000; Garrett 1996; Huber and 
Stephens 2001; Swank 1998). Many economists reject this scenario, arguing that 
economic integration and economic liberalism serve as powerful engines for growth that 
benefit all income groups: the proverbial “rising tide that lifts all boats” (Bhagwati 1997; 
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Burtless et al. 1998; Lawrence 1996). In fact, among a majority of economists, a 
consensus has formed in support of convergence theory: the idea that growth leads to a 
shrinking of inequality, both within and between countries (Baumol 1986; De Long 1988; 
Romer 1994; B. R. Scott 2001). 
Even if neoliberal policies and economic globalization bring negative effects, 
there is always potential for redistribution to mitigate the impact on low-income and low-
skilled workers (Pieterse 2002; Sen 1999). Thus, when discussing inequality, many 
scholars point to factors such as the strength of unions, political institutions and regime 
type, and participation in the democratic process. The presence and strength of unions 
and other labor organizations appears in many treatments of inequality, since these 
institutions are more likely to favor social spending that benefits low income groups 
(Freeman 1993; Glaeser 2005; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999). Likewise, political 
institutions may affect inequality in significant ways. In general, democracies foster an 
environment where social activists and peripheral groups can participate in the process 
and affect resource distribution (Bhagwati 1998). Proportional representation systems 
may allow the election of representatives that focus specifically on the needs of the poor, 
while majoritarian systems generally cater to the median voter, thus countries with 
proportional representation may experience less inequality than their majoritarian 
counterparts (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002; Persson and Tabellini 2005). 
The ideology of parties in power also matters, as leftist parties typically consider 
distributive issues as important, although researchers caution that party ideology matters 
only in the short term (Huber and Stephens 2001; Swank 2002). Similarly, participation 
in national elections can influence inequality. Low turnout due to economic constraints or 
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a lack of mobilization often disadvantages low-income groups (Lijphart 1997; Mahler 
2002). 
Some scholars have also suggested that understanding inequality requires us to 
examine the reasons governments and societies invest in their children and the poor. 
Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser argue that ethnic heterogeneity leads to more 
redistribution and investment in education, which shrinks the gap between the rich and 
poor (Alesina and Glaeser 2005). In a similar argument, several scholars point to social 
cohesion and class relations as principal determinants of inequality (C. Muntaner and 
Lynch 1999; Navarro 1999; Scambler and Higgs 1999). Finally, several sociologists 
point to long-term structural and institutional changes resulting from industrialization as 
causes of inequality, such as the spread of education, the rise of democratic government, 
and the distribution of labor in various sectors. Several studies show that secondary 
school enrollment (the spread of education) and a higher percentage of labor in 
agriculture tend to decrease income inequality. Likewise, the rate of population growth 
tends to increase income inequality (Alderson and Nielsen 1999; Nielsen 1994). 
As stated above, the literature provides a long list of potential causes of income 
inequality in the developing world. Chapter 5 attempts to control for many of these 
factors, although we simply do not have sufficient data on all of them. Luckily many of 
these factors, such as ethnic heterogeneity, change little over time within countries, 






2.5   Linking IPR to Public Health, Education, and Income Inequality 
 
Given the above discussion of the meaning and measurement of development, the 
current literature on the relationship between IPR and development, and the current 
literature on the determinants of public health, education, and income inequality, what 
remains is to bring these insights together into a cohesive theory about the impact of IPR 
on human development, and on these three social outcomes in particular. This is the 
theory I seek to describe and test. 
 
2.5.1 Public Health and IPR 
 
Perhaps the most direct and potentially harmful impact of IPR on human 
development involves public health outcomes. The key causal mechanism involves 
prices. Stronger protections of patents will increase the cost of essential medicines, as 
well as medical equipment and the technological infrastructure necessary for delivering 
healthcare. For societies that already struggle to afford public health initiatives, these 
price increases can be detrimental to medical access and an array of health outcomes.  
A potential counter-argument would be that IPR will spur domestic innovation, 
which should provide for better healthcare. In fact the WHO’s Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) pointed out that 
strong IP protections should provide an incentive for innovation in developing countries, 
promote domestic and foreign investment in innovation, facilitate the transfer of health-
related technology to the developing world, and improve the availability of medicines 
needed to combat diseases in poor countries (Satyanarayana and Srivastava 2007).  
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However, there has been little empirical evidence to suggest that this is the case. 
Most developing countries lack the capacity for innovation and the resources for research 
and development, while foreign firms tend to target research and development to the 
needs of rich societies. While some progress has been made developing the workforce 
and knowledge base for such innovation in middle income countries like China and India, 
the capacity for developing countries to create new health products is severely limited. As 
Satyanarayana and Srivastava note, “Many developing and nearly all least developed 
countries do not have the technological capability even to produce generics” 
(Satyanarayana and Srivastava 2007).  
Even if strong IPR lead to some innovation, I argue that the same intellectual 
property protections that facilitate new innovations would prevent most citizens in the 
developing world from accessing those new and better resources by increasing prices as 
described above. 
 A second counter-argument, focusing on the issue of access to medicines, 
suggests that patents are less of a problem in the developing world than is poverty. Those 
making this argument note that more than 95% of essential drugs – as defined by the 
WHO – are not patented anywhere in the world, particularly in low-income countries 
(Noehrenberg 2006). Rather than patents being to blame for a lack of access to these 
drugs, the issue is a market breakdown. Patented or not, the drugs cost money and the 
infrastructure to deliver them costs money, and in least developed countries these costs 
become prohibitive (Attaran and Gillespie-White 2001; Noehrenberg 2006). In response 
to these arguments, opponents of stronger IPR writing in the access to medicines 
campaign note the connections between the authors of such articles and the 
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pharmaceutical industry and call into question the objectivity and motivation behind 
them. Whether stronger IPR raise the costs of drugs and/or effect access to medicines and 
overall health outcomes is indeed an empirical question, and one I seek to address with 
this project. 
 
2.5.2 Education and IPR 
 
Existing scholarship linking IPR and education in the developing world has come 
largely from activists and scholars working in the “Access to Knowledge” (A2K) 
movement (Chon 2005; Kapczynski 2007; Rens, Prabhala, and Kawooya 2006). As was 
the case with public health, the key causal mechanism at work involves prices. Unlike the 
health issue, however, the A2K movement is primarily concerned with copyright rather 
than patents. Protecting books, educational computer software, and other learning 
materials through copyright may potentially make the resources necessary for education 
more expensive.  
Supporters of stronger IPR offer several counter-arguments. The first follows the 
same logic as above, suggesting that IPR will lead to domestic innovation and 
technological advancement. With stronger copyright protection, developing countries will 
have incentive to develop their own knowledge goods and educational resources, 
ultimately leading to better educational outcomes. As before, I argue that innovation 
remains unlikely in developing countries, which have been and continue to be net 
importers of knowledge goods.  
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Other IPR supporters point to exceptions and limitations that exist in the major 
intellectual property treaties and conventions, particularly Article 10(2) of the Berne 
Convention, Article 13 of the WTO’s TRIPS agreement, and the 1996 WIPO Copyright 
Treaty (WTC) (Chon 2005; Kawooya 2007; Schonwetter et al. 2010). Each of these 
documents does indeed offer limitations and exceptions to copyright for situations that 
pass what has become known as the “three-step test.” To qualify, “limitations and 
exceptions must be (1) applicable only in certain areas, (2) not in conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the work, and (3) not unreasonably prejudicial to the legitimate interests 
of the author/rights holder” (Schonwetter et al. 2010, 40). 
While these exceptions for education exist, they have thus far been underutilized 
by developing countries or further restricted and/or removed by bilateral trade 
agreements. There are many reasons why developing countries have failed to use the 
limitations and exceptions fully, including TRIPS-Plus trade agreements, domestic laws 
that restrict a country’s own ability to exercise the flexibilities, a lack of domestic 
capacity to replicate copyrighted material, rules that prevent parallel importation of 
copyrighted material, and in many cases a lack of resources to implement the flexibilities 
(Chon 2005; Nicholson 2006).  
In other words, while exceptions to copyright exist for public goods such as 
education, and publishers in developing countries continue to offer initiatives such as 
donation, differential pricing, and publishing partnerships (Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights 2002), copyright protections continue to be one major cause of a lack of 
access to knowledge goods and educational resources. The extent to which IPR affect 
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overall educational outcomes is therefore a major research question to be addressed in 
this project. 
 
2.5.3 Income Inequality and IPR 
 
The third and final social outcome of interest is income inequality within 
countries. The relationship between IPR and inequality is more complicated than IPR’s 
relationship with health and education. Causal mechanisms operate both from an 
economic argument about the “winners” and “losers” of strong IP regimes, as well as 
indirectly through the other two social objectives: education and health.  
From an economic standpoint, strengthening IPR may worsen income inequality 
by encouraging economic growth. A higher growth rate increases the rate of return on 
assets, thus increasing the income of asset-wealthy households relative to asset-poor 
households (Adams 2008; Chu 2009; Chu and Peng 2009). In other words, stronger IPR 
benefit property holders and those in society and abroad who have the capacity and 
resources for innovation and investment. The ‘losers’ in the equation are domestic 
entrepreneurs who count on imitation of existing products for their own economic 
success. The importance of imitation as an economic driver has been widely noted by 
opponents and supporters of IPR alike (Chen and Puttitanun 2005; Maskus 2000a, 
2000b). In effect, stronger IPR redistribute wealth from the users of intellectual property 
– average citizens and low-tech businesses – to the owners and creators of intellectual 
property. To be sure, economic growth is a good thing for development. The argument 
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here is that IPR can improve economic growth while simultaneously worsening income 
inequality. 
In addition to this economic logic, there is a potentially more powerful causal link 
involving education and health outcomes. As stronger IPR raise the cost of education, the 
education gap between the rich and poor will widen, while those with means can afford 
private education and more educational resources.  As the education achievement gap 
grows, income and wealth inequality also increases.  
Similarly, as stronger IPR increase the costs of medicines, medical technology, 
infrastructure, and medical access, the poor in society will suffer disproportionately. In 
developing countries, any illness in the family can lead to what Whitehead, Dahlgren, and 
Evans have called medical poverty traps (Whitehead, Dahlgren, and Evans 2001). A 
vicious cycle of poor nutrition, foregone education, and more illness results as the poor 
struggle to take care of sick family members, leading to reductions in family-level 
income. Meanwhile, those with financial resources can afford to take care of sick family 
members while maintaining their own educational and work lives, avoiding the medical 
poverty trap.  
 In conclusion, this chapter has attempted to provide the theoretical background for 
a hypothesized link between intellectual property rights and human development – 
particularly health, education, and inequality in the developing world. Examining the 
impact of IPR on human development will allow me to take a first cut at settling the 
debate in the literature of whether IPR are good or bad for developing countries. To the 
extent IPR are both helpful for economic development and harmful to human 
development, this analysis will also comment on that tradeoff, how developing country IP 
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policy can manage the tradeoff, and what policies can be implemented to exploit the 




The Impact of IPR on Health Outcomes 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, public health outcomes are a critical 
component of human development. Scholars have examined the role that health plays 
both as an outcome of development, and as a critical component in the process of 
development. Even considering the traditionally narrow examination of development as 
GDP per capita growth, public health plays an important role. Healthy citizens are more 
productive workers than otherwise comparable but less healthy citizens. Good health also 
contributes to a robust labor force, and enables children to stay in school, thereby 
increasing overall societal education and boosting worker productivity (Bloom, Canning, 
and Jamison 2004; Prah Ruger, Jamison, and Bloom 2001). In other words, even if all we 
care about is economic development, public health is still an important consideration.  
However, the effort to expand the definition and study of development beyond 
GDP per capita growth included a deepened focus on public health and education as key 
components of human development. The goal is to value health not simply for its indirect 
contribution to economic growth, but as Amartya Sen put it, as a “constituent component 
of development” (Sen 1999) – to value health as an end in itself. The Human 
Development Index introduced by the UN Development Program in 1990, which is 
discussed in detail below, includes measures of health and education alongside GDP as 
the three components of human development. Likewise, the World Bank has increasingly 
focused on health as a critical outcome of development. The 1993 World Development 
Report was subtitled “Investing in Health,” and has been considered a watershed moment 
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in international health (Ruger 2005). This was the first World Bank report to focus 
exclusively on health, and its stated goal was to make the case to the broader 
development community that a greater investment in health was needed. Since 1993, the 
World Bank has only increased its focus on health, nutrition, and population (HNP) 
issues. Through its loans, credits, and grants, the World Bank has become the single 
largest external source of health financing in developing countries, with support for HNP 
programs growing from 5% of the Bank’s portfolio in 1980 to 22% in 2003 (Ruger 
2005). 
This chapter explores the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) on several 
important public health outcomes. The overarching goal is to empirically test the 
assertion by some NGOs, activists, and scholars that strengthening IPR is bad for public 
health, especially in developing countries. If these arguments are correct, we should see 
stronger levels of IPR correlated with worse health outcomes.  
How, then, do IPR impact health outcomes? Activists and IPR critics point to a 
causal process that operates through prices. Stronger intellectual property rights are 
thought to increase the cost of health inputs, such as medical technology, medical 
supplies, and – most importantly – pharmaceuticals. Not only should higher prices 
increase healthcare costs to private individuals and governments, but in a world of limited 
resources, these higher prices should result in worse macro-level health outcomes in the 
population. In a perfect world, we would test the influence of IPR directly on prices of 
these various inputs. Unfortunately, we do not have large-N data on drug and medical 
prices, and therefore cannot test the impact of IPR on prices directly.  
55 
 
Instead, I test the influence of IPR on public health by examining a number of 
specific health outcomes for which extensive cross-sectional time series data is available. 
These health variables cover two key health indicators for a variety of demographic 
groups: life expectancy rates and mortality rates. If the activists and IPR skeptics are 
correct, we should see stronger levels of IPR associated with worse health outcomes.  
Of course, economists and IPR supporters make the opposite argument: that 
stronger IPR are good for development and good for public health specifically. Stronger 
IPR increase the incentive to innovate and develop new and better medical resources and 
drugs, which should improve the macro-level health outcomes we are examining. At a 
minimum, they argue, stronger IPR should strengthen the economy in other sectors, 
providing increased GDP and national income which can then be used to improve society 
in myriad ways, including public health. In truth, both of these stories may be correct. 
Stronger IPR may be responsible for a stronger economy and increased health innovation, 
as well as increased prices for health inputs and drugs. By holding healthcare spending 
and GDP constant in the following analyses, we can think of this project as a test not only 
of whether there are positive or negative impacts of stronger IPR, but a test of which 
impact is stronger. If higher levels of IPR are associated with worse outcomes, we can 
conclude that IPR is bad for public health, and if higher levels of IPR are associated with 
better outcomes, we can conclude that IPR is, in fact, good for public health. 
The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the variables and data used in the 
analysis, the methodology employed, and the results for each health outcome. The final 




3.1   Variables of Interest 
 
3.1.1 Dependent Variables  
 
I mentioned above that the dependent variables cover two key indicators of 
health: life expectancy rates and mortality rates.7 I examine the impact of IPR on female, 
male, and total population life expectancy; as well as female, male, maternal, infant, 
child, and neonatal mortality rates. Full definitions and descriptive statistics for all the 
dependent variables are found in Table 3.1. The specific hypotheses for each set of 
variables are discussed below. 
 
3.1.2 Intellectual Property Rights 
  
 The key explanatory variable is a measure of IPR strength. Evaluating IPR 
strength is a difficult task, but several measures currently exist (Ginarte and Park 1997; 
Mansfield 1994; Ostergard 2000, 2007; W. G. Park 2008; Rapp and Rozek 1990; 
Sherwood 1997). They all have shortcomings, but the index compiled by Ginarte and 
Park in 1997 and later extended by Walter Park in 2008 provides the best and most 
comprehensive index of patent strength available.  
 
 
                                                          
7 Several other health outcomes were explored but are not included in this analysis. In particular, various 
HIV/AIDS statistics were considered. I examined the impact of IPR on the HIV prevalence rate, the 
number of children living with HIV, the number of adults and children living with HIV, the number of 
children orphaned by HIV, and AIDS estimated deaths. In no instance was the IPR variable statistically 
significant, suggesting that IPR and HIV/AIDS outcomes are not related. This may be the result of the 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Patent strength is determined by coding each of five elements of patent law in the 
specified country in the specified year.  The authors consider (1) the extent of coverage,  
(2) membership in international patent agreements, (3) the absence of restrictions on 
patent rights, (4) the availability of enforcement mechanisms, and (5) the duration of 
protection. Each of the five elements is scored on a 0 to 1 scale and summed, so that each 
country’s patent strength in a given year can range from 0 to 5. Higher values represent 
stronger levels of protection. In the analysis that follows, I examine the impact of the IPR 
index on each dependent variable, but I also disaggregate the index to examine the 
relative importance of each component of the index.8  
 
3.1.3 Control Variables 
 
 In addition to the IPR variable, the health regressions include five control 
variables. Each controls for potential intervening variables that might correlate with 
both IPR and health outcomes. The most important control is for GNI (per capita, 
PPP), as richer countries are likely to have both higher levels of IPR and better 
health outcomes.9 I have also included two variables that serve as proxies for broader 
concepts.  
                                                          
8 Note that this variable measures only patent strength, saying nothing about copyright or trademark 
protections. This is not ideal; however there is good theoretical and empirical reason to believe countries 
with strong patent laws will also have strong copyright and trademark laws (Cavazos, Lippoldt, and Senft 
2010; P. Walter G. Park and Lippoldt 2005; Reynolds 2003). Countries generally pass intellectual property 
legislation as a package, including similar protections for each type of intellectual property. Additionally, 
for health outcomes, we have good reason to believe patents will be the most important type of intellectual 
property protection. 
9 Health regressions use the purchasing power parity expression of wealth for two reasons. First, this is the 
most theoretically appropriate measure of income/wealth. Using the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
calculation of GNI allows for price differences to be taken into account across the panel of countries, as one 
PPP dollar is equivalent for a given country in purchasing power as one US dollar has in the US economy.  
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First, I include secondary school enrollment rates as a proxy for the stock of 
human capital. Human capital is a term economists use to describe a society’s 
investment in education and training, so a more highly educated society is said to 
have a higher stock of human capital. Gary Becker popularized the term in 1964, 
leading to a long tradition of empirical work on human capital, and ultimately to 
Becker receiving the Nobel Prize in Economics. Human capital is featured 
prominently in the public health literature. Scholars have argued that education is 
linked directly to health outcomes as more highly educated individuals have better 
employment opportunities and higher wages (Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010; M. 
Grossman and Kaestner 1997). As a result, societies with higher stocks of human 
capital experience better health outcomes. Recent work has extended the analysis 
beyond the education-income argument to suggest that more highly educated 
individuals are also more likely to behave differently vis-à-vis their health and the 
health of their family. More educated individuals have more and better information 
about their health and more health-related resources, and they may also be more 
likely to make good health-related decisions for themselves and their children (S. 
Desai and Alva 1998; Mosley and Chen 1984). There is also a body of research 
suggesting that more highly educated individuals are less likely to suffer from mental 
and emotional health issues than their less educated counterparts (M. Marmot 2005; 
Carles Muntaner et al. 2004; Y. Yu and Williams 1999). Human capital is also a 
common variable in research on international development, and secondary school 
enrollment rates are a common proxy (Barro 1991; Barro and Lee 1993, 2001; Baum 
and Lake 2003; Levine and Renelt 1992; Miles 2004). We also have good reason to 
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expect human capital to be correlated with IPR, as more educated societies usually 
generate more intellectual property worth protecting. 
Second, I include the fertility rate as a proxy for gender attitudes. 10 This 
control is also common in the literature (Boissiere 2004; M. Marmot et al. 2008; M. 
Marmot and Wilkinson 1999). The literature has consistently found that countries with 
more egalitarian gender attitudes experience lower fertility rates (Kaufman 2000; 
Westoff and Higgins 2009). This is an important control because, for societies with 
less gender equality, negative impacts of IPR are likely to be felt hardest (or entirely) 
by women, as resources are spent first on men and children. This variable is most 
likely to be relevant when we seek to compare the impact of IPR on a particular 
outcome for men vs. women, or when we examine outcomes directly related to 
gender such as maternal mortality. 
The fourth control is the polity score. In countries with more democratic 
forms of government, political pressure may force governments to pay more attention 
to health outcomes above and beyond government spending on health. Measures of 
political participation are also common determinants of health outcomes in the public 
health literature, which finds that more democratic governments experience better 
health outcomes even when controlling for health spending, health inputs, levels of 
wealth, and other common determinants (Franco, Álvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz 2004).  
                                                          
10 To check robustness, each model was run with several other potential proxies for gender attitudes and 
female education. It is reasonable to assume that educated women might spend more time and effort on 
health outcomes for their families, so I want to be sure the educational level of women in society is 
properly controlled for. Other model specifications included: female percentage of the labor force, female 
secondary school enrollment, female tertiary school enrollment, and female total expected years of 




The fifth and final control variable is per capita government spending on 
health. This is arguably the most important variable mediating between IPR and 
social outcomes. Richer countries are likely to spend more on healthcare, and 
additional government spending could compensate for any negative impacts of IPR 
on each health-related dependent variable.11  Full definitions and descriptive statistics 
for all the independent variables are found in Table 3.2.  
 
3.1.4 Data  
 
The data used to test the relationship between IPR and health outcomes are from a 
variety of sources. The IPR variable is from Park (2008), which measures patent strength 
at five-year intervals from 1960-2005 for 122 countries. The polity variable comes from 
the Polity IV project. Finally, data for life expectancy rates, mortality rates, and the 
other four control variables come from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators.  
                                                          
11 To check robustness, each model was run with additional controls for the healthcare infrastructure, 
including the number of hospital beds per 1,000 people, the number of community health workers per 1,000 
people, the number of nurses and midwives per 1,000 people, and the number of physicians per 1,000 
people. The inclusion of each variable did not meaningfully alter the relationship between IPR and each 
outcome.  
 
Additionally, each model was run with the Gini index as a control, since income inequality could 
theoretically impact the relationship between IPR and health outcomes. Other than severely limiting the 
number of observations because of missing Gini data, there was no meaningful impact on the IPR 
coefficient and its significance. 
 
Additional robustness checks were done with controls for HIV prevalence, FDI, and the percentage of the 







3.2   Methods 
 
This chapter examines the impact of IPR on health outcomes through regression 
analysis. In the sections that follow, I will be reporting two different types of regression 
models. Given that we have cross-sectional time series panel data, the most appropriate 
model would employ fixed effects estimators with Huber/White robust standard errors, 
clustered at the country level. These robust standard errors are consistent even when the 
disturbances are not identically distributed over the panels or there is serial correlation in 
the error term. Of the regression models available to examine panel data, a fixed effects 
model is preferable for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Given the diversity of 
countries in the analysis, we have good reason to expect country specific fixed effects. In 
other words, the impact of IPR on health is going to be different in the United States and 
in Kenya. If the country-specific effects do not change over time, we can use a fixed 
effects model to control for those country-specific factors. This theoretical argument is 
confirmed by postestimation tests. A Hausman test after each regression, which checks 
mathematically for country specific effects, strongly confirms the presence of fixed 
effects, suggesting that both pooled OLS and random effects models would produce 
inconsistent estimators.  
Unfortunately, the nature of the data presents problems for the fixed effects 
model. Data on healthcare spending, which is a critical control variable, is only available 
from 1995 on. Therefore, while data on IPR and most of the other variables is available 
since 1960, the inclusion of healthcare spending limits the time dimension to 1995 – 
2005. I considered dropping health spending as a control variable to increase the number 
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of time periods, but this approach is simply not theoretically tenable. Healthcare spending 
is a necessary and indispensable control, and I believe we can learn little from regression 
models that ignore it. Combined with the fact that the IPR variable is measured every 5 
years, this data limitation shrinks the time dimension in the fixed effects models to just 
three points: 1995, 2000, and 2005. This is a problem for fixed effects estimators, which 
rely on variation within cases (countries) over time. There simply are not enough time 
periods to capture the impact of IPR on each dependent variable with this methodology. 
As a result, I also report single year cross-sectional OLS regression models for each 
variable. While not capturing variation over time, the OLS models do examine the 
relationship between IPR and the dependent variable across countries at each point in 
time, and provide insight into the direction and significance of the relationship between 
IPR and health outcomes.  
In order to fully explore the impact of IPR on each health outcome, this analysis 
proceeds in four parts. In the first analysis, I run regressions on the full set of countries, 
both developed and developing. In the second analysis, I include interaction terms to 
examine whether the impact of IPR is different in developing countries than in developed 
countries. In assigning countries to a particular level of development, I follow the World 
Bank’s procedure of divided them according to GNI per capita. The World Bank defines 
four groups: low income of $1,025 or less; lower middle income of $1,026 - $4,035; 
upper middle income of $4,036 - $12,475; and high income of $12,476 or more.  
 There is good reason to expect the impact of IPR on health to be different for 
developing countries than it is for developed ones. Developing countries may not have 
much of their own intellectual property to protect, thus relying more heavily on imported 
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technology and resources. As a result, stronger IPR may have a larger negative impact on 
developing countries. This is precisely the argument made by the “access to medicines” 
and “access to knowledge” campaigns discussed in the previous chapter.  
The goal, then, is to determine whether the impact of IPR on each dependent 
variable is different for developing countries than it is for developed ones. Using the four 
point scale of development described above, I collapse this measure of development into 
a dichotomous variable, with low and lower middle income countries coded 0 
(developing countries), and upper middle and high income countries coded 1 (developed 
countries). I then interact the development dummy variable with the IPR variable, and 
include in the regression the IRP variable, the development dummy variable, and the 
interaction term. We can interpret the coefficient of the IPR variable as the impact for 
countries identified as “developing” (coded 0 on the dummy variable). The coefficient of 
the interaction term is the difference in the impact for countries identified as “developed” 
(coded 1 on the dummy variable), such that the sum of the two coefficients is the total 
impact for developed countries. When the interaction term is statistically significant, we 
conclude that the impact is indeed different for the two groups. When the interaction term 
is not statistically significant, we conclude that the impact is the same for all countries.12  
                                                          
12 Interpreting the coefficient for the dummy variable is less relevant, so I will not spend much time 
interpreting it in the following sections. In an OLS regression, the constant term is the intercept for 
countries coded 0 on the dummy variable, and the coefficient for the dummy variable is interpreted as the 
difference in the intercept for countries coded as 1. When statistically significant, this coefficient tells us 
that the intercept is indeed different for the two groups (just as the statistically significant coefficient of the 
interaction term tell us that the slope is different for the two groups). In a fixed effects regression, however, 
the constant and dummy variables have slightly different interpretations. The constant terms tells us the 
average fixed effect present in the model, while the coefficient of the dummy variable tells us the 
difference in the average fixed effect. These intercepts and average fixed effects are not directly relevant 
for the research question I am addressing, which is why I have left the interpretation out of the results 
discussion.  
 I also report but spend no time interpreting the R2 statistics of these regressions. They have little 
theoretical interest, as health outcomes are severely overdetermined. My goal is not to account for all of the 
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In the third analysis, I disaggregate the IPR variable into its five components and 
test the impact of each component on the health outcomes. As I discussed above, the 
main explanatory variable captures five components of patent strength: (1) the extent of 
coverage, (2) membership in international patent agreements, (3) the absence of 
restrictions on patent rights, (4) the availability of enforcement mechanisms, and (5) the 
duration of protection. It may be informative to disaggregate this concept and to compare 
the impact of each of the five components on each health outcome. Perhaps one or more 
aspect of IPR is consistently more important than the others. Table 3.3, adapted from 
Park (2008), displays the method by which each of the five IP components were 
constructed. 
In the fourth analysis, I lag the IPR variable five, ten, and fifteen years to see if 
IPR has a different impact on health after a period of time. The causal process we are 
assuming – whereby stronger IPR lead to increased prices for medical technology, 
supplies, and pharmaceuticals – resulting in worse macro-level public health outcomes, is 
admittedly a long causal chain. To go from intellectual property rights, to prices, to life 
expectancy, for instance, may take considerable time. For this reason, the fourth analysis 
lags the IPR variable and examines the impact of IPR lagged 5 years, 10 years, and 15 
years on each dependent variable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
variation in these dependent variables with my model, but instead to examine whether there is an effect 
from IPR on the outcomes.  
67 
 
Table 3.3: Components and scoring method of patent rights index. Replicated from Park (2008).
(1) Coverage Available Not Available
Patentability of pharmaceuticals 1/8 0
Patentability of chemicals 1/8 0
Patentability of food 1/8 0
Patentability of surgical products 1/8 0
Patentability of microorganisms 1/8 0
Patentability of utility models 1/8 0
Patentability of software 1/8 0
Patentability of plant and animal varieties 1/8 0
(2) Membership in international treaties Signatory Not signatory
Paris convention and revisions 1/5 0
Patent cooperation treaty 1/5 0
Protection of new varieties (UPOV) 1/5 0
Budapest treaty (microorganism deposits) 1/5 0
Trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 1/5 0
(3) Duration of protection Full Partial
1 0 < f  < 1
(4) Enforcement mechanisms Available Not Available
Preliminary (pre-trial) injunctions 1/3 0
Contributory infringement 1/3 0
Burden of proof reversals 1/3 0
(5) Restrictions on patent rights Does not exist Exists
Working requirements 1/3 0
Compulsory licensing 1/3 0
Recovation of patents 1/3 0
where f  is the duration of protection as a fraction  of 20 years from the date of application or 17 
years from the date of grant (for grant-based patent systems). Overall score for patent rights 






3.3   Life Expectancy Rates 
  
3.3.1 Life Expectancy Full Panel Results 
 
The World Bank has compiled life expectancy rates for men, women, and the full 
population. They define life expectancy for each group as: “Life expectancy at birth 
indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of 
mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life” (World Bank 
n.d.). 
The causal logic is described above, with prices of medical technology, supplies, 
and pharmaceuticals being the conduit through which IPR negatively impacts health 
outcomes. Stronger IPR will make healthcare inputs more expensive, leading to worse 
outcomes. As a result, I am testing the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Countries with higher values for IPR will have lower life expectancies for 
men, women, and the full population. 
(IPR coefficients with a negative sign) 
 
Some economists and IPR supporters make the opposite argument: that stronger 
IPR spur innovation and increase economic growth, giving a country more resources to 
use in order to improve their public health outcomes. In that way, this analysis can be 
seen as a test of which effect of IPR is stronger – the positive impact on innovation and 
the economy or the negative impact on medical prices.  
Table 3.4 displays the results of the four regression models for population life 
expectancy. The IPR variable is insignificant in the fixed effects model, the 2000 OLS 
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model, and the 2005 OLS model. In the 1995 OLS model, however, we observe a 
significant negative relationship. A one-unit (20%) increase in IPR is associated with a 
2.4 year decrease in life expectancy, which is a substantively significant result. If a 
country went from no IPR protection to full IPR protection (an admittedly dramatic shift), 
they would experience a decrease in population life expectancy of 12 years. In terms of 
control variables, the GNI and fertility rate are significant in the direction we would 
expect, while the other controls are not significant.  
The results are almost identical for male life expectancy rates, as the models 
reported in Table 3.5 suggest. While the fixed effects model, the 2000 OLS model, and 
the 2005 OLS model show insignificant results, the 1995 OLS model suggests a 
significant and negative impact of IPR on male life expectancy of roughly the same 
magnitude. The same control variables are significant in this model as well. Interestingly, 
this result is not seen in female life expectancy rates. All four models for female life 















































































Observations 254 65 95 94
# Countries 106
# Years 3




†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level













































































Observations 254 65 95 94
# Countries 106
# Years 3




†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level





Why, then, do we have a significant result in 1995 but not in 2000 or 2005? One 
potential explanation is that IPR simply stopped having an impact on population and 
male life expectancy. Perhaps as more countries reformed IPR in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, factors other than IPR became more important predictors of life expectancy. Fully 
understanding this change will require further investigation. Regardless, the 1995 OLS 
model does offer some support for the hypothesis that stronger levels of IPR are 
associated (or have been associated in the past) with worse life expectancy rates.  
 
3.3.2 Life Expectancy Results by Level of Development 
 
Interestingly, there appears to be no difference between developed and developing 
countries. Every model run with development interaction variables yielded in 
insignificant results for the difference coefficient, suggesting that the impact of IPR on 
life expectancy is the same in all countries. 
 
3.3.3 Life Expectancy Results for Disaggregated IPR 
 
We can examine the impact of each of the five components of the IPR measure on 
life expectancy rates separately. Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 present the results to make the 
tables easier to read and interpret, I report only the IPR coefficients for each model. The 
models each have the same number of observations as the combined IPR models, and the 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Looking at all three tables it is clear that only one component of IPR appears to be 
important: treaty membership. Not only is this component significant in the 1995 OLS 
models, but it is significant in all three OLS models for all three dependent variables. The 
magnitude of the impact of treaty membership on life expectancy is also significant, with 
a one-unit increase in treaty membership resulting in a 5-8 year decrease in life 
expectancy, depending on the dependent variable and model specification. A one-unit 
increase in treaty membership represents a country being a signatory on all five major 
patent treaties rather than being a signatory on none of them. Put another way, countries 
who have signed on to all five treaties have life expectancy rates 5-8 years lower than 
countries who have signed on to none of them. In reality, however, very few countries 
have not signed any of these treaties (only 4 countries in 1995, 2 countries in 2000, and 1 
country in 2005). That said, there is significant variation in the treaty membership 
variable. For example, in 2005, 31 countries had signed all five treaties, 11 countries had 
signed four, 28 countries had signed three, 20 countries had signed two, and three 
countries had signed one. These models suggest that, while the other components of IPR 
are less important, treaty membership and the patent requirements each treaty imposes on 
countries appear to have a significant and negative impact on life expectancy. 
 
3.3.4 Life Expectancy Results With Lagged IPR 
 
 There is good reason to believe that it might take time for IPR to have an impact 
on a macro-level measure of health such as life expectancy rates. Rather than examining 
only the contemporary levels of IPR, I lagged the IPR variable five, ten, and fifteen years 
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and included the lagged IPR variable as the key explanatory factor. Table 3.9 reports the 
results. Again I report only the IPR coefficients to make the table easy to read. The 
number of observations and the results for the control variables are roughly identical to 
the contemporary IPR models reported above. Additionally, I am only reporting the 
results for the 2000 OLS model. The fixed effects models showed no significant results, 
which is likely a result of the methodological limitations discussed above. The 1995 and 
2005 OLS models show basically the same results as the 2000 OLS model, so reporting 





































†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level




For all three life expectancy measures, 10- and 15-year lagged IPR have significant and 
negative impacts on life expectancy. The magnitude of the effect is similar to the original 
combined-IP model, with a one-unit (20%) increase in lagged IPR leading to a 2-3 year 
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reduction in life expectancy. This is true for men, women, and the full population. These 
results add additional support for the hypothesis that stronger levels of IPR are associated 
with worse life expectancy rates. As before, I included development interaction terms in 
the model to see if the results were the same for developed and developing countries, and 
the results suggested that there was no difference for countries at different levels of 
development.   
 Taken together, the full panel 1995 OLS models, the disaggregated IPR OLS 
models, and the lagged IPR model all provide evidence in support of the stated 
hypothesis. Higher levels of intellectual property protection do appear to be related to 
worse life expectancy rates for men, women, and the total population. If IPR also 
improve life expectancy through innovation or economic growth, that positive impact is 
overcome by the negative impact of IPR observed in these regressions.  
 
3.4   Mortality Rates 
 
3.4.1 Mortality Rates Full Panel Results 
 
The mortality rate is another important measure of public health, and we can 
examine the impact of IPR on mortality rates for various demographics. The World Bank 
has compiled mortality rates for adult men and women, mothers giving birth, infants, 
children under five, and newborns (neonates). Each of the mortality rates is defined 






The rate, per 1,000 female adults, of a female dying between the ages of 15 and 60--that is, the probability of a 15-year-
old dying before reaching age 60, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates between those ages.
Male Adult Mortality
The rate, per 1,000 male adults, of a male dying between the ages of 15 and 60--that is, the probability of a 15-year-old 
dying before reaching age 60, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates between those ages.
Maternal Mortality Maternal mortality is the number of women who die during pregnancy and childbirth, per 100,000 live births.
Infant Mortality Infant mortality is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year.
Child Mortality
Under-five mortality is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to 
current age-specific mortality rates.
Neonatal Mortality
Neonatal mortality is the number of neonates dying before reaching 28 days of age, per 1,000 live births in a given 
year.
Table 3.10: Mortality Rate Definitions
 
 
Once again, the causal mechanism involves prices. If drugs, medical technology, and 
healthcare resources are more expensive for countries with stronger IPR, then fewer 
individuals will have access and more may die in a given year. As a result, I test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Countries with higher values for IPR will have higher mortality rates. 
(IPR coefficients with a positive sign) 
 
Once again, this analysis can be seen as a test of which effect of IPR is stronger: a 
positive impact on innovation and the economy suggested by economists and IPR 
supporters, or a negative impact on medical prices. 
Interestingly, in the full panel fixed effects and OLS models, the IPR variable was 
insignificant in every regression except maternal mortality. Table 3.11 reports the results 
for maternal mortality. While IPR is insignificant in the fixed effects model and the OLS 
models for 2000 and 2005, the 1995 model shows a positive and statistically significant 
result. A one-unit increase in IPR is associated with an increase in maternal mortality of 
84.6272 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. For the average country with a maternal 
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mortality rate of 214.23, this 20% increase in IPR is associated with a 39.5% increase in 
maternal mortality. In terms of control variables, the secondary school enrollment rate 
was negatively correlated and statistically significant and the fertility rate was positive 
and statistically significant. Both of these variables operate as we would expect. 
Luckily, maternal mortality is relatively rare in the world: an average rate of 
214.23 per 100,000 live births is only a maternal mortality rate of 2.1%. However, given 
the rarity of the event, increasing maternal mortality by 39.5% with a 20% increase in 
IPR is dramatic in terms of substantive significance. It would be helpful to know exactly 
how that process works – what medical costs result from increased IPR that play such a 
large role in increasing maternal mortality? Unfortunately, I cannot answer this question 
based on the aggregate data available. It is also interesting to note that this effect is not 
seen in the 2000 and 2005 OLS models.  
Note that the 1995 OLS model includes only 65 countries while the other two 
OLS models include 94 and 95. This is a result of data limitations in 1995. To make sure 
the difference in significance for IPR was not merely a result of the different samples, I 
ran the 2000 and 2005 OLS models with only the countries present in the 1995 model and 
the results were still insignificant. This suggests that the impact of IPR on maternal 
mortality observed in 1995 was not present in the following years for the same set of 
countries.13 There is therefore some evidence that – at least in 1995 – stronger IPR was 
associated with much higher maternal mortality rates. 
                                                          
13 In fact, the sample size for the 1995 OLS model is smaller than the sample size for the 2000 and 2005 
OLS models in every regression presented in this chapter. While the numbers fluctuate slightly due to 
various missing data, the 1995 regressions all had about 65 countries while the 2000 and 2005 regressions 
all had about 95 countries. To make sure differences between the years was not merely a result of different 
sample sizes and constellations of countries, I ran every 2000 and 2005 regression with the set of countries 
present in the 1995 OLS model for that variable. In none of the cases was the difference between 1995 and 













































































Observations 254 65 95 94
# Countries 106
# Years 3




†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level





3.4.2 Mortality Rate Results by Level of Development 
 
Including development interaction terms allows us to examine the impact of IPR 
in developing vs. developed nations. As before, the IPR variable was statistically 
insignificant for male, female, infant, child, and neonatal mortality. However, for 
maternal mortality the interaction model reveals an interesting outcome. Table 3.12 
shows that, for developing countries, IPR does not have a statistically significant impact 
on maternal mortality. The second IPR coefficient, which tells us the difference in impact 
for developed countries, is positive, large, and approaches traditional levels of statistical 
significance (p-value = 0.072). This result, along with the fact that IPR is statistically 
significant in the full panel model, suggests that IPR does not have an impact on maternal 
mortality in developing countries but does have a positive and significant impact on 
maternal mortality in developed countries.  
In other words, for richer countries strong IPR is associated with higher rates of 
maternal mortality. However, in poorer countries this effect is not present. I began this 
analysis with the assumption that any negative effect of IPR on health would be worse in 
developing countries – that strong IPR would be more harmful to public health in poor 
countries. This result offers some evidence that this is not the case. It is in the developed 
world where IPR has a negative impact on maternal mortality. Why might that be the 
case? Perhaps in the developing world maternal mortality is more a function of other 
factors: proximity to a hospital, the availability of doctors, cultural norms around 
childbirth, healthcare infrastructure, etc. In the developing world, perhaps these factors 
dwarf any impact of IPR on maternal mortality. However, in the developed world, where 
83 
 
these issues may be less important, we can see an impact of IPR on maternal mortality. 




IPR for Developing Countries
54.3363
(47.6352)



























†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level
Table 3.12: Difference in Impact of IPR on Maternal Mortality 





3.4.3 Mortality Rate Results for Disaggregated IPR 
 
Disaggregating the IPR variable gives some additional insight on the impact of 
IPR on mortality. Tables 3.13 – 3.18 display the results, reporting only the IPR 
coefficients for each model. While only maternal mortality was affected by the combined 
IPR variable, we see significant results in nearly every mortality rate when considering 
the disaggregated IPR components. Looking at all six mortality rates, it becomes clear 
that the most important component of IPR – when it comes to mortality – is treaty 
membership. Treaty membership is significant (or nearing traditional significance in the 
case of female mortality), in at least one model specification for each mortality rate.  
For maternal mortality, which is on a different scale than the others, a one-unit 
increase in treaty membership is associated with an increase in maternal mortality of 
241.0359 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 1995, and 138.8640 maternal deaths 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As discussed above regarding life expectancy rates, a one-unit increase in treaty 
membership is dramatic, representing a change from signing none of the five global 
patent treaties to signing all five of them. However, even a smaller change in treaty 
membership is associated with fairly large increases in maternal mortality, given the 
rarity of this kind of death. None of the other components of IPR are significant, although 
patent coverage approaches traditional levels of significance in the fixed effects and 1995 
OLS models (p-values of 0.077 and 0.098 respectively). If we accept these higher p-
values, the results suggest that countries who allow patents on more product categories 
experience higher maternal mortality rates. Of eight product categories listed in Table 3, 
pharmaceuticals and surgical products are the most likely to have a connection to 
maternal mortality. Regardless, a one-unit increase in patent coverage – which represents 
a move from covering none of these products to covering all of them – is associated with 
an increase in maternal mortality of 70.7637 deaths per 100,000 live births in the fixed 
effects model and 162.9095 deaths per 100,000 live births in the 1995 OLS model. It is 
worth repeating that this one-unit increase in coverage is dramatic, and both of these 
results fail to meet traditional measures of statistical significance. 
Male, female, infant, and child mortality rates are all measured as a number of 
deaths per 1,000 individuals in the category. Treaty membership appears to have a 
positive and significant relationship with each of these mortality rates. For female 
mortality, treaty membership comes close to meeting traditional levels of significance in 
the 2000 and 2005 OLS models (p-values of 0.071 and 0.064 respectively). If we accept 
these p-values, the results suggest that a one-unit increase in treaty membership results in 
an increase in female mortality of roughly 89-95 deaths per 1,000 adult females. For an 
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average country with an annual female mortality rate of 158.68, this is a 56-60% 
increase. Even for much smaller changes in treaty membership, this is a substantively 
significant result. For instance, a country that signs just one additional treaty is associated 
with a 10% higher female mortality rate. 
The impact is even more dramatic for male mortality, where we find a larger 
positive and significant impact, with a one-unit increase in treaty membership associated 
with an increase in male mortality of roughly 135-139 deaths per 1,000 adult males. The 
the average country with a male mortality rate of 226.72, this is a 60-61% increase. These 
results are both statistically significant (p-vales of 0.006 and 0.011 respectively), and 
substantively significant. In the fixed effects model for male mortality, the duration of 
patent coverage is also significant, with a one-unit increase in duration associated with an 
increase of 23.1727 in male mortality. This one-unit increase in patent coverage is a 
move from no patents at all to the full standard 20 years of coverage, which is a fairly 
dramatic increase. That said, even much smaller increases in patent duration are 
associated with meaningful increases in male mortality. 
Results for infant and child mortality are equally compelling. A one-unit increase 
in treaty membership is associated with increases in infant mortality of 15.8966 in 1995, 
13.5644 in 2000 (p-value = 0.083), and 12.3264 in 2005. Since infant mortality is less 
common, with the average country experiencing only 35.55 infant deaths per 1,000 live 
births a year, these impacts of treaty membership are very large. For children, a one-unit 
increase in treaty membership is associated with an increase in mortality rates of 48.6946 
in 1995, 34.8376 in 2000, and 25.6889 in 2005. Child mortality is also fairly uncommon, 
with an average mortality rate of 53.19. Thus, these changes in mortality are large by 
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comparison, and highly statistically significant. Interestingly, patent coverage is again 
significant for the 1995 OLS model of child mortality, with a one-unit increase in 
coverage associated with a very large increase in child mortality of 40.1137. This result is 
not present in the 2000 and 2005 models.  
The fixed effects model for neonatal mortality offers somewhat different results. 
Treaty membership is statistically significant; however, signing additional treaties is 
associated with reductions in neonatal mortality. A one-unit increase in treaty 
membership leads to a reduction in neonatal mortality of 2.8021. Neonatal deaths are 
exceedingly rare, with the average country experiencing only 17.92 newborn deaths per 
1,000 live births. While small, this negative coefficient for treaty membership represents 
a significant reduction in neonatal mortality. We do not observe this relationship in the 
OLS models, and no other IPR components are significant for neonatal mortality. This is 
a challenging result to explain. One potential explanations is that, in signing additional 
patent treaties and strengthening IPR as a result, countries are either generating 
innovation related to newborn heath or receiving access to some product or technology 
not available without strong patent protections that impacts newborn health. It is also 
possible that the economic argument in favor of IPR, whereby stronger IPR leads to 
economic growth, provides additional resources that make their way into the healthcare 
system to improve newborn mortality rates.  
We can draw a few conclusions from the regression results for these six mortality 
rates. First, while there is occasional evidence that patent duration and coverage might 
matter, the more compelling evidence is for treaty membership having a significant and 
positive effect on female, male, maternal, infant, and child mortality rates. Countries who 
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are signatories on more of the five global patent treaties are associated with significantly 
worse mortality rates. These results support the hypothesis above, and offer some 
evidence to support the claims of IPR skeptics who believe stronger IPR will damage 
health outcomes in countries at various levels of development. This result is not true for 
neonatal mortality, for which the fixed effects model suggests a significant but negative 
relationship. 
Second, the magnitude of the effect of treaty membership for mothers, infants, 
and children appears to have diminished over time. For these three mortality rates, the 
largest statistically significant impact appears in the 1995 OLS model. The size of the 
coefficient for each mortality rate decreases in the 2000 OLS model, and decreases again 
in the 2005 OLS model (dropping from significance for maternal mortality). We cannot 
know from these regressions the exact reason for this change over time. However, we do 
know that over time all of these mortality rates have been decreasing across the globe. 
With some notable exceptions, most countries have experienced progressively better 
mortality statistics year over year since 1960 when the World Bank began collecting 
them. At the same time, more and more countries have signed on to the five global patent 
treaties over time. As a result, in 2005 most countries included in the regression had 
higher treaty membership values and lower mortality rates than they did 1995. It seems to 
be the case that, as mortality rates have improved, the importance of treaty membership 
has been overtaken by other factors. This trend is not present for male and female 
mortality, where the magnitude of the impact of treaty membership on mortality is 




3.4.4 Mortality Rate Results With Lagged IPR 
 
Table 3.19 presents the results for all six mortality rates when we lag the IPR 
variable five, ten, and fifteen years. As before, the table reports only the IPR coefficients 
for the 2000 OLS model. The patterns observed here were roughly the same in the 1995 
and 2005 OLS models. With the exception of the neonatal mortality rate, for which the 
results are insignificant across all four models, the impact of lagged IPR on mortality is 
similar for each demographic. Using contemporary IPR values from 2000, the results are 
insignificant for all mortality rates. When lagged five, ten, and fifteen years, the IPR 
variable becomes statistically and substantively significant, and positively correlated with 
mortality. With a 5-year lag, male, female, and maternal mortality become significant, 
and with a 10-year lag child and infant mortality also become significant. For each 
mortality rate, the size of the coefficient is similar to the magnitude of the impact 
observed in previous models. Interesting the size of the coefficient increases the more we 
lag the IPR variable, such that the impact of IPR lagged fifteen years is very large; 
slightly smaller at ten years; and smaller again at five years. These results suggest that it 
may indeed take some time for intellectual property rights to have an effect on health 
outcomes, and mortality rates specifically. These results, along with the previous 
mortality rate results, offer some compelling evidence in support of the hypothesis that 

































































†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level




3.5   Discussion & Conclusion 
 
 I will conclude with a few general comments. First, the evidence presented 
here largely confirms the hypotheses being tested, suggesting that stronger IPR are 
associated with worse life expectancy and mortality outcomes. IPR was negatively 
correlated with life expectancy rates in the 1995 OLS models, and when we lag the 
IPR variable we see even larger negative impacts of IPR on life expectancy. 
Similarly, IPR was negatively correlated with maternal mortality in the 1995 OLS 
model, a result that was statistically significant and large in magnitude, but only true 
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only for developed countries. When lagged five, ten, and fifteen years, the magnitude 
of the negative impact of IPR on maternal mortality was even larger.  
 The second general outcome of these analyses has to do with developing 
versus developed nations. IPR skeptics in general, and especially those in the access 
to medicines campaign, have argued that IPR are bad for public health especially in 
developing countries. The results presented here do not support that argument. For 
the health outcomes where we observe a significant negative relationship, there is 
either no difference between countries at different levels of development, or the 
negative effect of IPR is present only for middle income and rich countries. I 
suggested one possible explanation above, which bears repeating here. It may be the 
case that in poor countries that are already struggling with public health 
infrastructure and resources, health outcomes are determined by other factors. Only 
in middle income and rich countries, where public health outcomes are quite good, 
can we observe a negative impact from IPR on the outcomes. Perhaps these countries 
have overcome the traditional barriers to public health delivery, and at the upper 
levels of life expectancy and mortality some small negative effects of IPR can be 
observed. This explanation is presently just conjecture, and a complete explanation 
of this result will require additional research.  
A third general conclusion involves the disaggregated IPR components. It is 
clear from these results that not all aspects of IPR have an impact on health 
outcomes. The treaty membership component is consistently the most important 
factor. Countries who have signed on to more of the five global patent treaties are 
associated with worse male, female, and population life expectancy rates. Likewise, 
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countries who have signed on to more treaties are associated with worse maternal, 
infant, and child mortality rates. Very interestingly, the magnitude of the negative 
impact of IPR on these mortality rates diminishes over time, with smaller 
coefficients in 2000, and even smaller coefficients in 2005.  
 The fourth and final conclusion involves lagging the IPR variable. Across all 
of these health outcomes, we observe at least some statistically significant negative 
impact of lagged IPR. This is the most dramatic evidence in support of the stated 
hypotheses, and in support of the critics of IPR. With good reason to expect that the 
process of strengthening IPR may take some time to affect these outcomes, the 
regression results suggest that this is exactly what is happening. IPR levels from five, 
ten, or fifteen years prior are negatively correlated with nearly all the health 
outcomes. 
It is important, before moving on, to return to a point I made in the 
introductory chapter: the reform of IPR and the relationship between IPR and health 
outcomes all occurs within a political context. It would be useful to control for the 
reasons behind IPR reform and the institutional aspects of IPR implementation in 
each country in the panel. While that data does not exist in large-N form, its 
development would be a key contribution for future research. It may be the case that 
stronger IPR have even larger negative impacts on health outcomes in countries that 
fully implement and enforce these protections and far weaker impacts in countries 
that don’t, but such distinction is concealed by the large-N nature of this analysis. 
99 
 
The next chapter explores the relationship between IPR and educational 
outcomes to see if the trends observed in this chapter continue, or if the relationship 






The Impact of IPR on Education Outcomes 
 
Along with public health, education has been widely viewed as a critical 
component of human development. Its inclusion in the UNDP’s human development 
index, as well as a growing literature on the role of education in the development process, 
is evidence of the importance scholars and development experts place in education. 
Education is a catalyst for economic growth and the reduction of poverty, and education 
is closely tied to public health, strong communities, and quality of life (Armstrong 2010). 
As I discuss in the theory chapter, there is a young but growing literature in 
political science regarding the relationship between of intellectual property rights and 
education. Both IPR supporters and skeptics have suggested that there is a link between 
educational outcomes and the availability of learning resources – both physical and 
digital – such as textbooks, computer software, and reference materials. Some supporters 
of strong IPR and extensive copyright protection offer the utilitarian perspective that says 
stronger protections give authors the necessary incentive to invest in the creation and 
dissemination of learning materials, benefiting the educational system and the public at 
large. Other proponents of stronger IPR make the argument that IPR has an indirect 
impact on education, through its positive impact on economic growth. This is a similar 
argument to the one discussed in the previous chapter on health outcomes. Stronger IPR 
generate economic growth, increasing national income which can be put to use in the 
educational sector improving educational attainment and other outcomes (Armstrong 
2010; Idris 2003).  
101 
 
IPR critics, on the other hand, argue that stronger intellectual property rights will 
present problems for education, especially in the developing world. This “access to 
knowledge” campaign and research agenda points to the fact that in the developing world 
there is little native creation of learning materials, and most textbooks and other 
educational resources are imported from the developed world. The most important impact 
of copyright in these countries involves not the generation and dissemination of learning 
materials, but access to and the price of those materials. In this view, stronger IPR will 
increase the costs of textbooks, educational software, and reference materials. This will 
make learning material less accessible and more expensive, increasing the cost of sending 
children to school and keeping them in school through graduation (Boyle 2004).  
This chapter examines the impact of intellectual property rights on several 
important education outcomes. As was the case in the previous chapter, the goal is to 
empirically test the assertion by some NGOs, activists, and scholars that strengthening 
IPR is bad for access to education and knowledge, especially in developing countries. As 
a result, the hypotheses are structured in this direction. However, since IPR supporters 
make the opposite argument, these analyses are also a test of which impact on education 
is stronger: a negative impact through increased prices, or a positive impact either 
directly through the development of new and cheaper resources or indirectly through 
economic growth. We must also be careful interpreting these results, as there is a 
potential argument for reverse causality. Rather than stronger IPR having an impact on 
educational outcomes, it is possible that better educational outcomes create incentives for 
countries to strengthen IPR as their citizens become intellectual property creators rather 
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than purely users. I discuss this idea more in the sections that follow and in the discussion 
at the end of the chapter.  
Ideally, we would examine the impact of IPR, especially copyright, on the prices 
of textbooks and educational material directly. Unfortunately, large-N data does not exist 
on these price levels. Instead, I examine the impact of IPR on macro-level education 
outcomes by running regressions on several education-related dependent variables, 
including enrollment rates at the primary, secondary, and tertiary level, school-life 
expectancy rates, and school completion rates. A second limitation involves the 
distinction between public and private education systems, and whether individual citizens 
have to pay for their children’s education. Countries vary widely in the percentage of 
students who attend public schools at each level of education, and in the average annual 
cost of school attendance. Some countries provide textbooks, educational software, and 
other learning material for free, while families in other countries are required to buy these 
materials. Unfortunately, large-N data on differences in the cost of attending school is not 
available and cannot be included directly in the statistical analysis. There are likely 
important intervening factors, and collecting this data would be a fruitful extension of the 
analysis in this project. 
The health chapter used a measure of patent strength as the IPR variable, which 
was the most appropriate measure for health outcomes. In this chapter, however, I use an 
index of copyright strength instead. Copyright has a much stronger theoretical link to 
educational materials and outcomes, which are largely authored works rather than 
industrial products and designs. 
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The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the variables and data used in the 
analysis, the methodology employed, and the results for each education outcome. The 
final section concludes with a discussion of the results.  
 
4.1   Variables of Interest 
 
4.1.1 Dependent Variables  
 
I examine the relationship between IPR and three sets of educational outcomes for 
various levels of education: enrollments, school life expectancy, and completion rates. 
Data on each outcome comes from the World Bank’s Education Statistics database. The 
general theory being tested is that stronger IPR will make sending children to school, and 
keeping them in school through completion, more expensive for families, and will 
therefore result in worse education outcomes. I discuss each dependent variable in more 
detail and the specific hypotheses being tested in the sections that follow. Full definitions 
and descriptive statistics for all the dependent variables are found in Table 4.1.14   
                                                          
14 One important education outcome that is notably missing from this list is literacy. Literacy is a critical 
outcome for all countries, especially developing countries. Unfortunately, large-N literacy data is 
incomplete and not extensive. When regressions were run on literacy statistics of many forms (adult, 
female, child, etc.), there were too few available observations to have confidence in the regression results. 
This was true for both fixed effects panel regressions and single-year OLS regressions. Literacy remains an 
essential education outcome, of course, but exploring the relationship between IPR and literacy will have to 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.1.2 Intellectual Property Rights 
  
 The key explanatory variable is a measure of copyright strength developed by Tad 
Reynolds, and later updated by Walter Park (W. G. Park 2005; Reynolds 2003).  
Copyright strength is determined by coding each of four elements of copyright protection 
in each country for the specified year: (1) the duration of copyright protection for various 
product categories, (2) restrictions on unauthorized use of copyrighted material, (3) the 
availability of enforcement mechanisms, and (4) membership in copyright agreements 
and treaties. Each of the four elements is scored on a 0 to 1 scale and summed, so that 
each country’s patent strength in a given year can range from 0 to 4. Higher values 
represent stronger levels of protection. This index is compiled annually, from 1965 – 
2010 for 122 countries at all levels of development. In the analysis that follows, I 
examine the impact of the copyright index on each dependent variable, but I also 
disaggregate the index to examine the relative importance of each component of the 
index. 
 
4.1.3 Control Variables 
 
 In addition to the copyright variable, the education regressions include five 
control variables. Each controls for potential intervening variables that might 
correlate with both IPR and educational outcomes. GDP, the polity score, and 
fertility rates are familiar controls from the previous chapter, but they have 
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theoretical importance for education outcomes as well.15 Richer countries are likely 
to have both stronger copyright and better education outcomes. Additionally, richer 
countries are likely to have better educational outcomes regardless of the level of 
intellectual property protection. Likewise, the policy score is relevant as countries 
with more democratic forms of government are more responsive to public opinion, 
which generally favors education programs and may force governments to pay more 
attention to educational outcomes above and beyond simple government spending on 
education.  
There is good reason to believe that when education is more expensive for 
families the impact on outcomes will be worse for young girls than young boys, 
especially in the developing world. Scholarly research, as well as work by the UN 
Children’s Fund, the World Bank, and NGOs, has routinely observed that when 
circumstances restrict access to education, families tend to education boys more than 
girls (Bellamy 2004; M. A. Lewis and Lockheed 2006; Tembon and Fort 2008; 
Unterhalter and Oommen 2009). We want to compare the impact of IPR on education 
outcomes for men vs. women, so in order to isolate the role copyright plays it is 
important to control for gender attitudes in society. As before, I use the fertility rate 
as a proxy for gender attitudes, a practice well supported in the development 
literature (Boissiere 2004; M. Marmot et al. 2008; M. Marmot and Wilkinson 1999).  All 
three of these variables also appear regularly in the literature on education outcomes 
(Davison 1993; J. Scott 2004). 
                                                          
15 This chapter uses GDP rather than GNI for two reasons: first, using GDP increases the number of 
observations because GNI is missing for several cases that would otherwise be included. Second, GDP is 
itself more often statistically significant than GNI. Each regression was checked for robustness by using 
GNI instead, and there was no meaningful difference in the impact of IPR on each outcome. 
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Additional controls for educational expenditure and pupil-teacher ratios are 
included. More government spending on education could mitigate any negative 
impact of IPR, as the cost to families is reduced or subsidized by government 
spending. Likewise, when countries have more favorable pupil-teacher ratios, they 
may be able to work with fewer books and educational materials, reducing the 
importance of the cost of these items. The education literature suggests that these 
variables are important determinants of education in general, and their potential 
relationship with IPR make them worthy controls to include (Card and Krueger 1996; 
Case and Deaton 1999; Fowler and Walberg 1991). The polity variable comes from the 
Polity IV project, the education spending and pupil-teacher ratio variables comes 
from the World Bank’s Education Statistics database, and the GDP and fertility rate 
data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Table 4.2 includes 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2   Methods 
  
This chapter employs similar methods as those used in the previous chapter on 
health outcomes. I examine the impact of copyright on each education outcome through 
fixed effects regressions with Huber/White robust standard errors, clustered at the 
country level. These robust standard errors are consistent even when the disturbances are 
not identically distributed over the panels or there is serial correlation in the error term. 
Of the regression models available to examine panel data, a fixed effects model is 
preferable for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Given the diversity of countries in 
the analysis, we have good reason to expect country specific fixed effects. This 
theoretical argument is confirmed by postestimation tests. A Hausman test after each 
regression, which checks mathematically for country specific effects, strongly confirms 
the presence of fixed effects, suggesting that both pooled OLS and random effects models 
would produce inconsistent estimators.  
Unlike the previous analysis of health outcomes, however, these education 
regressions have significantly more observations. The copyright index is measured 
annually from 1965 – 2010, and data for government spending on education is available 
since 1970. The reader will recall that, in Chapter 3, we had patent data every five years 
and health spending data only since 1990. As a result, the fixed effects regressions 
presented here include data from 1970 – 2005 and have more observations, more within-
country variation, and significantly more leverage. Notwithstanding this fact, I also ran 
single-year OLS regressions for each dependent variable. Missing data in some years 
restricted the number of countries in the OLS models, and each OLS returned 
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insignificant results for the copyright variable. As a result, I do not report the OLS 
models.16 
 As was the case with health outcomes, we have reason to believe that the impact 
of IPR on education might be different at different levels of development. To test whether 
or not this is true, I ran each model with interaction terms as described in Chapter 3. 
Interestingly, the level of development only mattered for one set of outcomes: tertiary 
enrollment rates. That difference is discussed in the relevant section below, but for every 
other outcome there was no difference in the impact of IPR for developed and developing 
countries.  
I then disaggregate the copyright variable into its four components and test the 
impact of each component on the education outcomes. As I discussed above, the main 
explanatory variable captures four components of copyright strength: (1) the duration of 
copyright protection, (2) restrictions on unauthorized use of copyrighted material, (3) the 
availability of enforcement mechanisms, and (4) membership in copyright agreements 
and treaties. It may be informative to disaggregate this concept and to compare the 
impact of each of the four components on each education outcome. Perhaps one or more 
aspect of copyright is consistently more important than the others. Table 4.3 displays the 
method by which each of the copyright index is constructed. 
                                                          
16 I also do not include the year dummy variables in the regression tables. Since there were many years in 
each model, it is impractical to report their coefficients in each table. Time fixed effects dummy variables 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Finally, I lag the copyright variable five, ten, and fifteen years to see if copyright 
has a different impact on education after a period of time. The causal process we are 
assuming – whereby stronger copyright protections increase the costs of learning 
materials, which in turn increases the cost of sending children to school and keeping them 
in school through graduation – is admittedly a long causal chain. For this reason, the 
fourth analysis lags the copyright variable and examines the impact of copyright lagged 5 
years, 10 years, and 15 years on each dependent variable. 
 
4.3   Enrollment Rates 
 
4.3.1 Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary School Enrollment Rates 
 
The theory in question is that stronger IPR make it harder for people across the 
world, but especially in developing countries, to access knowledge and education. 
Stronger IPR, especially copyright protections, make textbooks, educational software, 
and other learning material more expensive. Absent help from the government, a more 
expensive education will lead to fewer children enrolled in school. The enrollment rate is 
the percentage of the primary, secondary, and tertiary school age population who are 
enrolled in school for that year. When increased costs force families to keep children at 
home, we also expect that impact to be larger for girls than for boys. Therefore, we are 






H1: Countries with higher values for the copyright index will have lower primary, 
secondary, and tertiary enrollment rates. 
(IPR coefficients with a negative sign) 
 
H2: The magnitude of the negative impact on enrollment rates will be larger for 
the female population than for the male population.  
 
As mentioned above, IPR supporters make the opposite argument, that stronger copyright 
protection will generate native development of educational materials and may in fact 
drive prices down. Additionally, increased economic growth that results from stronger 
IPR will make more money available for governments to invest in education and other 
factors that may affect educational outcomes. If we observe a positive significant impact 
of IPR on enrollments, we may have evidence to support this opposing view. However, 
since there is a logical argument that causality may run in the opposite direction, a 
positive significant impact may be the result of reverse causality, where countries with 
more educated populations are generating more intellectual property and, as a result, 
strengthen their IPR laws. 
Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 present the results of regressions on primary, secondary, 
and tertiary enrollment rates. For primary enrollment, copyright strength appears to have 
a significant negative relationship with overall enrollment rates. A one-unit increase in 
the copyright score, which is a 25% increase in protection, is associated with a decrease 
in total primary school enrollment of 5.6537%.  This impact is smaller for males, where a 
one unit increase in copyright is associated with a 3.6191% decline in enrollment, and it 
is larger for females, where a one unit increase in copyright corresponds to a 6.3008% 
decrease in enrollment. This evidence is strong support for the hypotheses presented 
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above. Stronger IPR do appear to be related to worse enrollment rates for men and 




























































Observations 918 908 908
# Countries 108 107 107
# Years 16 16 16
R2 Overall 0.0085 0.0826 0.0057
R2 Within 0.5972 0.6411 0.5367
R2 Between 0.0721 0.0025 0.0694
†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 






























































Observations 734 718 718
# Countries 106 105 105
# Years 16 16 16
R2 Overall 0.5927 0.6377 0.5305
R2 Within 0.7406 0.7156 0.7422
R2 Between 0.6003 0.6450 0.512
†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 






























































Observations 639 589 589
# Countries 104 101 101
# Years 16 16 16
R2 Overall 0.6135 0.5535 0.5854
R2 Within 0.7438 0.7699 0.7221
R2 Between 0.5849 0.4772 0.5780
†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 





In terms of control variables, education spending and the pupil-teacher ratio both 
have significant positive relationships with enrollment, while GDP/capita has a 
significant negative relationship. It is almost certainly the case that we are observing 
reverse causality for these variables. When enrollments are higher, governments must 
spend more money on education and classes will face larger student-teacher ratios. When 
enrollments are lower, young people are not in school and the population has less 
education overall, which leads to lower productivity and lower GDP. Making a causal 
argument in the other direction is much more tenuous. Additionally, the fertility rate is 
significant only for female primary school enrollment. This relationship could potentially 
be explained through a causal argument in either direction. On the one hand, lower 
enrollments leave young women out of school, which may give them an increased 
opportunity to become pregnant at a young age, increasing the number of children young 
women have in their lives and society’s overall fertility rate. On the other hand, it might 
be the case that societies that have higher fertility rates also have less progressive gender 
attitudes, and as a result they do not prioritize formal education of young women, leading 
to lower enrollment rates. In fact, it may be the case that both of these processes are true. 
These control variable results are both interesting and worthy of further exploration. The 
purpose of including these variables is not to understand their individual relationships 
with enrollment rates, but rather to isolate the impact of copyright protection on 
enrollments.  
For secondary and tertiary enrollment rates, we get significantly different results. 
At both the secondary and tertiary levels, copyright strength is significantly and 
positively related to enrollment. While the copyright variable is not significant in the 
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regression model for total secondary school enrollment, it is significant for male 
secondary school enrollment and approaches traditional levels of significance for female 
secondary school enrollment (p-vale = 0.10). A one-unit increase in copyright strength is 
associated with a 3.3805% increase in male secondary school enrollment and a 3.1448% 
increase in female secondary school enrollment (if we accept this p-value). Only the 
fertility rate control is significant for secondary school enrollment, and the direction and 
function of this variable are similar to what we observed for primary school enrollment. 
The magnitude of the positive relationship between copyright and enrollments is 
even larger at the tertiary level. A one-unit increase in copyright strength is associated 
with a 5.3175% increase in total tertiary school enrollment, a 5.2143% increase in female 
tertiary school enrollment, and a 6.5779% increase in male tertiary school enrollment. 
For the control variables, the fertility rate is no longer significant, but GDP is positively 
related to enrollment and the pupil-teacher ratio (at the secondary school level) is 
negatively related to enrollment. The GDP relationship is easy to understand, as increases 
in GDP provide both the incentive and ability to attend university and other post-graduate 
programs. The negative relationship between secondary school pupil-teacher ratios and 
tertiary enrollments is more difficult to explain. It may be that secondary school pupil-
teacher ratios are indicating lower quality educational systems, or educational systems 
with fewer resources in general. Countries with weak or overtaxed educational systems 
are likely to matriculate fewer individuals into university and post-graduate programs. 
This is just one potential explanation, and fully understanding this result would require 
follow up research. 
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Clearly, this evidence does not support the two hypotheses being tested, and in 
fact offers significant evidence that a relationship exists in the opposite direction. There 
are a few ways we might interpret the results for secondary and tertiary enrollment rates. 
This positive significant relationship could be the result of stronger copyright increasing 
the incentives for domestic authors to create new and better learning resources, which 
theoretically could be available at lower costs than imported books, software, and 
reference material. Alternatively, stronger IPR (copyright and other IPR) may be 
generating economic growth. Stronger growth might create additional public and private 
resources that drive down the cost of education, and stronger growth might increase the 
need for and incentive to pursue secondary and tertiary education. Finally, the observed 
relationship may be the result of reverse causality, where higher enrollments are driving 
government decisions about IPR and copyright law. When more of the population is 
enrolled in secondary and especially tertiary education, countries may be generating more 
human capital and creating more intellectual property and authored works, increasing the 
incentive for governments to protect intellectual property. Rather than copyright driving 
enrollments, higher enrollments may be leading to stronger copyright protections. I 
discuss this reverse causality argument in more detail in the discussion section below. 
 
4.3.2 Enrollment Rates by Level of Development 
 
By including interaction terms for the level of development, a methodology 
described in detail in the previous chapter, we can determine if the relationship between 
copyright and enrollment rates is different for developed countries than for developing 
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ones. For primary and secondary enrollment the results suggest there is no difference 
based on the level of development. Both developing and developed countries experience 
a negative relationship between copyright and primary enrollment and a positive 
relationship between copyright and secondary enrollment. There was, however, a 
difference for tertiary enrollment rates. Table 4.7 reports the results for tertiary 
enrollment. The first copyright coefficient reports the relationship between copyright and 
enrollment in developing countries, while the second copyright coefficient reports the 
difference in the relationship for developed countries. The total impact of copyright on 
enrollment in developed countries is the sum of the two coefficients. According to these 
results, copyright has a significant positive effect on enrollments for both developing and 
developed countries, but magnitude of the impact is much larger in the developed world. 
In developing countries, a one unit increase in copyright corresponds to a 3.3216% 
increase in total tertiary enrollment, a 2.9889% increase in female tertiary enrollment, 
and a 4.4261% increase in male tertiary enrollment. In developed countries, the size of 
the impact is two to three times as large: a 10.091% increase overall, a 9.493% increase 
for women, and a 10.7339% increase for men. The significance, direction, and magnitude 
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Observations 639 589 589
# Countries 104 101 101
# Years 16 16 16
R2 Overall 0.6999 0.6572 0.6603
R2 Within 0.7767 0.7936 0.7577
R2 Between 0.6966 0.6385 0.6763
†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level




Whether this positive relationship between tertiary enrollments is the result of 
domestic innovation, increased economic growth, or reverse causality, the relationship is 
apparently much stronger in the developed world. This could be a function of more 
sophisticated educational systems, higher levels of domestic innovation, and more 
developed intellectual property-related industries in the developed world, although the 
exact causal link is unclear from these results.  
 
4.3.3 Disaggregated Copyright Scores and Enrollment Rates 
 
We can examine the impact of each of the four components of the copyright 
measure on enrollment rates separately. Table 4.8 presents these results. To make the 
tables easier to read, I report only the copyright coefficients for each model. The models 
each have the same number of observations as the combined IPR models above, and the 
significance and direction of the control variables are the same as reported above. The 
first column reports the coefficient for the combined copyright variable. The next four 
columns display the results for each component of copyright.  
An important caveat is needed here. Recall that the combined variable was 
constructed by adding the four component parts. Each of the four components is on a 
scale from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no protection of that component and 1 indicating 
complete protection. The combined variable can take on values between 0 and 5, while 
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†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level




When we are examining regression coefficients we can compare directly across the four 
components of copyright that are on the same scale, but we must be careful comparing 
the impact of any single component to the combined variable, as these will be on 
different scales. While a one-unit increase in the combined copyright value is a 25% 
increase in protection, a one-unit increase in one of the component parts is a 100% 
increase. 
For primary school enrollment, only treaty membership is insignificant. Copyright 
duration, restrictions on unauthorized use, and enforcement mechanisms are all 
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statistically significant and negative, with a one-unit (100%) increase in each component 
corresponding to a roughly 5.9% - 14.5% decrease in enrollments. In terms of magnitude, 
duration and restrictions have relatively equal impacts on enrollment, while enforcement 
has a smaller impact. As is the case with the combined copyright measure, stronger 
protections decrease enrollment more for women than for men. We can conclude from 
these results that duration and usage appear to have large impacts on enrollments, 
enforcement a meaningful but smaller impact, and treaty membership alone no impact. 
The results for secondary and tertiary enrollment are different. At the secondary 
school level, the positive relationship between copyright and male enrollment is 
explained entirely by treaty membership, which is the only component that is statistically 
significant. Treaty membership’s impact is also quite large, with a one-unit (100%) 
increase in treaty membership corresponding to a 13.5151% increase in male secondary 
school enrollment. At the tertiary level, duration, enforcement, and treaty membership are 
each significant for total enrollment and male enrollment, while only duration and treaty 
membership are significant for female enrollment. In terms of magnitude, treaty 
membership has the largest impact, with a one-unit (100%) increase in membership 
corresponding to an increase in total enrollment of 16.6845%, in female enrollment of 
19.2345%, and in male enrollment of 21.3851%. The size of the coefficient is smaller for 
duration, where a one-unit increase is related to enrollment increases between 10.5% – 
13.1%. The relationship between tertiary enrollment and enforcement is smaller still, with 
a one-unit increase in enforcement related to an 8.0439% increase in total tertiary 
enrollment and 8.2860% increase in male tertiary enrollment.  
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What general conclusions can we draw from these disaggregated copyright 
results? First, these results confirm the finding from the combined copyright variable that 
the relationship between copyright and enrollments functions differently at the primary 
level than it does at the secondary and tertiary level. For primary school, copyright and its 
components are negatively related to enrollments, offering evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that stronger copyright protections drive up the cost of school and decrease 
primary school enrollment. At the secondary and tertiary level, there appears to be a 
relationship in the opposite direction, with stronger protections associated with higher 
enrollments. This is true for the copyright components as well as the aggregate copyright 
measure.  
The second general conclusion is that each of the four components of copyright 
matter for some enrollments and not others. Treaty membership does not seem to be 
significant in the negative relationship between primary school enrollment and copyright, 
but it is highly significant with large impacts in the positive relationship between 
secondary and tertiary enrollment and copyright. Meanwhile, although restrictions on 
unauthorized use is significant for primary school enrollments, it is not significant for 
secondary and tertiary enrollments. Apparently, each of these four components matters, 
but does not matter consistently across all enrollment measures.  
 
4.3.4 Lagged Copyright and Enrollment Rates 
 
As was the case in the previous chapter, we might expect it to take time for IPR to 
have an impact on a macro-level measures of education. Rather than examining only 
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contemporary copyright levels, I lagged the copyright variable five, ten, and fifteen years 
and included the lagged variable as the key explanatory factor in each regression. Table 
4.9 reports the results for primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment rates. Again I report 
only the copyright coefficients to make the table easy to read. The number of 
observations and the results for the control variables are roughly identical to the 
contemporary models reported above.  
 When lagged five and ten years, copyright strength appears to have similar 
impacts on enrollments as contemporary copyright strength. The direction, significance, 
and magnitude of lagged copyright is almost identical for primary and secondary 
enrollment rates. Tertiary enrollment is the one place we see some slight differences. Five 
and ten year lagged copyright are significantly and positively related to tertiary 
enrollments, but the level of significance is stronger and the magnitude of the impact is 
larger. While a one-unit increase in contemporary copyright strength is associated with a 
3.3% - 4.4% increase in tertiary enrollment, significant at the 0.05 level, five and ten year 
lagged copyright is associated with a 6.1% - 7.2% increase in tertiary enrollment, 
significant at the 0.001 level. Interestingly, copyright lagged fifteen years is not 
significant at all for primary and secondary enrollment, and is less significant with 






































































































†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level




 These results suggest that, for the most part, lagging the copyright variable does 
not produce significantly different relationships between copyright and enrollment. If 
anything, after some time copyright may have slightly larger impacts on tertiary 




4.4   School Life Expectancy 
 
4.4.1 Total, Female, and Male School Life Expectancy 
 
 The World Bank tracks another educational benchmark called school life 
expectancy, which is the total number of years of schooling a child of a certain age can 
expect to receive in the future, including primary and lower secondary levels of 
education. If stronger copyright protections make textbooks and other educational 
resources more expensive, preventing access to education for young people, we would 
expect school life expectancy rates to decline. As before, we might expect this negative 
impact on school life expectancy to be worse for young girls. Thus, we are testing the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H3: Countries with higher values for the copyright index will have lower school 
life expectancy rates. 
(IPR coefficients with a negative sign) 
 
H4: The magnitude of the negative impact on school life expectancy will be larger 
for the female population than for the male population.  
 
As before, we must consider the counter argument from IPR supporters that stronger 
copyright protection will increase economic growth, making more money available for 
governments to invest in education. If we observe a positive significant impact of 
copyright on school life expectancy, we may have evidence to support this opposing 
view. Reverse causality is also still a possibility, so a positive significant impact may be 
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the result of countries with more educated populations generating more intellectual 
property and, as a result, strengthening their IPR laws. 
 Table 4.10 presents the results for total, female, and male school life expectancy. 
Copyright appears to have a significant negative impact on school life expectancy for the 
total population, for females, and for males. A one-unit (25%) increase in copyright 
strength is associated with a decrease in school life expectancy of 0.4176 years for the 
full population, 0.4242 years for the female population, and 0.2610 years for the male 
population. Countries represented in the regression model had minimum school life 
expectancy values close to zero and maximum values of 16.41 years, with an average 
school life expectancy of 10.07 years. For the average country, a decrease in school life 
expectancy of nearly half a year is a 5% overall decrease resulting from a 25% increase in 
copyright protection. This is a substantively significant result. For the control variables, 
education spending is positively related, and fertility rates are negatively related to school 
life expectancy, which is similar to the results observed for enrollment rates discussed 
above. This evidence supports the hypotheses being tested: stronger copyright protections 
appear to be related to lower school life expectancy rates, and the magnitude of that 
negative impact is considerably larger for females than males. I mentioned above, but 
will repeat here, that this result holds for countries at all levels of development. There is 



























































Observations 840 804 804
# Countries 106 105 105
# Years 16 16 16
R2 Overall 0.1251 0.3139 0.0565
R2 Within 0.7274 0.7501 0.6934
R2 Between 0.0498 0.2369 0.0027
†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 





4.4.2 Disaggregated Copyright Scores and School Life Expectancy 
  
 Table 4.11 presents the results for disaggregated copyright components. Among 
the four components of copyright protection, the most consistently relevant factor is the 
availability of restrictions on unauthorized use. This component is statistically significant 
or close to traditional levels of significance for total, male, and female school life 
expectancy (p-value = 0.07 for female school life expectancy). Countries who have all 
three restrictions experience school life expectancy rates 1.0939 years shorter for the total 
population, 0.8833 years shorter for females, and 0.7442 years shorter for males than 
countries that have none of the three restrictions. In the regression model for total school 
life expectancy, the duration of coverage component and the enforcement component are 
also significant (p-value = 0.078 for enforcement). A one-unit (100%) increase in 
duration is associated with a 0.8891 year decrease in total school life expectancy, while a 
one-unit (100%) increase in enforcement is associated with a 0.5132 year decrease in 
school life expectancy (assuming we accept this p-value). Finally, membership in 
copyright treaties is very close to traditional levels of significance (p-value = 0.056), but 
only for female school life expectancy. From these results we can conclude that each of 
the four components appears to matter to some degree, and the restrictions components is 






4.4.3 Lagged Copyright and School Life Expectancy 
 
 Once again we can lag the copyright variable to see if the impact of copyright on 
school life expectancy is different after a period of time. Table 4.12 presents these results, 
which are similar to the lagged copyright results for school enrollment rates. Lagged five 
and ten years, copyright has roughly the same effect on school life expectancy rates as 
contemporary copyright levels. This result is true for the total population, for males, and 
for females. We do not learn much new about the relationship between copyright and 
school life expectancy from these results, but there is no evidence that contradicts the 
hypotheses in question. Copyright protection appears to have a significant negative 
impact on school life expectancy rates for male and female students, with a one-unit 
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Table 4.11: Disagregated Copyright on School Life Expectancy
***  Significant at 0.001 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
†      Significant at 0.10 level










































Table 4.12: Lagged Copyright on School Life Expectancy
†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level  
 
 
4.5   School Completion Rates 
 
4.5.1 Primary and Secondary School Completion Rates 
 
If stronger copyright protections make sending kids to school more expensive, we 
might expect fewer students to complete each level of their education. World Bank data 
is available on primary and secondary school completion rates for male and female 
students, as well as the total student population. I test the following hypotheses: 
 
H3: Countries with higher values for the copyright index will have lower primary 
and secondary school completion rates. 
(IPR coefficients with a negative sign) 
 
H4: The magnitude of the negative impact on school completion rates will be 




Given the counterargument from IPR supporters that stronger IPR will lead to growth and 
ultimately better education outcomes – and the potential for reverse causality – this is 
also a test of which effect of copyright is stronger: the positive impact on education 
through growth or the negative impact on education through prices. 
Tables 4.13 and 4.14 present the results for primary and secondary school 
completion rates. At the primary level, we observe a significant negative relationship 
between copyright strength and completion rates. A one-unit (25%) increase in copyright 
strength is associated with a 2.6881% decrease in total primary school completion and a 
4.0008% decrease in female primary school completion, and a 2.1064% decrease in male 
primary school completion (p-value = 0.095). Controls for education spending and the 
fertility rate are significant and function in the direction we would expect, with increases 
in spending improving completion rates while higher fertility rates are associated with 
lower completion rates, especially for women. As was the case with primary school 
enrollment rates, higher GDP is significantly associated with lower completion rates, 
which may be the result of reverse causality as societies with lower completion rates have 





























































Observations 671 628 628
# Countries 94 89 89
# Years 15 15 15
R2 Overall 0.2405 0.4225 0.1086
R2 Within 0.6510 0.6653 0.5508
R2 Between 0.1422 0.3571 0.0234
†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 































































Observations 491 458 458
# Countries 86 82 82
# Years 14 14 14
R2 Overall 0.6065 0.5544 0.3576
R2 Within 0.6491 0.6468 0.5972
R2 Between 0.6737 0.6216 0.3949
†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 





These results offer strong support for the hypotheses being tested. Stronger copyright 
protection appears to have a significant and negative impact on primary school 
completion. Interestingly, none of these results hold for secondary school completion 
rates. Copyright strength, as well as nearly all the control variables, appears to have no 
impact on or relationship with secondary school completion. 
 
4.5.2 Disaggregated Copyright and School Completion Rates 
 
Table 4.15 presents the results for disaggregated copyright components. For 
secondary school completion, none of the components is statistically significant, which 
mirrors the results for the combined copyright variable. For primary school completion, 
the negative relationship observed for the combined measure is explained by two of the 
four components: duration of protection and restrictions against unauthorized use. The 
magnitude of the impact of the restrictions component is slightly larger than the impact of 
the duration variable, although both are quite large, with a one-unit (100%) increase in 
each component associated with a 6.7% - 12.5% decrease in primary school completion. 
For both components, as was the case for the combined copyright measure, the negative 
impact is slightly larger for female students than for male students. We can conclude that 
duration and restrictions are both important determinants of primary school completion 
rates, while the presence of enforcement mechanisms and membership in copyright 






4.5.3 Lagged Copyright Scores and School Completion Rates 
 
The results for lagged copyright strength are presented in Table 4.16 and follow 
the patterns observed for the lagged measure in the previous analyses. At five, ten and 
fifteen years lagged, copyright continues to have a significant negative relationship with 
primary school completion rates. The five-year lag coefficients are more statistically 
significant and slightly larger than the contemporary copyright coefficients, although the 
size of the coefficients at ten and fifteen years prior are slightly smaller. These results 
suggest that copyright levels from five years ago may have a slightly larger impact on 
primary school completion, and that the impact of copyright on completion rates may 
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†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level
Table 4.15: Disagregated Copyright on Completion Rates
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larger negative impact on female primary school completion rate than male rates. All of 
these results continue to support the hypotheses being tested, that countries with stronger 
copyright protections should experience worse primary school completion rates, and that 




At the secondary level, the lagged copyright models follow the results found in 
the contemporary copyright models: there does not appear to be any relationship – 







































































†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level
Table 4.16: Lagged Copyright on Completion Rates
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4.5   Discussion & Conclusion 
 
 I will conclude with a few general comments. When it comes to education 
outcomes both IPR skeptics and IPR supporters may find evidence presented here to 
support their viewpoint. Stronger copyright protections are associated with worse 
education outcomes at the primary school level; the evidence is mixed at the 
secondary level; and the relationship operates in the other direction at the tertiary 
level. The fixed effect regressions demonstrate a significant, negative relationship 
between copyright strength and primary school enrollment rates, school-life 
expectancy (for primary through lower secondary school), and primary school 
completion rates. Each of these relationships is true for males, females, and the total 
student population, and the magnitude of the impact of copyright on each education 
outcome was larger for females than for males. Unlike the results for secondary and 
tertiary enrollment, there is no reverse causality argument to be made, so these 
results are fairly compelling evidence in support of the hypotheses being test and the 
argument that stronger copyright protections are a barrier to access to education.  
 On the other hand, the results are quite different for secondary and tertiary 
education, where we find statistically significant but positive relationships between 
copyright strength and enrollment rates. For tertiary enrollment, we have evidence 
that the impact of copyright is different at different levels of development. There is a 
statistically significant positive relationship for all countries, but a much larger 
impact for developed countries.  
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As discussed above, there are three potential explanations for this positive 
relationship. First, stronger copyright (and other IPR) may be stimulating domestic 
creation of educational materials, making those materials cheaper. Alternatively, 
stronger copyright (and other IPR) may be stimulating overall economic growth. This 
may have two beneficial effects on enrollments, increasing public and private 
resources and student/family financial conditions that allow students to stay enrolled, 
while at the same time increasing the economic incentive to attend secondary and 
tertiary programs. Finally, we may be observing reverse causality with enrollment 
rates driving copyright protection. When more students are enrolled in secondary and 
tertiary education, society is developing more human capital and higher capacity for 
developing intellectual property and authored works. This increases the incentive for 
governments to protect intellectual property as citizens shift from importers of 
intellectual property to creators of intellectual property. All three of these 
explanations make logical sense.  
Here it is helpful to return to the political and institutional factors that play 
into the relationship between IPR and human outcomes. One argument against 
reverse causality has to do with the process by which countries have been reforming 
IPR law in the recent past. For most of the developing world, changes to IPR 
protections have come not endogenously through economic growth and the growth of 
knowledge industries, but through joining the WTO and bilateral and multilateral 
political pressure from the richer and more powerful economies of the world. Sifting 
through these three explanations, and determining the causal process by which 
secondary and tertiary enrollments are related to copyright strength, is one of the 
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most promising opportunities for future research beyond this dissertation. The case 
study in Chapter 6 explores these institutional factors in more detail.  
One of the most surprising findings from these analyses involves the impact 
of copyright at different levels of development. I began the analysis with the 
assumption found in the access to knowledge literature that the negative impact of 
copyright on education would be worse in the developing world. The evidence 
presented here does not support that conclusion. Tertiary enrollment rates – where 
we find a positive relationship – is the one and only model in which the impact is 
different at different levels of development. The statistically significant negative 
relationship observed for primary school enrollment rates, school-life expectancy 
rates, and primary school completion rates is the same in developing and developed 
states. Understanding why there is not a larger difference between countries at 
different levels of development is another promising direction for follow-up 
research.  
We can draw fewer concrete conclusions from the models with disaggregated 
and lagged copyright measures. These results do not contradict the combined 
copyright model results: we still observe significant and negative relationships for 
primary enrollments, school life expectancy, and primary completion rates as well as 
positive relationships for secondary and tertiary enrollment rates. The four 
components of copyright – duration of protection, restrictions on unauthorized use, 
the availability of enforcement mechanisms, and membership in treaties – each 
appears to be important for some outcomes and not others. Treaty membership 
clearly matters more for the positive impact on secondary and tertiary enrollment 
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rates, and this component is not significant in the models that result in a negative 
impact on education outcomes. The other three components sometimes matter and 
sometimes do not. The lagged copyright analyses offer similarly vague results. At no 
point does the direction of the relationship change when the copyright variable is 
lagged (something that did happen in the previous chapter). For the most part, 
copyright strength lagged five and ten years remains statistically significant and in 
the same direction as contemporary copyright strength.  
In conclusion, these analysis offer support to IPR skeptics when we consider 
primary school outcomes, but offer support to IPR supporters when we consider 
secondary and tertiary school outcomes. While not conclusive, these results offer 
good suggestive evidence that copyright presents a barrier to education for young 
students, but not for older students. At some point later in the educational process, 
copyright protection and education are mutually reinforcing rather than at odds with 





The Impact of IPR on Inequality 
 
Income inequality is the third and final aspect of human development this project 
will examine. As was the case in the previous two chapters, the goal is to empirically test 
the assertion by some NGOs, activists, and scholars that strengthening IPR is bad for 
human development, especially in developing countries. This chapter begins with a 
discussion of the theoretical link between IPR and inequality, followed by a discussion of 
the variables and data used in the analysis, the methodology employed, and the outcome 
of the analysis. The final section concludes with a discussion of the results.  
The theoretical relationship between IPR and inequality is more complicated than 
IPR’s relationship with health and education. Causal mechanisms operate both from an 
economic argument about the “winners” and “losers” of strong IP regimes, as well as 
indirectly through the other two social objectives: education and health.  
From an economic standpoint, strengthening IPR may worsen income inequality 
by encouraging economic growth. A higher growth rate increases the rate of return on 
assets, thus increasing the income of asset-wealthy households relative to asset-poor 
households (Adams 2008; Chu 2009; Chu and Peng 2009). In other words, stronger IPR 
benefit property holders and those in society who have the capacity and resources for 
innovation and investment. The ‘losers’ in the equation are domestic entrepreneurs who 
count on imitation of existing products for their own economic success, along with 
farmers, the working poor, and others who do not depend on IP-related products and 
services. The importance of imitation as an economic driver has been widely noted by 
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opponents and supporters of IPR alike (Chen and Puttitanun 2005; Maskus 2000a, 
2000b). In effect, stronger IPR redistribute wealth from the users of intellectual property 
to the owners and creators of intellectual property. To be sure, economic growth is a good 
thing for development. The argument here is a familiar one many scholars make 
regarding globalization in general: that IPR can spur economic growth while 
simultaneously worsening income inequality. 
In addition to this economic logic, there is a second causal link involving 
education and health outcomes. If stronger IPR raise the cost of education, the education 
gap between the rich and poor will widen, while those with means can afford private 
education and more educational resources.  As the education achievement gap grows, 
income and wealth inequality also increases. In this way, stronger IPR reinforces existing 
inequality within societies. 
Similarly, if stronger IPR increase the costs of medicines, medical technology, 
infrastructure, and medical access, the poor in society will suffer disproportionately. In 
developing countries, any illness in the family can lead to what Whitehead, Dahlgren, and 
Evans have called medical poverty traps (Whitehead, Dahlgren, and Evans 2001). A 
vicious cycle of poor nutrition, foregone education, and additional illness emerges. The 
poor struggle to take care of sick family members, leading to reductions in family-level 
income. Meanwhile, those with financial resources can afford to take care of sick family 
members while maintaining their own educational and work lives, avoiding the medical 
poverty trap. Operating through one or more of these causal processes, stronger IPR thus 




5.1 Variables of Interest 
 
5.1.1 Dependent Variables  
 
I examine the impact of IPR on two measures of income inequality: the Gini 
index and the Palma ratio. The Gini index, also known as the Gini coefficient or Gini 
ratio, is a widely used and widely criticized statistic. The Gini index attempts to measure 
the extent to which the distribution of income in a society deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution. It does this by plotting the cumulative percentages of income received 
against the cumulative number of individuals along a Lorenz curve. The Gini index 
reports the area between the Lorenz curve and a 45 degree line representing perfect 
equality. The Gini index is the area between the line and curve expressed as a percentage 
of the maximum area under the line. The resulting Gini index can therefore vary from 
zero to 100, with a value of zero representing perfect equality, and a value of 100 
representing perfect inequality (World Bank n.d.). Thus, larger Gini values represent 
more unequal distributions. In the data used here, the actual range of the Gini index is 
from 21.20 to 65.45.  The Gini index has been the subject of a considerable amount of 
criticism (for some examples, see Davidson 2009; Deltas 2003; Demuynck 2012; Maio 
2007; Pyatt 1976). Notwithstanding that fact, it remains the most widely used measure of 
income inequality. Data on the Gini index comes from the World Bank Development 
Indicators. 
In addition to the Gini index, I examine the impact of IPR on a second measure of 
inequality called the Palma ratio. The Palma ratio is a fairly new inequality statistic, 
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developed by Alex Cobham and Andy Sumner based on the work of economist Gabriel 
Palma (Cobham and Sumner 2013). Palma’s research discovered that, for most countries, 
the share of national income held by the middle 50% of the population – those 
households between the fifth and ninth decile – is remarkably stable across time and 
countries (Palma 2006, 2011). The income share of the middle 50% almost always 
represents about half of gross national income, while the other half is split between the 
richest 10% and the poorest 40% of society. Countries differ greatly on the share of these 
two groups. The Palma ratio is calculated as the ratio of the income share of the top 10% 
to that of the bottom 40%. Like the Gini index, higher values for the Palma ratio 
represent higher income inequality. In the regressions examined in this chapter, the Palma 
ratio ranges from 0.6437 to 3.4559. 
The Palma ratio addresses two of the biggest issues with the Gini index identified 
by critics: its over-sensitivity to changes in the middle of the income distribution for a 
given country, and its insensitivity to changes at the top and bottom of the income 
distribution. Cobham and Sumner argue that the Palma ratio is an excellent alternative to 
the Gini index, and is preferable to other common income ratios used in the literature (i.e. 
the 20:20 ratio which compares the income share of the top 20% to that of the bottom 
20%). We would expect the Gini index and the Palma ratio to be highly correlated, and 
they are. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.8688. 
I constructed to Palma ratio using data from the World Bank Development 
Indicators. The World Bank collects data on the income share of each decile and quintile 
for countries across time. It is simple enough to create the ratio by dividing the income 
share held by the top decile by the income share held by the bottom two quintiles for each 
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country in each year. One important note is required regarding the construction of the 
Palma ratio. Recall that for the patent index, we have values every five years from 1960 – 
2005. World Bank data on income share by decile and quintile is somewhat spotty, and 
was missing for certain years in which patent data was available. I filled in those missing 
years for the Palma ratio following the procedure Cobham and Sumner established, by 
using the Palma ratio values from one or two time years before or after the relevant year 
(Cobham and Sumner 2013). For example, if the income data was missing for a country 
in 1985, but was available for that country in 1984 or 1986, I assume the same value for 
1985. We have good reason to believe that the income share of the top 10% and bottom 
40% do not change rapidly, so this is a reasonable step to take and allows for sufficient 
observations to conduct large-N analysis. Table 5.1 includes definitions and descriptive 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1.2 Intellectual Property Rights 
  
 In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we used two separate IPR variables: an index of 
patent strength and an index of copyright strength. Patents are more relevant for health 
outcomes while copyright is more relevant for education outcomes. Both types of IPR 
may be relevant for income inequality, so this chapter uses both IPR variables and 
examines each index’s impact on the two dependent variables discussed above. The IPR 
indices should be familiar to the reader, but the index of patent rights is compiled by Juan 
Ginarte and Walter Park and later extended through 2005 by Walter Park (Ginarte and 
Park 1997; W. G. Park 2008). A country’s patent strength in a given year can range from 
0 to 5, with higher values representing stronger levels of protection. The patent index 
includes 122 countries measured every five years from 1960 – 2005. The copyright index 
was developed by Tad Reynolds and later updated by Walter Park (W. G. Park 2005; 
Reynolds 2003). A country’s copyright strength in a given year can range from 0 to 4, 
with higher values representing stronger levels of protection. The copyright index 
includes the same 122 countries measured annually from 1965 – 2010. The two indices 
are clearly related, and we would expect countries with strong patent protections to have 
strong copyright protections as well. The Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.6742 







5.1.3 Control Variables 
 
 In addition to the IPR variable, each inequality regression includes six control 
variables. GDP and the polity score are familiar controls from the previous chapters 
and may be relevant for this investigation as well. GDP is correlated with both 
inequality and IPR strength, so we want to make sure we are not merely observing 
the impact of wealth on inequality. Likewise, the polity score is correlated with both 
inequality and IPR strength, so it is important to control for regime type. We also 
need several economic controls. Inflation, unemployment, and the volume of trade 
are key economic indicators that have been associated with inequality and may 
intervene in the relationship between IPR and inequality. Both inflation and 
unemployment are associated with higher levels of income inequality (Birdsall 1998; E. 
Cardoso and Urani 1995). The relationship between inflation and inequality is debated in 
the literature, although there is some agreement that higher inflation generally worsens 
inequality (Albanesi 2007; Al-Marhubi 1997; R. M. Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2005; 
Jin 2009; Walsh and Yu 2012). There are various ways in which inflation hurts poor 
households more than the rich. The mechanisms for avoiding the costs of rising inflation 
– such as shifting future purchases to the present, investing in consumption goods and 
inflation-adjusted tools rather than cash assets, and using bargaining power to increase 
one’s wages – are usually available to the rich at much higher rates than the poor. The 
relationship between unemployment and inequality is also well established in the 
literature, with general agreement that higher unemployment is a major cause of income 
inequality (Björklund 1991; Cysne 2004; Simkins 2000). The wealthy receive a higher 
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percentage of their income as investment income rather than wage income, and as a 
result, unemployment has a larger negative effect on poorer households. The volume of 
trade is also potentially related to inequality. The literature has come full circle on this 
issue, with the original Heckscher-Ohlin analysis suggesting that trade is a central driver 
of income inequality, as the rich benefit more from trade than the poor. Economic 
analysis in the 1990s demonstrated that this logic did not always hold, especially in low-
income countries. In recent years, the economic literature has produced a number of new 
studies on the relationship between trade and inequality which suggest that the two may 
be positively correlated after all (for a review of this literature, see Harrison, McLaren, 
and McMillan 2011). 
The causal process discussed above involves stronger IPR leading to economic 
growth, which further exacerbates income inequality. In order to isolate the impact of 
IPR it is important to include control variables for unemployment, inflation, and trade 
volume. One additional control proved important: the percentage of the population 
working in agriculture. Highly agrarian economies generally experience more 
inequality and less economic development, which may impact the relationship 
between IPR and inequality. Table 5.2 includes full definitions and descriptive 
statistics for all of the independent variables. 
Government redistributive policies / social welfare spending is one important 
intervening variable that is difficult to include in the large-N analysis. Countries that 
have more egalitarian redistributive policies are likely to have less income inequality 
at all levels of IPR protection and at all levels of development. However, large-N 
data on social welfare spending and redistributive policies are not available  for the 
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full panel of countries. Only the OECD collects social spending data, and that data is 
only available for 34 OECD member countries since 1980. When I include social 
spending in the following models, it decreases the number of observations in each 
model drastically. Social welfare spending is itself not statistically significant in any 
model specification for income inequality, and it is difficult to determine whether 
changes to the significance and magnitude of any of the other independent variables 
is the result of controlling for redistribution or simply an artifact of the limited 
sample and time frame. As a result, I report the full panel models without social 
spending controls. With redistribution / social welfare spending poorly controlled, 
these results are limited. Collecting such data on the full panel over time would be 
one fruitful extension of the project. We would expect redistribution to mitigate 
negative impacts of IPR on income inequality, so for the models below that show a 
significant negative impact of IPR on inequality, it is likely that these models 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The methodology of this chapter is the same as in the previous chapters on health 
and education outcomes. I examine the relationship between IPR and income inequality 
using fixed effects estimators with Huber/White robust standard errors, clustered at the 
country level. I ran single-year OLS models as well, but the results were insignificant for 
the IPR variables. Data limitations in given years, especially for the Gini coefficient, 
reduced the number of observations in the OLS models as well, further weakening the 
value of these regressions. As a result, I only report the fixed effects results.  
For income inequality, as with health and education outcomes, we have reason to 
believe that the impact of IPR on education might be different at different levels of 
development. To test whether or not this is true, I ran each model with interaction terms 
as described in Chapter 3. In the third set of analyses, I disaggregate both the patent index 
and the copyright index into their components and evaluate the impact of each 
component on the Gini index and Palma ratio. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 display the method by 
which each index is constructed, information discussed in the previous chapters but 
repeated here. Finally, I lag the copyright variable five, ten, and fifteen years to see if IPR 




                                                          
17 As was the case in the previous chapter, I do not include the year dummy variables in the regression 
tables. Since there were many years in each model, it is impractical to report their coefficients in each table. 
Time fixed effects dummy variables were included in every model; some year dummies were significant 
and some were not, but none are reported directly. 
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Table 5.3: Components and scoring method of patent rights index. Replicated from Park (2008).
(1) Coverage Available Not Available
Patentability of pharmaceuticals 1/8 0
Patentability of chemicals 1/8 0
Patentability of food 1/8 0
Patentability of surgical products 1/8 0
Patentability of microorganisms 1/8 0
Patentability of utility models 1/8 0
Patentability of software 1/8 0
Patentability of plant and animal varieties 1/8 0
(2) Membership in international treaties Signatory Not signatory
Paris convention and revisions 1/5 0
Patent cooperation treaty 1/5 0
Protection of new varieties (UPOV) 1/5 0
Budapest treaty (microorganism deposits) 1/5 0
Trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 1/5 0
(3) Duration of protection Full Partial
1 0 < f  < 1
(4) Enforcement mechanisms Available Not Available
Preliminary (pre-trial) injunctions 1/3 0
Contributory infringement 1/3 0
Burden of proof reversals 1/3 0
(5) Restrictions on patent rights Does not exist Exists
Working requirements 1/3 0
Compulsory licensing 1/3 0
Recovation of patents 1/3 0
where f  is the duration of protection as a fraction  of 20 years from the date of application or 17 
years from the date of grant (for grant-based patent systems). Overall score for patent rights 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3   Results 
  
 In each analysis below, I examine the impact of the patent index and the copyright 
index on each measure of income inequality. Based on the mechanism described above 
whereby stronger IPR protections lead to higher levels of income inequality, I am testing 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Countries with higher values for IPR (patents and copyright) will have 
higher (more unequal) values for the Gini index and the Palma ratio. 
(IPR coefficients with a positive sign) 
 
 
5.3.1 Gini Index and Palma Ratio for All Countries 
 
 Table 5.5 presents the regression results for the patent index. Patent strength 
appears to have a significant positive impact on the Gini index. A one-unit (20%) 
increase in patent strength is associated with an increase in the Gini index of 1.8478. For 
the average country with a Gini index value of 38.04, this is a 4.9% increase in the Gini 
index, which is a substantial increase in income inequality. Larger increases in IPR 
protection would obviously result in even larger increases in inequality. The only control 
variable that is significant in this model is the percentage of the population who work in 
agriculture. The positive coefficient suggests that countries with higher percentages of 
agricultural workers have higher levels of inequality, which matches our expectations for 
this variable. Interestingly, the patent index is insignificant for the Palma ratio, 
suggesting that there is no relationship. This could be the result of missing data, as the 
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total number of observations in the Palma model is smaller, and the Palma model only 
includes 44 countries while the Gini index model includes 63. Alternatively, this could be 
the result of the Palma ratio capturing a different aspect of inequality. Fully 
understanding why the patent index affects the Gini index but not the Palma ratio will 
require follow-up research. From these results we can conclude that patents appear to be 
significantly and positively associated with at least one measure of income inequality.  
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# Countries 63 49
# Years 6 6
R2 Overall 0.0179 0.0020
R2 Within 0.3126 0.2814
R2 Between 0.0117 0.0244
†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level





 Table 5.6 presents the regression results for the copyright index. In both models 
the copyright measure is statistically insignificant, suggesting that there is no relationship 
between copyright strength and the Gini index or the Palma ratio. Several control 
variables are significant, including GDP and the percentage of the population in 
agriculture in both models, and inflation in the Palma ratio model. Oddly, the GDP 
variable changes direction and is negatively associated with the Gini index but positively 
associated with the Palma ratio. This suggests that countries with higher GDP/capita 
levels have more equal distributions of income as measured by the Gini index, but less 
equal distributions of income as measured by the Palma ratio. Exploring this outcome in 
more detail is beyond the scope of this project, but this is an interesting result and one 
that might tell us something about the relative merits of measuring inequality with the 
Gini index vs. the Palma ratio. Both inflation and the percentage of the population in 
agriculture are positively correlated with inequality, which is the expected direction for 
each variable. While the control variable results are interesting, the insignificant result for 
the copyright variable suggests that there is no observable impact of copyright strength 
on inequality across the countries in the sample. These models do have significantly more 
observations that the patent index models above, since the copyright index has annual 
data rather than 5-year data.  
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# Countries 75 55
# Years 27 26
R2 Overall 0.2169 0.0001
R2 Within 0.1664 0.2141
R2 Between 0.2252 0.0002
†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level





5.3.2 Gini Index and Palma Ratio Results at Different Levels of Development 
 
By including development interaction terms we can determine if the results 
observed in the previous models hold at all levels of development. For the patent index, 
there is no difference between countries that are developing and those that are developed. 
The positive significant relationship between patent strength and the Gini index, and the 
absence of any relationship between patent strength and the Palma ratio, appear to be 
consistent for all countries. That is not the case for copyright. While the absence of a 
relationship between copyright strength and the Palma ratio holds for all countries, there 
is a difference for copyright’s impact on the Gini index. Table 5.7 presents the results of 
the interaction model of copyright strength on the Gini index. The first copyright 
variable, which reports the impact of copyright on the Gini index for developing 
countries, suggests that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship in the 
developing world. A one-unit (25%) increase in copyright strength corresponds to an 
increase in the Gini index of 1.3424, which is a 3.5% increase in inequality for the 
average country in the sample. The second copyright coefficient reports the difference in 
impact of copyright on the Gini index for developed countries. Since it is statistically 
significant, we conclude that there is in fact a difference in developed countries. The 
difference coefficient is negative and about the same magnitude as the positive 
coefficient for developing countries. The total impact of copyright on the Gini index in 




Copyright for Developing Countries
1.3424*
(0.6839)


































†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level




This suggests that there is a significant positive impact in developing countries 
and a very small but significant negative impact in developed countries, which helps 
explain why the copyright coefficient was insignificant in the full panel model above. 
When considering all countries, there appears to be no relationship because the small 
negative impact in developed countries offsets the slightly larger positive impact in 
developing countries. In terms of control variables, GDP has a significant negative 
impact on the Gini index, and the percentage of the population in agriculture has a 
significant positive impact on agriculture, which are similar results as those observed 
above. From this model we can conclude that in developing countries stronger copyright 
does appear to be related to higher levels of inequality, but in developed countries this is 
not the case. 
 
5.3.3 Disaggregated IPR and the Gini Index and Palma Ratio 
 
Table 5.8 presents the results for the disaggregated components of the patent 
index. To make the tables easy to read, I report only the copyright coefficients for each 
model. Both models have the same number of observations as the combined patent model 
above, and the direction and significance of the control variables are the same as before. 
The first column reports the coefficient for the combined patent index, and the next five 






























































































































































































































































I will offer the same caveat as in the previous chapters: Each of the four 
components is on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no protection of that component 
and 1 indicating complete protection. The combined variable is the sum of the five 
components and can take on values between 0 and 5. When we are examining regression 
coefficients we can compare directly across the five components of patent protection that 
are on the same scale, but we must be careful comparing the impact of any single 
component to the combined variable, as these will be on different scales. While a one-
unit increase in the combined patent index is a 20% increase in protection, a one-unit 
increase in one of the component parts is a 100% increase. 
The significant positive relationship observed between the patent index and the 
Gini index appears to be explained through just two components: the extent of coverage 
for various product categories and the availability of enforcement mechanisms. Between 
the two, the coverage variable has a larger positive impact and is more statistically 
significant. A one-unit (100%) increase in the coverage variable corresponds to an 
increase in the Gini index of 7.3161. This is a very large increase in the Gini index, but a 
one-unit increase in the coverage variable is also a very large increase. A one-unit 
increase in coverage represents a move from offering patents on no products to offering 
patents on all eight categories of products. Even when countries cover just one or two 
additional product categories, however, this change is related to a meaningful increase in 
inequality. For enforcement, a one-unit increase in enforcement – which represents a 
move from having none of the three enforcement mechanisms to having all three of them 
– is associated with an increase in the Gini index of 2.9886. This is a smaller but still 
substantive change in inequality. The other three components do not appear to be 
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significant factors for the Gini index, and none of the five components appears to have a 
relationship with the Palma ratio.  
Table 5.9 presents the results for the disaggregated components of the copyright 
index. Since the copyright variable was insignificant when considering all countries, I ran 
the disaggregated component model of copyright only for developing countries where we 
have observed a relationship between copyright and the Gini index. The table reports the 
results of that limited model. For the sake of readability, I only report the copyright 
coefficients, but it is important to note that these models have 329 observations that cover 
a period of 18 years across 50 countries coded as developing countries. The significance 
and direction of the control variables was the same as those reported in the full panel 
models above. The same caveat about interpreting the results is true here as well: the 





































































































































































































































































The significant positive relationship we observed for developing countries is 
explained through two components. Enforcement, which was significant in the 
disaggregated patent model, is significant for copyright as well.18 A one-unit increase in 
enforcement – which represents a move from having no enforcement mechanisms to 
having all four copyright enforcement tools – is associated with an increase in the Gini 
index of 4.2958. The second significant variable is membership in the copyright treaties, 
whose coefficient is highly significant and large in magnitude. A one-unit increase in 
treaty membership – which represents signing all nine related treaties – is associated with 
an increase in the Gini index of 11.9156. Therefore, countries that sign just one or two 
additional treaties experience significantly higher levels of inequality as measured by the 
Gini index. The duration of patent coverage and the availability of restrictions on 
unauthorized use are not significant, and do not appear to have an impact on the Gini 
index. None of the copyright components appear to be related to the Palma ratio.  
These disaggregated models offer a few general conclusions. Enforcement 
mechanisms appear to be important for both patents and copyright, as countries with 
more enforcement mechanisms experience higher levels of income inequality. 
Furthermore, patent coverage and copyright treaty membership each has a large impact 
on inequality. Countries that offer patents on more product categories, and those who 
sign on to more copyright treaties, experience significantly higher inequality levels. The 
other components are not relevant. There are no components that offer contradictory 
                                                          
18 Note, importantly, that the enforcement mechanisms in the copyright index are not the same as the 
enforcement mechanisms in the patent index. The patent index considers three patent-specific enforcement 
tools, and the copyright index considers four copyright-specific enforcement tools. The two components are 
only correlated with one another with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.4721. In other words, countries 
may well have robust enforcement mechanisms for patents and few enforcement mechanisms for copyright, 
or vice versa.  
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evidence or significant relationships in the opposite direction. Finally, none of these 
components have a relationship with the Palma ratio. Combining this result with the 
insignificant results in the combined IPR models, we can conclude that there appears to 
be no relationship between any part of IPR and the Palma ratio.  
 
5.3.4 Lagged IPR and the Gini Index and Palma Ratio 
 
As was the case in the previous chapters, we might expect it to take time for IPR 
to have an impact on income inequality. Rather than examining only contemporary patent 
and copyright levels, I lagged the IPR indices five, ten, and fifteen years and included the 
lagged variable as the key explanatory factor in each regression. Table 5.10 reports the 
results for the lagged patent index. Again I report only the copyright coefficients to make 
the table easy to read. The number of observations and the results for the control 
variables are roughly identical to the contemporary models. Patents are not related to the 
Palma ratio at any point, but the lagged regressions on the Gini index offer interesting 
results. At five years lagged, the patent index coefficient is positive and approaches 
traditional levels of significance (p-value = 0.09). At ten years lagged, the coefficient is 
positive and significant, with about the same magnitude of effect as contemporary patent 
strength. At fifteen years lagged, however, the direction of the relationship flips. Rather 
than being positively related, patent strength has a significant negative relationship with 
the Gini index. This result may just be anomalous, but if not this suggests that after a 
longer period of time, the economic benefits of patent protection may in fact improve 
income inequality. These models suggest that there is a short term increase in inequality 
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but a long term decrease. In addition, the magnitude of the negative effect of 15-year-






























†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level




We do not find a similar result for lagged copyright protection. Table 5.11 
presents those results, and I again only include the copyright coefficients. As before, the 
results for the Palma ratio are insignificant in every model specification. When 
considering the full panel of countries, the results are insignificant for the Gini index as 
well, so the table presents the results for the restricted sample of developing countries. 
The number of observations, years, and countries are the same as discussed in the 
previous section for the developing country sample, and the direction and significance of 































†      Significant at 0.10 level
*      Significant at 0.05 level
**    Significant at 0.01 level
***  Significant at 0.001 level




 For lagged copyright strength, we find a slightly larger and significant effect of 
copyright on the Gini index when lagged five years, but no significant relationship when 
lagged ten and fifteen years. Unlike lagged patents, there is no apparent negative 
relationship with lagged copyright. This could be the result of the limited sample, or a 
result of different long term impacts of patents and copyright on economic growth.  
 The lagged models presented here both confirm and contradict the positive 
significant relationship observed between patents and the Gini index in all countries, and 
between copyright and the Gini index in developing countries.  
 
5.4  Discussion & Conclusion 
 
 I will conclude this analysis with four general comments. First, even though 
the Gini index and the Palma ratio are theoretically linked and empirically correlated 
(r = 0.8688), the results are markedly different for the two dependent variables. 
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While we consistently find a significant relationship between IPR and the Gini index, 
we find no relationship at all between IPR and the Palma ratio. There are several 
possible interpretations of this result. Since data on the income share held by each 
decile and quintile is less complete than Gini index data, the Palma models have 
fewer observations on fewer countries. The difference in results could be due to 
these data limitations. Alternatively, it could be the case that – while correlated – the 
Gini index and Palma ratio are measuring fundamentally different things.  
Determining which measure is a more accurate operationalization of income 
inequality is a debate worth having in the literature, but for now these results could 
be suggesting that these measures of inequality are fundamentally different in 
various ways. Finally, perhaps the difference in results suggests that when IPR 
affects income inequality, it does that by affecting incomes in the middle 50% of 
households. Recall that the Palma ratio ignores the middle 50% and measures the 
ratio of the top 10% to the bottom 40%. Meanwhile, the Gini index methodology 
tends to overemphasize the middle 50%. By finding significant relationships between 
IPR and the Gini index but not the Palma ratio, these analyses could suggest that 
changes in inequality are taking place in the middle of the income distribution. 
Follow-up research may be able to evaluate these interpretations in order to 
determine the most likely explanation for why the results are so different for the Gini 
index and Palma ratio.  
 The second conclusion involves relationships at different levels of 
development. As was the case with health and education outcomes, I began this 
analysis with the assumption, found in the IPR literature, that undesirable effects of 
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IPR would be worse in the developing world. These analyses offer only weak 
evidence to support that assumption. For patents, there is no difference in the impact 
of patent strength on income inequality in developing vs. developed countries. The 
positive significant relationship observed in the full panel model holds for countries 
at all levels of development. Copyright, on the other hand, appears to be related to 
the Gini index only for developing countries. In the developing world, stronger 
copyright protections are associated with worse income inequality. In the developed 
world, however, there is no relationship between the two.  
 Third, these analyses suggest that not all aspects of patent and copyright 
protection are relevant for income inequality. For patents, only the number of 
categories covered by patents and the availability of enforcement mechanisms are 
significant determinants of inequality. The duration of those patents, the presence of 
restrictions on patents, and membership in patent treaties have no effect on 
inequality. Similarly for copyright, only membership in copyright treaties and the 
availability of enforcement mechanisms are significant. There is no relationship 
between inequality and copyright coverage or restrictions on unauthorized use. While 
these indices examine different enforcement mechanisms for patents and copyright, 
the presence of some enforcement mechanism is the only consistently relevant aspect 
of IPR when it comes to income inequality. This is logical, as countries that have 
strong IPR protections but no ability to enforce those protections are unlikely to 
experience large IP-related effects. 
 Finally, the lagged patent model offers some interesting results worthy of 
future investigation. The fact that, when lagged 15 years, patents appear to improve 
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rather than worsen income inequality is an unexpected outcome. Assuming this result 
is not merely a product of data limitations or spurious correlations, it suggests that 
there may be a different short term and long term effect of patents. If patents do 
worsen income inequality in the short term, but in the long term improve inequality 
even more, IPR critics who suggest that stronger IPR will be bad for inequality may 
be overstating their case. To be sure, these results are far from conclusive, and the 
absence of controls for redistribution / social welfare spending is a major limitation. 
As noted above, this missing variable may result in an underestimation of the 









IPR Reform in the Kingdom of Jordan 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to supplement the large-N analysis in the preceding 
chapters with a case study of IPR reform in a single country. The statistical analyses 
suggest a general relationship between IPR and health, education, and income inequality. 
I want to complicate this story by suggesting that political and institutional factors 
intervene in the relationship. At several points in the previous three chapters I suggest 
that the regression results point to potential endogeneity problems. In other words, we 
observe relationships between IPR and particular health, education or inequality 
outcomes that can be plausibly explained by causal processes operating in either 
direction. Are these outcomes harmed or improved because IPR was strengthened, or do 
countries strengthen IPR in response to changes in health and education outcomes? The 
possibility of reverse causality or simultaneity (causality operating in both directions) 
confounds the proper interpretation of the statistical results.  
In this chapter, I argue that the process of IPR reform, the political motivations 
behind strengthening of IPR, and the institutional agencies responsible for the reform and 
enforcement of IPR partially determine the impact of IPR on outcomes. This case study is 
an initial test of this argument. Of course, we cannot fully test this theory with a single 
case study, and follow up research will be necessary to fully understand how institutional 
and political factors matter. 
There are three reasons why the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (hereafter, 
“Jordan”) makes for an excellent test case. First, Jordan reformed its intellectual property 
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law between 1997 and 2001. It was one of the first countries in the Middle East to adopt 
strong IP protections, and it made these reforms within a relatively short period of time. 
The condensed timeline makes it easier to examine the impact of IPR reform. Second, 
Jordan is a middle-income developing country. Many of those writing in the “access to 
medicines” and “access to knowledge” campaigns argue that strong IPR will have the 
largest negative impact on developing countries. Choosing a developing country for the 
test case allows for a “most likely” scenario, and avoids one potential line of criticism 
from IPR skeptics. Furthermore, one might argue that the least developed countries of the 
world have so little intellectual property to protect that any strengthening of IPR could 
only benefit foreign firms. As a middle income country Jordan has economic activity and 
knowledge economy to theoretically benefit from strong IPR. Finally, Jordan’s decision 
to strengthen its IPR law could have been endogenous or exogenous. The reforms came 
at a time when Jordan was making other economic reforms, as discussed below, which 
were intended to stimulate economic growth and local industries. The choice to 
strengthen IPR could have been an economic decision meant to increase local innovation 
and foreign direct investment. At the same time, however, Jordan was in the process of 
joining the WTO and signing bilateral free trade agreements with the US and EU. The 
choice to strengthen IPR could equally have been a political decision acquiescing to the 
demands of powerful developed states. By examining the process of IPR reform in 
Jordan, we can determine whether the impetus for IPR reform was, in fact, exogenous or 
endogenous.  
The chapter proceeds in six parts. First, I begin with background information on 
Jordan, its history and economy, the Jordanian legal system, and the history of IPR 
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protection in Jordan. In the next section I discuss the process of IPR reform, the decision-
making process of the Jordanian leadership, and the pressure put on Jordan by the US and 
other powerful states to adopt strong IP protections. In the third section, I discuss the 
institutional framework for IPR regulation and enforcement in Jordan. The fourth section 
examines the impact of IPR reform on health, while the fifth section examines the impact 
on education, and the sixth section discusses inequality. The seventh section returns to 
the argument presented above, and concludes with a discussion of IPR in Jordan and 
what we can learn from this case study. 
 
6.1  Jordanian Political and Economic History, Legal System, and IPR 
 
6.1.1  Background on Jordan 
 
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed following World War I, the League of 
Nations gave the British a mandate to govern much of the Middle East, including the 
region that is modern day Jordan. In the 1920s, the British separated from Palestine a 
semi-autonomous region they called Transjordan, and in 1946 the area gained its 
independence and formed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Jordan lost the West Bank 
of the Jordan River to Israel in 1967 during the Six-Day War, but maintained a claim on 
the land until officially relinquishing it in 1988.  
In 1921 the British established the monarchy in Jordan, led by King Abdullah I 
until he was assassinated in 1951. The king was briefly followed by his son, King Talal, 
who abdicated a year later. From 1952 until his death in 1999, Talal’s son King Hussein 
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ruled Jordan, and since 1999 the country has been led by Hussein’s son King Abdullah II. 
Following independence, Jordan established itself as a constitutional monarchy, with a 
bicameral legislature and Prime Minister as head of government. The King remains a 
powerful figure in Jordan, with the authority to sign, execute and veto all laws; appoint 
the Prime Minister and Senate; dismiss judges; dissolve parliament at any time; and rule 
by decree when Parliament is dissolved (Robins 2004). 
 
6.1.2  The Jordanian Economy 
 
Jordan is a small country of just 89,342 square kilometers, of which only 2.41% is 
arable land. Agriculture is therefore concentrated in the Jordan River valley. Jordan has 
few natural resources other than phosphate and potash, which can be turned into a 
fertilizer, giving the country virtually no oil revenue and insufficient water resources. 
Additionally, Jordan has little heavy industry. The Jordanian economy thus relies heavily 
on foreign assistance and remittances from workers abroad, along with tourism and 
service industries (Ramachandran 2004).  
While Jordan has one of the smallest economies in the Middle East, the country 
performed fairly well from the end of the war in 1967 through the mid-1980s. Jordan’s 
GDP grew by an average of 11.6% during the 1970s, representing one of the highest 
growth rates in the region (Al-Khaldi 2008). This growth was partially the result of 
Jordan becoming the world’s third largest exporter of phosphates (Dandan 2011). 
Additionally, Jordan received billions of dollars of foreign aid and foreign remittances. 
Remittances constitute, on average, 20% of Jordan’s annual GDP (Ramachandran 2004). 
182 
 
Finally, Jordan positioned itself as a transit hub for exports and imports flowing between 
Western Europe and the Middle East, generating significant foreign direct investment 
(Dandan 2011).  
 This economic success was somewhat short-lived, however. Jordanians working 
abroad had been drawn to the oil industry in nearby countries, and as a result the level of 
foreign remittances was sensitive to the global price of oil. As oil prices declined in the 
mid-1980s Jordan experienced significant economic decline, resulting in a collapse in the 
value of the currency and increasing government and external debt. During the1990s, 
Jordan benefited from additional aid inflows, including support from the World Bank. 
Additionally, many Jordanians returned home following the 1991 Gulf crisis and War. 
During this period, Jordan again experienced a period of relatively strong economic 
activity and growth rates returned to 2-3% per annum (Al-Khaldi 2008; Ramachandran 
2004).  
When King Abdullah II came to power in 1999, he began a process of economic 
reform that included reducing barriers to trade, privatizing state-owned industries, and 
financial sector reforms. He also ushered Jordan into the World Trade Organization and 
signed new free trade agreements with the US and EU. Jordan experienced GDP growth 
of 8% from 2004-2008, although that growth has slowed following the global financial 







6.1.3  The Jordanian Legal System 
 
Jordan’s legal system is a product of Ottoman, French, British, and Islamic 
influence. The Ottoman government blended the French Commercial and Penal Code 
with the Hanafi School of Islamic law to create a new secular legal system in the later 
part of the 19th century (Coulson 1964; Lippman, McConville, and Yerushalmi 1988; 
Nesheiwat 2012). Unlike common law systems of the United Kingdom and the United 
States – in which most law is uncodified and relies heavily on precedent and prior 
decisions to shape the legal system – civil law systems like Jordan’s depend on 
comprehensive, continuously updated legal codes that aim to specify all aspects of the 
law, its interpretation, and the appropriate penalties for violating the law (Dainow 1966). 
Some elements of common law have been incorporated into the Jordanian legal system 
under British rule, especially in the Jordanian Commercial Code (Nesheiwat 2012). The 
result is a unique civil law system with some elements of British common law. 
Jordanian laws fall under one of four branches: the constitution, the criminal code, 
the civil code, or the commercial code. Intellectual property rights have their roots in the 
civil code, which enumerates three types of “rights” belonging to the individual: personal, 
material, and incorporeal. Intellectual property rights are explicitly listed as examples of 







6.1.4  Intellectual Property Rights in Jordan 
 
The legal protection of intellectual property in Jordan dates back at least 125 
years. The Ottoman Patent and Trade Mark Law was implemented in 1887, and the 
Ottoman Copyright Law in 1910. There is some evidence that intellectual property 
protections are even older, perhaps dating to a time before the emergence of Islam in the 
region (El-Said 2006). Laws were updated in the 1920s under British rule, and again in 
the 1950s as part of the transition to independence. 
Patents and trademarks had been enforced through the Ottoman Patent and Trade 
Mark Law. The Ottoman law was based on principles in the Paris Convention, to which 
the Ottoman Empire was a signatory. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed and Jordan 
was placed under the British Mandate, changes to the legal system included an update to 
patent and trademark regulations. These changes included trademark legislation in 1930, 
updated in 1938 and again after independence in 1952. This legislation was accompanied 
by the 1953 Goods Merchandise Law that remains in force today. The Ottoman patent 
law was also updated under the British Mandate in 1924 and after independence in 1953. 
These trademark and patent laws remained in effect until 1999, when Jordan began its 
modern overhaul of intellectual property laws (El-Said 2006).  
Similarly, copyright protections date back to Ottoman rule. However, while a 
number of Arab states revised copyright law following the end of the Ottoman Empire, 
Jordan did not. The Ottoman Copyright Law remained in effect until the 1990s, when a 
new Jordanian law replaced it. Jordan’s copyright law underwent another set of revisions 
during the overall IP reform process, which went into effect in 2004. 
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6.2  The Process of IPR Reform in Jordan 
 
Between 1999 and 2004, Jordan passed eleven IPR-related new laws and 
amendments to existing laws (Jaafari 2012; Olwan 2013a). As I mentioned in the 
introduction, this change came at a time when King Abdullah II ascended to the throne 
and began making an array of economic changes and reforms, all of which were intended 
to strength the economy and generate growth. This process included financial sector 
reform and privatization of state-owned enterprises, as well as structural changes to the 
economy and trade sector. At the same time, the King led the charge for Jordan to join 
the World Trade Organization and increase trade and economic cooperation between 
Jordan and the United States.  
 
6.2.1  Jordanian Accession to the WTO 
 
On April 11, 2000, Jordan became the 136th member of the World Trade 
Organization. Its official membership came after more than two years of negotiations, 
which involved considerable legal and economic reforms by the Jordanian leadership. As 
part of any WTO Accession protocol, Jordan had to negotiate with existing WTO 
members, especially powerful leaders like the United States. In order to join the WTO, 
Jordan was required to reform its intellectual property laws to come into compliance with 
the TRIPS agreement. The process began in 1997, when Jordan signed a Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) and a Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIT) 
with the United States (El-Said 2006). In the following two years, Jordan passed several 
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new patent, trademark and industrial design laws, including (1) Patent Law No. 32 of 
1999, (2) Trademark Law No. 34 of 1999, (3) Industrial Design Law No. 24 of 2000, (4) 
Plant Varieties Law No. 24 of 2000, (5) Geographical Indication Law No. 8 of 2000, (5) 
Unfair Competition and Trade Secret Law No. 15 of 2000, and (6) The Protection of 
Layout-Designs and Integrated Circuit Law No 10 of 2000 (Olwan 2013a).  
In terms of copyright, the 1992 Copyright law was updated to reflect TRIPS 
requirements in 1998, again in 1999, and finally in 2005. Additionally, Jordan joined the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary Works (“Berne Convention”) in 1999, 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty in 2004 
(Nesheiwat 2012; Olwan 2013a). 
Each of these new or revised laws provided increased protection of intellectual 
property. Full discussion of the TRIPS agreement and its various IPR protections can be 
found elsewhere,19 but some of the most important changes in Jordanian law included: an 
extension of patent protection from 16 years to the standard 20 years from the date of 
application; patent holders were granted the right to claim damages on any IPR-related 
crimes related to the patent; penalties against IPR violators were increased; compulsory 
licenses were greatly restricted; and the trademark duration was increased from 7 to 10 
years, with the option to renew for continuous 10-year periods (El-Said 2006). 
 
6.2.2  Jordan-US Bilateral Free Trade Agreement 
 
In addition to the TIFA and BIT with the United States and Jordan’s accession to 
the WTO, Jordan signed a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with the US in 2001 that 
                                                          
19 See (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Sell 2004, 2007) 
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increased IPR protections beyond those enshrined in the TRIPS agreement – what 
scholars refer to as “TRIPS-Plus conditions”. For Jordan, these TRIPS-plus rules come in 
the form of restrictions to parallel importation and compulsory licenses, and extensions of 
patents and data exclusivity in certain circumstances. Each of these will be discussed 
briefly. 
The TRIPS agreement, while generally requiring extensive intellectual property 
rights, also provides for certain flexibilities and exceptions. These flexibilities were 
largely the product of lobbying by NGOs and activists in the “Access to Medicines” 
campaign. Their lobbying efforts culminated in a TRIPS declaration affirming the 
primacy of public health during the Doha ministerial in 2001. The Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration), emphasized that the TRIPS 
agreement should be interpreted in a way that supports public health (World Trade 
Organization 2001). Its widely quoted paragraph 4 notes, 
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members 
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' 
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for 
all (World Trade Organization 2001). 
 
The Doha Declaration goes on to enumerate the flexibilities built into the TRIPS 
agreement, and it emphasizes the use of those flexibilities to protect public health. 
In the process of joining the WTO, signing the bilateral FTA with the US, and 
reforming domestic law, Jordan’s IPR regulations limited the use of some of these 
flexibilities. Jordan’s Patent Law No. 32 (1999) and Patent Law No. 71 (2001) forbid the 
use of parallel importation without prior consent by the patent holder (Malpani 2007). 
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Parallel importation is the process of importing generic versions of patented medications 
by countries without a domestic generic drug industry from another country that does 
produce generic versions. With this restriction on parallel importation, even if Jordan had 
a public health emergency and thus a right to override a patent, they could not import any 
generic versions of patented drugs without the patent holder’s permission. Unless they 
could produce a generic domestically, they would be unable to exercise their right to 
override the patent. The Doha Declaration allows parallel importation without patent 
holder permission, so Jordan’s law clearly goes beyond the requirements of TRIPS. The 
good news for Jordan is that it has strong generic production capacity, which should limit 
the need for parallel importation.  
The US-Jordan FTA itself imposes several additional TRIPS-plus conditions. 
These include patent extensions to compensate for delays in the marketing approval 
process, and an additional three years of data exclusivity (beyond the standard five years) 
for new uses of already known chemical entities (Malpani 2007). Data Exclusivity 
effectively extends patents for some drugs beyond the 20 years of protection offered by 
TRIPS. It also allows for up to five years of market monopoly for drugs that are not 
patented. Many generic drugs rely on clinical test data submitted for a drug’s first (brand 
name) approval, and regulatory agencies generally accept this test data for unaltered 
generic versions. Data exclusivity means that generics cannot use the original clinical test 
data for a period of time after the patent expires, and thus cannot get approval for the 
generic unless they replicate expensive trials. If the drug is not patented in a country, data 
exclusivity still prevents the use of clinical trial data for the registration of a generic for 
five years after the initial registration of the brand name drug in that country.  
189 
 
Finally, the US-Jordan FTA limits the use of compulsory licenses. TRIPS permits 
all WTO members to issue compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals, which override a 
patent and allow the production of a generic version of the protected drug. While TRIPS 
does not limit the conditions under which compulsory licenses can be granted, it does 
impose obligations such as fair compensation to the patent owner and a procedural 
requirement that the government issuing the license first attempt to negotiate lower prices 
or voluntary generics from the patent owner. This procedural requirement can be waived 
for health emergencies or public non-commercial use of the patent. Article 31 also 
requires that licenses be issued “predominately for the supply of the domestic market” 
and not be exported. The US-Jordan FTA, however, does limit the use of compulsory 
licenses. It permits them only (a) to remedy anti-competitive practices, (b) in the case of 
public non-commercial use, or (c) in the case of national emergency or other situations of 
extreme urgency (Malpani 2007).  
 
6.2.3  The Decision-making Process in Jordan 
 
 In general, Jordanian leadership warmly welcomed accession to the WTO and 
deeper integration into the global trade regime (Al-Sharieh 2008).20 Public statements by 
the Jordanian negotiators at the WTO also suggested that Jordanian leadership believed 
the stronger IPR regulations they were agreeing to would benefit the Jordanian economy. 
                                                          
20 Faris Nesheiwat notes that, while the Jordanian leadership was eager to join the WTO and enjoy the 
economic benefits accession was expected to bring, that is not to say that the decision was popularly 
sanctioned. Two of the most important treaties signed during the process, which imposed significant 




Dr. Mamoun Talhouni, the head of the National Library, summarized the leadership’s 
position on the eve of WTO accession: 
IP experts agree that intellectual property protection promotes domestic economic 
activity, attracts foreign investment, facilitates the transfer of technology and 
creates confidence in Jordanian industries worldwide. These are messages the 
National Library will be seeking to get across in the coming months (qtd. in Al-
Sharieh 2008, 104).  
 
Likewise, Dr. Mahammad Halaiqah – then Secretary General of the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade and chief negotiator for accession to the WTO – emphasized the role of IP in 
promoting a technology economy and economic growth: 
By staying committed to protecting intellectual property rights, encouraging 
knowledge transfer and fostering a thriving IT industry that is second to none, the 
government foresees Jordan’s role in the regional, as well as in the international 
community, as an influential force in empowering its people with the skills, 
expertise and resources that they require to excel in today’s digital economy (qtd. 
in Al-Sharieh 2008, 104). 
 
However, Dr. Halaiqah also recognized that there were costs to joining the WTO. 
Notwithstanding those costs, he believed Jordan had little choice, saying “There is a 
great cost to joining the WTO, but if we do not join, the cost will be higher… our 
industries will no longer be competitive, they will lose markets and foreign investment in 
Jordan will be jeopardised” (qtd. in Al-Sharieh 2008, 104).  
In many ways, the decision to join the WTO and sign FTAs with the US and EU 
were as much political choices as economic ones. Jordanian leadership certainly faced 
political pressure, which is discussed in the next section, but they were also keenly aware 
that development aid, support, and economic partnerships with the US would be 
contingent on compliance with WTO and international trade norms. In negotiating the 
terms of WTO accession and free trade agreements Jordan’s leaders focused on market 
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access, FDI, and economic growth, and the IPR chapter of each treaty was given less 
consideration. Not only did the Jordanian leadership not seem to focus on IPR during the 
negotiations, but every expert I have spoken to has said that in all likelihood the 
negotiators did not fully understand the implications of the intellectual property 
protections they were agreeing to. Ahmed Abdel Latif, an Egyptian career diplomat and 
IPR scholar, summarized the process in reference to Jordan and other nations, saying: 
It is not always clear if these TRIPS-Plus obligations in national laws are the 
result of a conscious and deliberate choice by legislators and policy-makers, or 
are more the result of inadequate legislative advice given to these Arab countries 
in the process of modernization of their IP laws by certain bilateral donors and 




In his field interviews with the WTO delegation from Jordan, IPR scholar Faris 
Nesheiwat said he got the sense that IP and IP standards were not front and center in any 
of the debates at the WTO. Instead, they were a byproduct of the process. The goal was to 
get into the WTO and get the “FDI genie out of the bottle”. The focus was on the benefits 
of global trade, and not enough attention was paid to intellectual property (Nesheiwat 
2014).  
 
6.2.4  US Pressure 
 
Throughout the process of WTO accession, the signing of the US-Jordan bilateral 
FTA, and afterwards, Jordanian leadership faced constant and significant pressure from 
US officials and industry groups. Leaked diplomatic cables published by the Wikileaks 
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website in 2011 and subsequently analyzed by IPR law scholar Mohammed El-Said 
(2012), reveal the nature of the pressure the US was placing on Jordan.  
Pressure from the US came from both government agencies and private groups. 
The US embassy in Amman, the US Trade Representative (USTR), the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and its AMIR Program in Jordan, and the US Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) appear to be the most active agencies pushing for 
stronger intellectual property rights. In addition, Jordan faced pressure from the Business 
Software Alliance (BSA), and the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) on 
the issue of copyright, as well as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA) on the issue of patents (El-Said 2012). On the Jordanian side, the 
participants in diplomatic exchanges included the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the 
National Library, the Jordanian Food and Drug Administration (JFDA), and the Ministry 
of Health – whose roles will be discussed in the next section.  
El-Said described the overall tone of diplomatic interaction as reflecting “a 
general pattern of encouragement and collaboration where positions are unified. When 
positions are not, criticism is often associated with suspension – or threat of suspension – 
of funds from the US side” (El-Said 2012, 10). Throughout the discussions, US officials 
and industry groups pushed for “maximalist” interpretations of IPR commitments while 
the Jordanian government’s response was usually reactive and at times contrarian.  
The leaked cables reveal that the majority of diplomatic pressure regarding IPR 
focused on patents more than copyright, and focused on data exclusivity provisions 
specifically. One cable from 2005 suggested that the US and international drug 
companies were satisfied with the patent registration system in Jordan, but not with the 
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pro-public health decisions the JFDA’s committees had often adopted. The cable went on 
to describe the committees as “multi-agency committees [that] do not have the same 
reputation [as the JFDA], being holdovers from a former paternalistic era of healthcare” 
(El-Said 2012; US Embassy Amman 2005).  
The cables reveal efforts by the US to influence the decisions made by JFDA 
committees, including one situation in which a pharmaceutical company had requested an 
extension of data exclusivity protection for new dosing instructions on an existing 
medication. They requested three consecutive 5-year protection periods for the adult 
dose, children’s dose, and infant dose of the medicine. When the case was dismissed by 
Jordanian courts on a technicality not related to the substantive dispute, the US Embassy 
wrote, “[s]ome in the PhRMA community believe it was a breach of the law for the 
[government of Jordan] to fail to uphold the FTA obligation to protect data submitted for 
the once-weekly dose, regardless of any lawyer court decision” (El-Said 2012; US 
Embassy Amman 2005). They pushed for this outcome despite the fact that separate 
extensions of data exclusivity for different doses are not guaranteed by TRIPS or by the 
FTA itself, and the fact that such extensions are not the standard practice in any country.  
After a second dispute regarding data exclusivity for a cancer treatment, in which 
the JFDA disagreed with the start date of data protection, the US Embassy called for a 
review of the FTA, while the USAID AMIR program called for a gap analysis to 
determine if Jordanian patent legislation was insufficient. The US Embassy went so far as 
to demand that a PhRMA representative be placed on the JDFA’s High Committee for 
Drugs (El-Said 2012; US Embassy Amman 2005).  
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In a third example, new chemical data trials on an anti-asthma therapy revealed 
that the drug could also help patients with coexisting allergic rhinitis. The JFDA 
approved the new use but not a “new indication” that would grant a 3-year data 
exclusivity extension, saying that the “gray area of overlapping uses does not permit a 
distinction” and as a result would not receive exclusivity protection. The leaked cables 
reveal PhRMA’s outrage at this decision, and resulted in an appeal from embassy 
officials for the JFDA Director General to take a “harder look at what ‘protection’ 
means” (El-Said 2012; US Embassy Amman 2005). 
Summarizing the US position, El-Said said: “Scrutinizing the cables, a sense of 
frustration on the part of the U.S. officials is evident, as a result of JFDA’s reluctant 
approach to award additional TRIPS-Plus protection to drug manufacturers. This 
frustration is apparent despite the fact that the JFDA’s position was influenced by 
domestic public health considerations” (El-Said 2012). 
 
6.2.5  Concluding Remarks Regarding the Process of IPR Reform 
 
While the Jordanian leadership and WTO negotiators highlighted the potential economic 
benefits of IPR reform, the field research conducted by Jordanian scholars who 
interviewed the WTO negotiating team and others in the Jordanian leadership suggest 
that IPR reform was as much a product of negotiations with the US and other WTO 
members as a deliberate attempt to stimulate innovation. The leaked diplomatic cables 
further suggest that Jordan strengthened IPR to the extent it did at least partially in 
response to political pressure applied by the US during the negotiations. Considering all 
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of the available information, it does not appear that IPR reform was either purely 
exogenous or purely endogenous, but was instead a product of both internal economic 
goals and external pressure.  
 
6.3  Institutional Structure for IPR Regulation and Enforcement  
 
Intellectual property rights in Jordan are regulated and enforced by a dizzying 
array of agencies. Patents are regulated by the Industrial Property Protection Directorate 
(IPPD) within the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT). The IPPD is also in charge of 
classifying and registering trademarks, although the enforcement of trademarks against 
counterfeiting is the responsibility of another MoIT department: the Jordan Institution for 
Standards and Metrology (JISM). Copyright is regulated by yet another agency: the 
Author’s Right Protection Office (ARPO) at the National Library (NL). Additional 
confusion is added by the Customs Department, which created a special section to 
enforce copyright and trademarks called the Customs Procedures Section (CPS). Finally, 
several other product-specific agencies participate in IPR enforcement, especially the 
Jordanian Food and Drug Administration (JFDA) which deals with IPR related to 
pharmaceuticals (Nesheiwat 2012).  
The MoIT has been in charge of regulating industrial activity since its founding in 
the 1950s, with a goal of increasing Jordanian economic growth and global 
competitiveness. It is through this pro-business perspective that the ministry administers 
patents and trademarks. Jordan has not developed the expertise or logistical processes for 
examining and registering patents, and therefore relies heavily on the World Intellectual 
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Property Organization (WIPO) and its integration of patent filing systems in the 
developed world for examination and search of patents. The WIPO system allows 
countries to share the task of examining patent applications and determining whether an 
invention qualifies for a new patent. Jordan has access to the evaluation and decision 
made by other countries on previous patent requests for the same product, and can rely on 
others’ judgment. This greatly reduces the administrative burden on Jordan. The result of 
relying on other patent office’s decisions, however, is that a Jordanian patent is almost 
always awarded for products that have received patents outside of Jordan (Nesheiwat 
2012). With weak domestic spending on research and development, the majority of patent 
requests in Jordan come from international manufacturers. For example, Jordan received 
431 international applications in 2010 but only 43 domestic applications. Of those, 64 
patents were granted to foreign products and 22 to domestic products (Ministry of 
Industry & Trade n.d.). 
The Jordanian Copyright Law names the National Library (NL) as the repository 
for authored works seeking protection, although the law does not require works to 
register with the NL in order to receive protection. That said, the NL plays an important 
role because it has the authority to prevent a work from being commercially circulated in 
Jordan if it is not registered with the National Library. This complex relationship is 
summarized well by scholar and Jordanian IPR lawyer Faris Nesheiwat: “While the 
foreign work is protected from infringement in Jordan, even if it is not registered with the 
NL, the NL has veto power over its commercial circulation in Jordan. Similarly, the NL 
controls the right to publish works in Jordan by asserting its right to approve those works 
ahead of publication” (Nesheiwat 2012). 
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6.4  IPR Reform and Health 
 
6.4.1  IPR and Macro-level Health Outcomes 
 
We have data for Jordan from before and after IPR reform regarding the macro-
level health outcomes discussed in Chapter 3. The appendix to this case study presents 
graphs for Jordan’s score on the patent and copyright index (Figures 1 and 2) as well as 
male, female, and population life expectancy (Figure 3); male and female adult mortality 
(Figure 4); infant, child, and neonatal mortality (Figure 5); and maternal mortality (Figure 
6). 
 Patents are more important than copyright when it comes to health outcomes, as 
discussed in previous chapters. Figure 1 demonstrates that Jordanian patent strength 
increased dramatically in 1999 and again (less dramatically) in 2004. However, when we 
look at life expectancy rates and mortality rates for Jordan (Figures 3-6), there is no 
noticeable disruption in the long term trend during or following the period of IPR reform. 
Life expectancy rates follow upward trends from 1990-2014, while mortality rates follow 
downward trends. These trends are logical, and ones we observe in most countries as 
development and advances in medicine allow for better health outcomes over time. If 
stronger IPR did have an impact on these health outcomes, we would not necessarily see 
a dramatic change in the long term trends, but we would expect to see a disruption around 
1999-2004 or shortly afterward. We do not see any such disruption. As more time passes, 
it is possible that additional negative impacts on these macro-level outcomes will emerge. 
In summary, these Figures suggest that – for Jordan – there was no immediate or short 
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term impact of strengthened IPR on the macro-level health outcomes I examined in 
Chapter 3.   
 
6.4.2  IPR and Drug Prices 
 
Because Jordan was one of the first countries in the Middle East to adopt strong 
patent protections, scholars and NGOs in the Access to Medicines movement have 
studied their impact on drug prices directly. In 2007, Oxfam International commissioned 
a report on IPR and drug prices, ultimately concluding that overall prices had increased 
by 20% since 2001. The increase has been spread across an array of pharmaceuticals, 
with 91 therapeutic classes experiencing a price increase over 20%, and 88 therapeutic 
classes experiencing a price increase between 0-20% (Malpani 2007).  
This has translated into dramatically increased government and private 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals in Jordan. In order to put a dollar figure on the increased 
costs to the government and consumers, Oxfam analyzed cumulative expenditure for new 
medicines with no generic equivalent during that time frame, which amounted to $46 
million. Of that figure, $31.49 million was spent on medicines that had no generic 
competition due to data exclusivity. Using previous research showing that generic 
competition causes the prices of medicines to fall between 30 and 70 percent, Oxfam 
concluded that stronger IPR resulted in between $6.3 million and $22.04 million in 
increased drug costs to the government and consumer. This represents between 13.7% 
and 47.9% of the cumulative costs of new medicines, or between 1.2% and 4.4% of total 
pharmaceutical spending, holding other factors constant (Malpani 2007). 
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 Ryan Abbott and his colleagues conducted a second, more recent examination of 
drug prices in Jordan following IPR reform (R. B. Abbott et al. 2012). Using slightly 
different methodology the study authors found that between 1999 and 2004, adjusting for 
increased sales volume and inflation, there was a 17% increase in total annual 
expenditure for medicines in Jordan. Abbott, et. al. compared the prices of 46 of the most 
essential medicines used in Jordan in 1999 to the price in 2004, adjusting for inflation. 
None of these 46 drugs was patented in Jordan. To examine the impact of delayed market 
entry resulting from data exclusivity, the JFDA independently determined which of the 
medicines was within the ability of Jordanian generic manufacturers to produce, and the 
authors compared the pre-IPR (1999) prices to the post-IPR (2004) prices for those 
medicines (R. B. Abbott et al. 2012). 
 In terms of total private market sales, both the total units of medicines and the 
total prices of medicines went up, from 26 billion units in 1999 at a price of $81 million, 
to 32 billion units in 2004 at a price of $125 million. Adjusting for inflation, this is a 17% 
increase in the total price of medicines. Summarizing the effect of delayed market entry 
of generics, Abbott and his co-authors write: 
In 2004, the weighted average generic medicine price was 45% the price of its 
originator [brand name] counterpart. This data suggests that 1 year of data 
exclusivity of NCEs [New Chemical Entities / a.k.a. new medicines] registered in 
2004 cost Jordan’s retail market approximately 3.3 million USD. Extrapolating 
these numbers based on these calculations to include 90 NCEs registered with the 
JFDA between 2000 and 2003, which were also protected by data protection in 
2004, it is estimated that delayed market entry of generics due to enhanced IP 
protections cost Jordan’s retail market approximately 18 million USD in 2004. 
This represents approximately 14% of the total annual pharmaceutical spending in 
Jordan’s private sector (R. B. Abbott et al. 2012, 80–81).  
 
The size of the impact on drug prices is comparable to the Oxfam study, and on the high 
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end of Oxfam’s calculation of $6.3-$22.04 million of increased cost due to IPR 
protections. Ideally we would have more than two studies of drug prices, but to my 
knowledge no others exist, including any examination of this issue from the Jordanian 
government itself. Newer and more complete studies of Jordanian drug prices and exactly 
what impact those prices have on larger health outcomes is one potential area for future 
research. 
 
6.4.3  Data Exclusivity Rather Than Patents 
 
 The majority of new drugs introduced in Jordan following the reform of IP laws 
have, in fact, not been patented there. As discussed above, IPR reform in Jordan brought 
protections for clinical trial data collected by brand name drug manufacturers for the 
initial registration of a drug (data exclusivity). Data exclusivity prevents drug regulators 
from using trial data developed by originator companies to establish the safety and 
efficacy of a medicine for market approval for a period of five years. Generic companies 
must either wait until data exclusivity ends, or conduct their own expensive clinical trials 
(which generally take longer than five years). Since April 2000, when data exclusivity 
was adopted, multinational pharmaceutical companies registering new products in Jordan 
have tended to forgo patent protection since they would enjoy five years of automatic 
protection from generic competition through data exclusivity. This is likely a cost/benefit 
calculation on their part, given the relatively limited size of the Jordanian pharmaceutical 
market and the expense and time-consuming process of filing for a patent. It is also far 
easier for a drug to be granted market monopoly through data exclusivity. While patent 
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offices carefully review applications for novelty, safety, and other aspects of each 
product, a pharmaceutical company only needs to submit clinic trial data to obtain a five-
year market monopoly for their product through data exclusivity (Malpani 2007). 
 In their research, Oxfam examined 108 new medicines with no generic equivalent 
introduced in Jordan by the 21 largest multinational pharmaceutical companies from 
2001 through mid-2006 (Malpani 2007).21 Of these 108 medicines enjoying a market 
monopoly in Jordan, only five had product patents. The rest were free from generic 
competition as a result of data exclusivity. Since December 2004, Jordanian law has 
allowed for an additional three years of data exclusivity for approved new uses of an 
existing medication, although there has been a back-and-forth debate between the 
government and pharmaceutical companies over what qualifies as a new use. The 
government has maintained a policy that only new indications qualify, so far rejecting 
industry efforts to consider new dosing instructions, drug combinations, and formulations 
(R. B. Abbott et al. 2012). According to Oxfam, at least 25 medicines have been granted 
an additional three years of data exclusivity for new indications. Since IPR reform, the 
market share of drugs without a generic equivalent tripled from 3% in 2002 to 9.4% in 
2006 (Malpani 2007). 
Drug prices are influenced by many factors, including advances in technology and 
economies of scale, negotiations with drug manufacturers and wholesalers, inflation, and 
shifts in currency valuations. Those factors notwithstanding, there is evidence that the 
increase in drug prices Jordan is the result – at least in part – of the strengthening of 
intellectual property protections. However, as previously discussed, there is no evidence 
                                                          
21 These 108 medicines are not an exhaustive list of all medicines introduced in Jordan in the time period, 
but they account for 42% of all new medicines with no generic equivalent, and more than 70% of sales of 
new medicines with no generic equivalent.  
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to suggest that the increase in drug prices ultimately resulted in worse overall health 
outcomes. These two facts taken together suggest that the increase in drug prices was 
absorbed by increased public and private spending on health. This increased spending is 
itself a negative impact for Jordan, as it shifts public and private spending from other 
sectors of the economy. Whether the negative impact of higher health costs outweighs 
any positive impact from stronger IPR is an empirical question. Fully answering it is 
beyond the scope of this project, but we can take a cursory look at changes to FDI and 
innovation in Jordan following IPR reform.  
  
6.4.4 IPR, Local Research & Development, and Foreign Direct Investment  
 
During the IPR reform process, as Jordan joined the WTO and negotiated bilateral 
free trade agreements with the US and EU, there was considerable focus on IPR as a 
driver of economic growth and foreign direct investment, both from the Jordanian 
leadership and from outside Jordan. The US negotiators were particularly adamant that 
IPR would spur FDI in Jordan (El-Said 2012). The economic logic is discussed in 
previous chapters, but reform of IPR was promised to bring new innovation and 
investment in Jordan’s economy, including in the pharmaceutical industry. Since IPR 
reform in Jordan, several scholars have examined the extent to which stronger IPR has 
led to increases in R&D and FDI (Al Nasa’a et al. 2008; El-Said 2006, 2012; El Said and 
El-Said 2007; Jaafari 2012; Malpani 2007; Nesheiwat 2010; Ryan 2004). 
 With one exception (Ryan 2004), each of these studies has concluded that the 
promised gains in R&D and FDI have failed to materialize, especially in the 
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pharmaceutical sector. Since 2001, there has been no meaningful uptick in licensing 
agreements, technology transfer, or collaboration between multinational drug 
manufacturers and Jordanian companies (El Said and El-Said 2007; Malpani 2007; 
Nesheiwat 2010). As a senior manager at one of Jordan’s few successful licensee firms 
noted, 
We have several licensing agreements but most of them go back to before 1999 
and those signed after 1999 had nothing to do with the FTA itself. It is our firm’s 
long standing policy to sign such strategic agreements whenever possible and 
beneficial. The FTA did not lead to any licensing agreements because it was a 
one-sided agreement. They told us that the FTA will be good for us, that it will 
lead to more innovation, joint ventures, licensing and R&D. It led to none of the 
above because stronger IP protection was never the problem. The problem itself 
was lack of resources, lack of sufficient R&D, lack of human skills and lack of 
infrastructure that are all necessary for innovation (qtd. in El Said and El-Said 
2007). 
 
Compare the lack of FDI growth in Jordan with FDI growth in Egypt. While 
Jordan has dramatically reformed IP protections, Egypt has not. Egypt adopted minimum 
obligations under TRIPS, introducing patent protection in 2005 but not offering data 
exclusivity to any products. Unlike Jordan, Egypt has routinely been criticized by the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA), the pharmaceutical 
industry association and lobby, for failing to adequately protect intellectual property. 
However, from 1995 – 2006 Egypt received $223 million in investment in 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, 39% of which came from foreign multinational firms. 
Meanwhile, Jordan has received almost no investment in pharmaceutical manufacturing 
(Malpani 2007). Much of the international investment in Egypt has come in the form of 
licensing agreements. According to PhRMA, 30% of all drug manufacturing inside Egypt 
is from local subsidiaries of foreign drug companies, and an additional 35% is through 
licensing agreements and partnerships between multinationals and local generics 
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manufacturers in Egypt (Malpani 2007). Of course there are many factors that explain 
why FDI has been larger in Egypt than in Jordan. Egypt is a much larger country and 
potential market, it has a larger and more vibrant economy, and the extant level of 
medical and pharmaceutical expertise is at least as good as that in Jordan. Investors look 
at more than intellectual property rights when making decisions about investments and 
other business collaboration. This example does, however, illustrate the fact that simply 
having strong IPR protections is not a necessary and sufficient condition for generating 
FDI, licensing agreements, and technology transfer.  
Likewise, local R&D and innovation in Jordan has not seen much growth since 
passage of IPR reform. Most Jordanian firms that conduct R&D report spending roughly 
the same 2-3% of sales on R&D that they spent before 2000. Employment in R&D 
divisions of most local drug manufacturers has not increased, and in many cases it has 
declined (El Said and El-Said 2007).  
Other than superficial claims that IPR will benefit local industry made by the US, 
PhRMA, and other industry lobbyists, only one scholar has argued that IPR reform in 
Jordan has or will bring FDI and R&D growth. In discussing strategies for Jordan to spur 
economic growth and development, professor Michael Ryan points to the increase in 
multinational pharmaceutical firms’ scientific offices in Jordan and several examples of 
potential collaborations between multinational firms and Jordanian manufacturers (Ryan 
2004). In responding to Ryan’s claims, Faris Nesheiwat suggests that these science 
offices established in Jordan have almost uniformly been staffed with aggressive sales 
associates rather than researchers, and that very little technology transfer is involved in 
the relationship (Nesheiwat 2010). 
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To summarize, there appears to be little evidence that strengthening IPR in Jordan 
has brought with it significant increases in local innovation, R&D, technology transfer, or 
foreign direct investment.  
 
6.4.5  Concluding Remarks about Health 
 
The studies described in this section offer evidence that stronger IP protections, 
especially data exclusivity provisions, have increased the costs of drugs to the Jordanian 
government and private market consumers. The magnitude of this impact is estimated to 
be between $6.3 and $22.04 million through 2006, although there are no recent empirical 
studies of the impact after 2006. Jordan does not have a national healthcare system, nor is 
there a national health insurance regime, which means that both the government and 
private citizens end up paying more when drug prices go up. Examining the long-term 
trend for life expectancy rates and mortality rates, however, it does not appear as if these 
increases in drug prices have translated into worse overall health outcomes. As time goes 
on, it will be important to revisit these outcomes to see if impacts do eventually emerge.  
 
6.5  IPR Reform and Education  
 
 As before, we have data for Jordan from before and after IPR reform regarding 
the macro-level education outcomes discussed in Chapter 4. In addition to graphs for 
Jordan’s score on the patent and copyright index (Figures 1 and 2), the appendix to this 
chapter presents male, female, and population primary school enrollment (Figure 7); 
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male, female, and population secondary school enrollment (Figure 8); male, female, and 
population tertiary school enrollment (Figure 9); male, female, and population primary 
school completion rates (Figure 10); male, female, and population secondary school 
completion rates (Figure 11), and male, female, and population school life expectancy 
(Figure 12).  
 When it comes to education outcomes, copyright is more important than patents. 
Figure 2 displays the trend for Jordanian copyright protection. As you can see, there were 
two large increases in the copyright score: one in 1990 when the first copyright reform 
took place, and the second in 2004. To draw attention to these two points in time, I have 
placed vertical reference lines on Figures 10-15 indicating the two points of copyright 
strengthening. 
 For enrollment rates (Figures 7-9), we have interesting results. In the years 
following each copyright reform, primary school enrollment rates experienced a decline, 
secondary school enrollment rates experience a very slight increase, and tertiary school 
enrollments experience a larger increase. This mirrors the results found in Chapter 4 
where stronger copyright protections were associated with lower primary school 
enrollment rates and higher secondary and tertiary school enrollment rates. However, 
these Figures depict uncontrolled correlations between copyright and enrollment rates. 
We cannot be certain that the decline in primary school enrollment and the uptick in 
tertiary school enrollment are the result of stronger copyright laws. For primary school 
enrollments, I have serious doubts that the decline in enrollment is related to IPR. Jordan 
provides free primary school education to all citizens, including the cost of textbooks and 
other resources. Jordanian families must pay for transportation, notebooks, pencils, and 
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food, so poverty remains one factor keeping some children out of school, but the 
resources families must pay for at the primary school level are not related to IPR. About a 
sixth of Jordanian students attend private schools rather than public schools, but families 
who choose private schools are generally wealthier and less likely to keep children home 
based on the cost of learning materials and school fees. 
The results for completion rates (Figures 10 and 11) and school life expectancy 
(Figure 12) suggest no relationship between IPR reform and outcomes. Primary school 
completion rates, after improving dramatically in the 1970s, hovered in the 90-105% 
range through the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.22 There is no noticeable change in the long 
term pattern following the two increases in copyright strength. Data on secondary school 
completion rates, as Figure 11 illustrates, is incomplete for Jordan, so we cannot have 
confidence in any conclusions based on this data. I was unable to locate more complete 
secondary school enrollment rates for Jordan, other than these World Bank data. Finally, 
school life expectancy follows the same uninterrupted trend as primary school 
completion rates, with relative stability in the 11-11.5 year range following dramatic 
increases in the 1970s. This trend does not appear to be altered by the two increases in 
copyright protection. 
 While the impact of IPR on drug prices in Jordan has been studied, the impact of 
IPR on education and learning material prices has not. The majority of existing research 
on intellectual property rights generally, and in the Arab world particularly, focus on 
TRIPS, free trade agreements, pharmaceuticals, e-commerce, and the internet (Olwan 
2013a). To my knowledge, there are no empirical studies of intellectual property’s role in 
                                                          
22 As noted in Chapter 4, enrollment rates and completion rates, which are expressed as percentages of the 
population for the relevant age group, can exceed 100% due to over-aged and under-aged students 
attending school at each level. 
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education in Jordan from scholars, organizations, or the Jordanian government itself. As a 
matter of fact, I could find no empirical studies of copyright in Jordan at all. There is no 
additional data available for Jordan on textbook and learning material costs. 
Instead, we can supplement the aggregate results presented above with a 
discussion of the process by which Jordan reformed its copyright laws and the potential 
impacts IPR reform may bring to the educational sector. The following sections do that 
by examining the specifics of the copyright law, the exceptions to copyright relevant for 
education, critiques of the law by legal scholars, and the process of copyright 
enforcement in Jordan.  
 
6.5.1 Copyright Law in Jordan 
 
 As noted previously, copyright has been protected in Jordan since the Ottoman 
era, but a modern copyright law was not introduced until 1992. When Jordan joined the 
WTO, and following the US and EU free trade agreements, the 1992 law was amended to 
come into compliance with TRIPS and the FTAs. The Jordanian Copyright Law is 
extensive, and outlines a very modern system of copyright protections. The law, as 
amended through 2005, includes 62 articles and spans 33 pages (World Intellectual 
Property Organization n.d.).23  
 With its roots in the French civil law system, Jordan’s copyright law does not use 
the terms “fair use” or “fair dealing” in outlining situations in which copyrighted material 
can be used without compensation. Instead, Jordan’s law refers to “limitations to author’s 
rights.” In drafting this portion of the law, Jordan followed closely the principles 
                                                          
23 Thirty-three pages in English; the Arabic (original) version is 17 pages. 
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established in the Berne Convention. Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and Article 13 
of TRIPS outline a “three-step test” that restricts how countries can organize exceptions 
and limitations to copyright without inappropriately restricting the author’s copyright 
(Olwan 2013a). Any limitations should fulfill these three conditions: 
1. The limitation or exception is set under specific cases; 
2. There is no conflict with normal exploitation of the work; and 
3. The limitation and exception cannot prejudice the author’s interest. 
 
 
Among the allowed exceptions in Jordan’s law are reproduction for translation purposes; 
reproduction of published works under certain conditions; reproduction for private 
purposes; reproduction for teaching and educational purposes; reproduction in the form 
of quotation; reproduction for information purposes; and reproduction for libraries, non-
commercial documentation centers, and educational scientific and cultural institutions.  
 
6.5.2  Limitations and Exclusions with Implications for Education 
 
 In most countries, exceptions and limitations to copyright fall into one of three 
categories (Hackett 2009). The first group includes limitations intended to protect 
fundamental user rights, such as public speeches, the right to make quotations, the 
reporting of current events, the right to parody information, and private non-commercial 
use such as home recordings. The second category involves commercial interest, industry 
practice, and competition. Examples of these limitations include reviews, short 
recordings by broadcasters, museum catalogues, and reverse engineering of computer 
software for the purpose of interoperability. The third category concerns the needs of 
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society, and includes exceptions for libraries, teachers, persons with disabilities, and 
religious uses (Hackett 2009; Olwan 2013a, 2013b). The Jordanian Copyright Law 
includes limitations from all three of these categories.  
 The two limitations that have the biggest impact on education come from Article 
17(c) and Article 20 of the Copyright Law. Article 17(c) allows copyrighted works to be 
used without the author’s permission for educational and teaching purposes. The article 
says this use is allowed when: 
Relying on the work for illustration in education through publications, programs 
and sound, audio and visual recordings for education, cultural, religious or 
vocational purposes within the parameters necessary for achieving these purposes 
provided that this does not conflict with the regular exploitation of the work and 
that relying on this work in this case does not aim to achieve any financial gain 
and that the name of the work and author are mentioned (The Copyright Law Law 
No. 22 for the Year 1992 and Its Amendments 1992, art 17(c)). 
 
These exceptions make copyrighted materials available to educators for use in the 
classroom, although the law does not specify what a “reasonable limit” means, and leaves 
it up to judicial interpretation. 
 Article 20 of the Copyright Law grants public libraries, non-commercial 
documentation centers, educational academies, and scientific and cultural institutions the 
authority to reproduce works for their use, without the copyright holder’s consent, 
provided “that the photocopying and the number of copies is limited by the needs of these 
institutes and that same does not harm the copyright of the author and does not conflict 
with the normal exploitation of the work” (The Copyright Law Law No. 22 for the Year 
1992 and Its Amendments 1992 art 20). As before, the law does not explicitly state what 
number of copies is reasonable or what it would mean for the photocopying to harm the 
copyright of the author. As Rami Olwan points out, this exception is apparently not 
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granted to private and commercial libraries. However, most libraries in Jordan are public 
and/or affiliated with a University (Olwan 2013a, 2013b). 
 Article 11 discusses the granting of licenses by the Ministry of Culture for the 
purpose of translating works into Arabic and when sufficient numbers of copies are not 
available. Article 11(a) allows for the right to obtain a license from the Minister of 
Culture or his designee for the purpose of translating a work into Arabic, provided that at 
least three years have passed since the work was first published and that it is not available 
elsewhere in Arabic, or if all Arabic translations are out of stock. Article 11(b) allows for 
a license to reproduce or publish any item when at least three years have passed since its 
initial publication, there are not enough copies in Jordan to fulfill the needs of the public, 
and the published copies are sold at a price equal to or less than prices of available 
copies. Article 11(c) further clarifies that both of these exclusion are only for the 
purposes of school or university education and research, and Article 11(d) further states 
that upon granting of these licenses the author shall be entitled to just compensation (The 
Copyright Law Law No. 22 for the Year 1992 and Its Amendments 1992, art 11). While 
this exclusion makes it possible for educators to obtain Arabic language versions of 
copyrighted materials or additional copies of undersupplied items, it does not make that 
process easy or particularly affordable. It is likely that educational institutions will opt to 







6.5.3 Critique of the Law 
 
 Little research exists on the Jordanian Copyright Law and its impact on Jordanian 
society. Those scholars that have examined the law, and the process of adopting and 
revising the law, have been largely critical. Rami Olwan, a Jordanian copyright expert 
and intellectual property lawyer, has said the law is “poorly drafted, inadequate, and 
outmoded” (Olwan 2013b, 248). Olwan notes that the limitations and exclusions for 
teaching purposes and libraries are vague and do not cover some of the most important 
aspects of fair use. Article 17(a) permits the performance or display of a work for 
educational purposes only within the physical classroom, preventing similar use in online 
education using the internet. Similarly, Article 20 does not make it clear whether or not 
libraries have the ability to make electronic items available online. In short, “Article 
17(a) and (c) of the Copyright Law in Jordan does not support distance education” 
(Olwan 2013b, 248). 
 Saleh Al-Sharieh is also critical of the copyright law’s vague language, especially 
when the law states that exceptions and limitations must not interfere with the normal 
exploitation of the work, and must not cause unjustified damage to the interests of the 
rights holder (Al-Sharieh 2008). The law does not provide means for a test of interference 
or unjust damage, leaving it to a judge to decide how to interpret these exceptions. 
 One of the biggest challenges, especially for the educational sector, is the outright 
rejection of the “first sale doctrine” in the Jordanian Copyright Law (Al-Sharieh 2008). 
Many copyright regimes include a limitation that is known as the first sale doctrine, 
which allows for the re-sale of copyrighted material without permission from the 
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copyright holder.24 In other words, the initial sale of the item exhausts the copyright for 
that particular copy. It is the first sale doctrine that allows students, schools, and 
universities to sell used books to students rather than always requiring the purchase of 
new copies. Articles 9 and 15 of the Copyright Law outline the rights reserved to the 
copyright holder, including the right of distribution. Article 9(d) says “The author shall 
have the right to financially exploit his work in any way he chooses. No other person may 
engage in any of the following conducts without the author’s written permission, or the 
permission of his successors: (a)… (b)… (c)… (d) Distribution of the work or copy 
thereof through sale or other disposition of ownership” (The Copyright Law Law No. 22 
for the Year 1992 and Its Amendments 1992, art 9(d)). Article 15 further states, “The 
transfer of the title of the original copy of the work or the only reproduction or a number 
of reproductions thereof to other shall not include the transfer of the copyright of this 
work to same…” (The Copyright Law Law No. 22 for the Year 1992 and Its Amendments 
1992, art 15). Read together, these articles amount to a rejection of the first sale doctrine 
(Al-Sharieh 2008). 
 Several observers have raised questions about how the Copyright Law treats 
temporary and transient electronic copies of copyrighted material (Consumers 
International n.d.; Olwan 2013b; World Intellectual Property Organization 2002). This is 
particularly an issue for computer software, eBooks, and other digital works. Some legal 
scholars and technology companies argue that temporary copies made by a computer’s 
random access memory (RAM) in the normal course of computer use constitutes a 
reproduction of the item in material form, and an infringement of its copyright 
                                                          




(Consumers International n.d.; Olwan 2013b; World Intellectual Property Organization 
2002). Many countries include an exception to copyright that excludes temporary or 
transient copies incidental to lawful use. However, Article 9(a) of the Jordanian 
Copyright Law does not include any such prevision, leaving all rights of reproduction, 
whether permanent or temporary, to the rights holder (The Copyright Law Law No. 22 for 
the Year 1992 and Its Amendments 1992, art 9(a)). This same article prevents consumers 
of copyrighted material from legally making a backup copy for their own purposes, even 
if the original software, music, DVD, ebook, or other item was obtained legally. 
 Finally, the Jordanian Copyright Law has been criticized for failing to allow 
limitations for people with visual and sensory impairments (Olwan 2013a, 2013b). 
Without such limitations, the adaptation of a work in an accessible format for the benefit 
of persons with visual or sensory impairment requires the permission of the copyright 
owner. Limitations for the visually impaired has been a topic of discussion among 
scholars of copyright in the Access to Knowledge movement, and at treaty discussions at 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (Proposal By Brazil, Ecuador And 
Paraguay, Relating To  Limitations And Exceptions: Treaty Proposed  By The World 
Blind Union (WBU) 2009; Ress 2008; World Intellectual Property Organization 2009). 
With 4-5% of the Jordanian population living with a visual or sensory impairment, 
according to the UN Development Program, the lack of any relevant exclusion in the 






6.5.4 Enforcement of Copyright in Jordan 
 
There is also little existing research into the enforcement of copyright in Jordan, and the 
Jordanian government does not make extensive data on copyright enforcement available. 
However, data from 2008 suggest that among the various types of intellectual property, 
copyright cases do get referred to the Jordanian court system at a high rate: 
 









345 14 5 109 
Source: (Nesheiwat 2014, 127) 
 
Of the 473 IP-related cases in Jordan in 2008, just under 73% of them dealt with 
copyright. Additionally, Table 2 displays the number of copyright cases annually from 
2000-2008, showing a marked increase from 2000-2003, followed by a leveling off and 
slight fluctuation year over year afterwards: 
 
 
Table 6.2: Number of copyright cases referred to the National Library (ARPO), 2000-2008. 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Cases 6 149 298 384 218 296 285 357 354 
Source: (Nesheiwat 2014, 135) 
 
 
Discussing this trend, Faris Nesheiwat noted that the enforcement of copyright in Jordan 
– despite the comparatively large number of cases referred to the National Library and 
courts – has been both weak and selective: 
It is not clear why these numbers fluctuate or why they are not increasing, as data 
are not readily available and often hard to obtain. One reason might be that 
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enforcement by the NL takes into consideration the economic and social aspects 
of Jordanian society. In other words, while the NL is technically charged with 
fighting copyright infringement, it is also aware of its limited resources and the 
particularities of Jordanian society. Therefore, the NL might be striking a balance 
between fighting piracy and accommodating the needs of citizens access to 
copyrighted material (Nesheiwat 2014, 134). 
 
Unfortunately, data is not available on the types of products generating copyright cases in 
the legal system, but there is some evidence to suggest that the majority of cases involve 
foreign software and entertainment media. Given the lack of data on this point, it is 
difficult to say whether material that is specifically useful for education is being protected 
at the same rate as other author’s works.  
 Another study examining the enforcement of copyright protections in Jordan 
suggested that Jordan had made progress over the years, but that numerous enforcement 
challenges remained (Mulki 2008). The study concluded that “these challenges were not 
experienced because the protection of intellectual property, as a concept, was new; rather 
that these challenges emerged because the enforcement of such laws is new to both the 
people and the government of Jordan” (Mulki 2008, 195).  
What does seem clear is that enforcement efforts are hampered by poor 
coordination between the various agencies and ministries involved. Poor coordination is 
further exacerbated by overlapping responsibilities and serious lack of resources for each 
agency. Furthermore, there is a disconnect between the legislative language and intent on 
the one hand, and the actual implementation of IP protections on the other, which 
Nesheiwat attributes to the inexperience of Jordanian leaders in both the drafting and 




6.5.5 Concluding Remarks About Education 
 
 While there is some scholarship critiquing the Copyright Law in Jordan, as 
discussed above, there is no empirical research on the impact of copyright on education 
in Jordan, nor on the costs of education inputs such as textbooks and educational 
software. In fact, there is little empirical research on copyright of any kind, in large part 
because there are few – if any – scholars doing empirical work on intellectual property 
rights in Jordan. That said, we are able to make some comments about the application of 
copyright in practice in Jordan.  
 While Article 11(a/b) of the Copyright Law allows the Ministry of Culture to 
issue licenses to make copies of material without the author’s consent, given several 
stipulations discussed in section 6.4.2, no such licenses have been granted by the Ministry 
or local authorities (Consumers International n.d.). In all likelihood, this is not a 
reflection of the government’s unwillingness to issue licenses, but more likely the result 
of a lack of demand for them.   
 
6.6 IPR Reform and Income Inequality 
 
Jordan provides less insight regarding income inequality than it does for health 
and education outcomes. The appendix to this chapter presents data for the Gini index 
(Figure 13) and Palma ratio (Figure 14) before and after IPR reform in Jordan. Gini index 
values are available from 1973 - 2010, and Figure 13 presents an up and down pattern for 
Gini values during that time frame. Inequality levels appear to be going down in the 
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period following IPR reform (after 2004), although given the fluctuation in Gini values 
during the entire period, this decline does not appear dramatic. Gini index values do not 
drop as low as they were in the early 1980s.  
Income distribution data are available for Jordan only from 1985 – 2010, so this is 
the period of time for which we can calculate a Palma ratio. Figure 14 displays a dramatic 
increase in the Palma ratio from 1985 – 1992, and then a steep decline from 1992 – 1995. 
After that, the Palma ratio increases slightly in the early 2000s and drops off sharply after 
2005. Again, it is possible that this decline in inequality after 2005 is the result of IPR 
reform, but given the variation in the Palma ratio since 1985 the decline is not dramatic, 
and Palma ratio values do not drop much below where they were in the mid-1980s. 
Without controlling for alternative factors affecting income inequality in Jordan during 
the 1970s-2000s, we cannot draw any firm conclusions about the impact of IPR on 
inequality from these graphs. 
Beyond the World Bank data on Gini index scores and income distribution, there 
has been no empirical work on income inequality in Jordan following IPR reform. There 
are few published studies of inequality in Jordan, and I was not able to find any 
documents, reports, or public statements about income inequality from the Jordanian 
government. The experts on Jordan I spoke to suggested that income inequality, while a 
serious social challenge for Jordan, is not well studied and is not a focus of the Jordanian 
leadership. As a result, I am unable to further explore the impact of stronger IPR on 






 Jordan’s accession to the WTO and completion of bilateral free trade agreements 
with the US and EU were clearly the product of both external pressure and eagerness to 
further join the global trade regime and spur economic development. Reform of 
intellectual property rights came along with these processes, and Jordan faced additional 
pressure to dramatically strengthen its protection of patents, trademarks, and copyright. 
 Several experts have discussed cultural attitudes about intellectual property rights 
as important factors (Mulki 2008; Nesheiwat and Adcock 2014). Scholars have suggested 
that ordinary citizens in Jordan have little understanding of or appreciation for intellectual 
property rights, and that few people understand that the unauthorized reproduction of an 
authored work is illegal (Mulki 2008). Among those who do understand their 
wrongdoing, citizens are often motivated more by pragmatic cost/benefit calculations 
rather than a sense of legal obligation. As Faris Nesheiwat and Mike Adcock put it, “The 
strong collectivist culture of the Arab world, of which Jordan is part, results in little 
personal freedom, which leads to a weak individual assumption of responsibility” 
(Nesheiwat and Adcock 2014, 4). They go on to say, “In such a collectivist society, 
where individuals sacrifice their personal ambitions for the good of the collective, the 
spread of IP piracy is more likely, as individuals motivated by solidarity, cooperation, 
trust, and support are likely to share property with others and expect them to do the same, 
without much regard for the notion of IPR” (Nesheiwat and Adcock 2014, 4).  
The point here is that, much like average citizens in every country, the Jordanian 
public does not have a sophisticated understanding of IPR, and these issues do not make 
their way into regular political and economic conversations. During WTO accession, the 
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argument over the pros and cons of strengthening IPR did not occur at the lay level, or 
even at the legal professional level. Whether the reason has to do with Arab culture or 
simply not having a deep understanding of intellectual property rights in the first place, it 
appears to be the case that Jordanians do not view the copying of books and other 
resources as a matter of ethical or legal consequence.  
 I return to the argument I previewed in the introduction. The evidence from 
Jordan supports the idea that the process of IPR reform, the political motivations behind 
strengthening of IPR, and the institutional agencies responsible for the reform and 
enforcement of IPR partially determine the impact of IPR on outcomes. In Jordan, 
stronger intellectual property rights have not translated into measurably worse health and 
education outcomes because of intervening political and institutional factors.  
We see these political and institutional factors in the Jordanian Food and Drug 
Administration’s reticence to extend data exclusivity protection to new indications for 
existing drugs, as discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.4 above. Even under heavy pressure 
from the US Embassy, the US Trade Representative, and the pharmaceutical industry 
lobby, the JFDA avoided maximalist protection decisions in several instances. When 
stronger patent protection – and more importantly expanded data exclusivity – did 
eventually drive up the prices of drugs, the Jordanian government increased health 
spending to partially compensate for this effect. Figures 15 and 16, presented below, 
display government spending on health per capita and as a percentage of the budget. 
Following IPR reform in the 1999-2004 period, both measures increased dramatically. By 
offsetting the increased price of drugs and other medical inputs, the Jordanian 
government may have avoided larger impacts on health outcomes. Of course this added 
221 
 
Figure 15: Health Spending Per Capita 
Figure 16: Health Spending (% Budget) 
health spending comes from somewhere, and does represent a net negative to Jordan, 
especially in light of the lack of local innovation or FDI studies suggest the change in IPR 


































































 We also see political and institutional factors at work regarding the impact of IPR 
on education in Jordan. Here the intervening institutional factor is a lack of copyright 
enforcement. Despite the suggestive evidence in Figures 10-12 that stronger copyright 
may be associated with lower primary school enrollment and increased secondary and 
tertiary school enrollment, studies examining the enforcement of copyright in Jordan 
highlight the poor coordination between the agencies involved in enforcement. The 
number of agencies and ministries involved, along with the lack of resources available to 
them, lead to overall weak enforcement. Even when enforcement does happen, Faris 
Nesheiwat suggests that the National Library selectively enforces copyright infringement 
taking into account the needs of society – paying more attention to entertainment 
software piracy and less attention to other copyrighted material with more important 
social impacts (Nesheiwat 2014). If copyright in Jordan had been aggressively enforced, 
we may have seen larger and more consistent impacts on educational outcomes. Of 














































As I have said, we cannot fully test these arguments with a single case study. 
However, evidence from IPR reform in Jordan supports the idea that political and 






Appendix to Chapter 6 
 
 
   
 
 












































































































1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Figure 1: Patent Index for Jordan, 1975-2005 
Figure 3: Life Expectancy Rates in Jordan, 1990-2013 
Figure 2: Copyright Index for Jordan, 1970-2010 
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Figure 5: Youth Mortality Rates in Jordan, 1990-2013 Figure 6: Maternal Mortality Rate in Jordan, 1990-2010 
Figure 7: Primary School Enrollment Rates in Jordan, 1970-2010 Figure 8: Secondary School Enrollment Rates in Jordan, 1970-2010 
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Figure 9: Tertiary School Enrollment Rates in Jordan, 1970-2010 Figure 10: Primary School Completion Rates in Jordan, 1970-2010 






     
  






















The goal of this project is to examine the impact of intellectual property rights on 
human development. I have done this by focusing on three core social outcomes: health, 
education, and inequality. While scholars, activists, and other IPR critics have made the 
case against IPR, suggesting that stronger IPR will be associated with worse health and 
education outcomes, they have not presented systematic empirical evidence to test that 
theory.  
Meanwhile, economists and IPR supporters offer abundant empirical evidence to 
support their claim that IPR are good for economic development, innovation, FDI, and 
growth. Unfortunately, these literatures talk past one another and fail to consider the 
other side’s arguments. My goal is to offer a large-N empirical test of the impact of IPR 
on the social outcomes IPR critics champion, and to consider both the positive impact of 
IPR on growth and a potential negative impact of IPR on health, education, and 
inequality.  
I have also tried to highlight the role politics plays in the process of IPR reform 
and as an intervening factor in the relationship between IPR and human outcomes. This 
chapter summarizes the findings from the statistical models in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, as 





7.1   Summary of Findings 
 
7.1.1 Intellectual Property Rights and Health  
 
The statistical models in Chapter 3 suggest that IPR strength is consistently 
related to health outcomes. Stronger patent protections are associated with worse life 
expectancy rates, for both men and women. When we lag the IPR variable five, ten, and 
fifteen years, we find an even more dramatic effect. The statistical significance and the 
magnitude of the effect are larger than in the contemporary IPR models. We find similar 
results for maternal mortality rates, for which patent strength is negatively correlated. 
This result is also stronger when IPR is lagged, although the results only hold for 
countries at higher levels of development. We do not observe this outcome in poor and 
lower-middle income countries. Lagged IPR is also associated with worse mortality rates 
for adult men and women, infants, and children. While the contemporary measure of IPR 
was insignificant for each of these mortality rates, when lagged the IPR variable becomes 
highly significant. Each of these results offers support for the hypotheses being tested, 
that stronger IPR will be associated with worse health outcomes.  
Interestingly, when examining the difference in impact for developed and 
developing countries, I find no difference by level of development for any health measure 
except for maternal mortality. IPR’s association with worse (higher) maternal mortality 
rates is true only in developed countries. The observed relationships for all other 
variables are the same regardless of the level of development. Finally, when I 
disaggregate the patent index and separately test each component of patent protection, it 
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becomes clear that not all aspects of IPR are equally important. When IPR is associated 
with worse outcomes, treaty membership is routinely the most important factor 
explaining the connection.  
I want to be clear that these results suffer from data and methodological 
limitations. Because cross national data for government health spending is available only 
since 1991, the timeframe of the analysis is limited to fifteen years, from 1991-2005. At 
the same time, the patent index is measured only every five years, with values for 1995, 
2000, and 2005. As a result, we have just three time periods for each country. This does 
not give the fixed effects regression much within-case variation on which to model the 
relationship. As a result, I also report single-year OLS models for each health outcome, 
and the conclusions discussed above come from those single year cross-sectional models. 
This evidence is suggestive of a relationship between IPR and each outcome, but future 
research should try to improve data and explore these relationships further, as discussed 
below.  
 
7.1.2 Intellectual Property Rights and Education  
 
When considering education outcomes, both IPR skeptics and IPR supporters will 
find evidence in the education models to support their point of view. In general, at the 
primary school level stronger copyright protections are associated with worse outcomes: 
lower enrollment rates, less school life expectancy, and lower completion rates. However, 
these results are not true at the secondary and tertiary level. In fact, stronger copyright 
protections are associated with higher secondary and tertiary enrollment rates.  
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In Chapter 4 I discussed three potential explanations for this result, but it bears 
repeating that discussion here. First, stronger copyright (and other IPR) may be 
stimulating domestic creation of educational materials, making those materials in fact 
cheaper. Alternatively, stronger copyright (and other IPR) may be stimulating overall 
economic growth. This may have two beneficial effects on enrollments, increasing public 
and private resources and student/family financial conditions which allow students to stay 
enrolled, while at the same time increasing the economic incentive to attend secondary 
and tertiary programs. Finally, we may be observing reverse causality with enrollment 
rates driving copyright protection. When more students are enrolled in secondary and 
tertiary education, society is developing more human capital and higher capacity for 
developing intellectual property and authored works. This increases the incentive for 
governments to protect intellectual property as citizens shift from importers of 
intellectual property to creators of intellectual property.  
For each education outcome I also test a secondary hypothesis: that the impact of 
IPR on education will be larger for women than for men. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
literature suggests that when increased costs force families to prioritize education for 
their children, boys receive more education than girls. The models presented in Chapter 4 
support this argument, with larger coefficients for women than men for each outcome.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the education models follow the health models in 
suggesting that the impact of IPR on each outcome is the same at all levels of 
development. The lone exception is tertiary enrollment rates, where the positive 
relationship with copyright is significant for all countries but much larger in developed 
countries. Regression models for disaggregated copyright and lagged copyright provide 
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fewer generalizable conclusions. Each of the four components of copyright are significant 
in some models but not others, and the lagged measures of copyright strength report 
roughly the same impact as the contemporary copyright index.  
The data for education regressions are also more complete. We have cross 
national education spending data since 1970 and the copyright index is measured 
annually since 1965, so as a result the fixed effects models of education outcomes have 
significantly more observations with which to model the relationship. As a result, these 
conclusions do not rely on single year OLS results. 
 
7.1.3 Intellectual Property Rights and Income Inequality  
 
I examined the impact of both the patent index and the copyright index on two 
measures of income inequality: the Gini index and the Palma ratio. For the Gini index, 
there is a significant positive relationship with patents, but no observable relationship 
with copyright in the full panel model. However, when development interaction terms are 
included, we see that copyright strength is positively associated with the Gini index in 
developing countries, but not in the developed world. The positive relationship between 
the patent index and the Gini index appears to be the same for all countries. 
The analysis found no relationship between either index and the Palma ratio. 
Since the two measures of inequality are theoretically linked and empirically correlated (r 
= 0.8688), we might expect the results to be similar. As I noted in Chapter 5, there are 
several possible interpretations of this result. Since data on the income share held by 
each decile is less complete than Gini index data, the Palma models have fewer 
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observations on fewer countries. The difference in results could be due to these data 
limitations. Alternatively, it could be the case that – while correlated – the Gini 
index and Palma ratio are measuring fundamentally different things. Determining 
which measure is a more accurate operationalization of income inequality is a debate 
worth having in the literature, but for now these results could be suggesting that 
these measures of inequality are fundamentally different in various ways. Finally, 
perhaps the difference in results suggests that when IPR affects income inequality, it 
does that by affecting incomes in the middle 50% of households. Recall that the 
Palma ratio ignores the middle 50% and measures the ratio of the top 10% to the 
bottom 40%. Meanwhile, the Gini index methodology tends to overemphasize the 
middle 50%. By finding significant relationships between IPR and the Gini index but 
not the Palma ratio, these analyses could suggest that changes in inequality are 
taking place in the middle of the income distribution. 
When I disaggregate the two IPR indices and examine the impact of each 
component, it becomes clear that not all aspects of IPR are related to income 
inequality. Only the number of categories covered by patents, membership in 
copyright treaties, and enforcement mechanisms for both patents and copyright 
proved to be significant determinants of inequality.  
Lagging the IPR indices leads to interesting results. When lagged fifteen 
years, patents appear to improve rather than harm income inequality. Assuming this 
result is not merely a product of data limitations or anomalies, we may have evidence 
of a short term increase in inequality followed by longer term decreases in inequality 
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resulting from stronger IPR. This result is far from conclusive, and requires 
additional investigation to properly understand.  
A final note is needed regarding magnitudes. Where the statistical models present 
statistically significant results, the magnitude of the effect of IPR is usually small. 
Significant strengthening of IPR is usually related to single-digit percentage changes in 
outcomes. This is true for health, education, and inequality outcomes. Even with small 
magnitudes, finding evidence of a relationship between IPR and each outcome is still 
important, but one potential conclusion is that IPR matters only at the margins. Changes 
in IPR may either help or hurt outcomes by a few percentage points, but other factors are 
likely to be bigger drivers of success for each of these social objectives.  
 
7.1.4 Intellectual Property Rights in Jordan  
  
 The case study of IPR reform in Jordan complicates the picture drawn by the 
statistical models in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. I argue that the process of IPR reform, the 
political motivations behind strengthening of IPR, and the institutional agencies 
responsible for regulation and enforcement IPR intervene in the relationship between IPR 
and social outcomes. We see political and institutional factors at work both in the JFDA’s 
reticence to extend data exclusivity to drugs for new indications, and in the relatively 
poor level of copyright enforcement. While the case is just one test of this argument, it 





7.2   Directions for Future Research 
 
7.2.1 Improving Data 
 
There are several variables for which we lack sufficient data, and several for 
which we have no large-N data. Rather than examining the impact of patents and 
copyright on macro-level health and education outcomes and making the case that the 
causal pathway operates through the price of medical and educational inputs, it would be 
much better to examine the impact of IPR on the price of those inputs directly. One of the 
most valuable data collection efforts would involve amassing cross sectional time series 
data on drug prices and the prices of select medical inputs and technologies, as well as 
prices for textbooks, educational software, and other select educational resources.   
Additionally, for the healthcare models, having government health spending only 
since 1991 severely limits the timeframe of the analysis. Supplementing World Bank data 
on health spending with additional pre-1991 years would allow for a richer, more 
rigorous, and more methodologically sound analysis of the impact of IPR on health. The 
nature of the patent index also limits the timeframe of the health models. Rather than a 
value for patent protection every five years, assembling annual data on patent strength 
would allow for more observations through time and generate more powerful statistical 
models. 
I would also like to improve the measurement of enforcement used in these two 
indices. While both IPR indices include enforcement, each enforcement component 
measures only the statutory availability of enforcement mechanisms. This tells us 
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whether patents and copyright could be enforced in the country, but it does not 
effectively tell us whether or not IPR is enforced thoroughly in practice. In addition to a 
measure of statutory availability of enforcement mechanisms, it would be helpful to have 
data on actual enforcement practices. Of course, collecting this data would require an 
extensive commitment of time and resources. Evaluating actual enforcement practices 
across this panel of countries through time is a monumental task. That said, actual 
enforcement data would deeply enrich the analysis of IPR’s role in human development. 
Finally, the case study points to several new variables for which data could be 
collected. If it is true that the process of IPR reform and the political motivations behind 
reform are important intervening factors, data on the motivation behind IPR changes 
would be helpful. This could be done in a number of ways, but a simple ordinal measure 
of the degree to which changes in IPR were the result of outside pressure would allow us 
to differentiate the motivations behind reform. Perhaps IPR has a different impact in 
countries that reform IPR for economic reasons than in those that reform for political 
reasons or in response to pressure.  
 
7.2.2 New and Unanswered Research Questions 
 
The statistical analysis in Chapters 3-5 generated new and unanswered questions. 
The following questions require follow-up investigation, and finding answers to them 
will give significant insight into the relationship between IPR and human development: 
 First, why don’t we see a bigger difference in the impact of IPR on health, 
education, and inequality in developing countries? We have good reason to believe that 
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IPR will affect these outcomes differently at different levels of development, but the 
analyses presented in this project suggest that is generally not the case. The statistically 
significant relationships observed, with only a few exceptions, were true for all countries 
regardless of their level of development. 
 Second, the analysis of maternal mortality found a dramatic and statistically 
significant relationship in which a 20% increase in patent strength corresponded to a 
39.5% increase in maternal mortality in developed countries (but a much smaller impact 
in developing countries). This is a difficult result to explain. I suggested one potential 
explanation: Perhaps in the developing world maternal mortality is more a function of 
other factors, including proximity to a hospital, the availability of doctors, cultural norms 
around childbirth, healthcare infrastructure, etc. In the developing world, perhaps these 
factors dwarf any impact of IPR on maternal mortality. However, in the developed world, 
where these issues may be less important, we can see an impact of IPR on maternal 
mortality. At this point, my explanation is purely conjecture. Further exploring the 
relationship between patents and maternal mortality, especially in the developed world, 
would give us greater insight into this important measure of public health.  
 Third, the education models demonstrated a negative relationship between 
copyright strength and primary school enrollment, but a positive relationship between 
copyright and secondary and tertiary enrollment. This result in particular can be plausibly 
explained through causality operating in either direction, as discussed above. Future 
research should explore the causal process behind this relationship to determine whether 
strengthening IPR can itself improve education outcomes. If so, this is a public policy 
some countries may wish to pursue. 
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Fourth, why do we observe a statistically significant relationship between IPR and 
the Gini index, but no relationship between IPR and the Palma ratio? If this difference is 
merely the result of data limitations regarding the Palma ratio, that is less interesting. If, 
however, there is a difference because when IPR affects income inequality, it does so 
by affecting incomes in the middle 50% of households, this is a much more 
interesting finding. It will take additional investigation to determine if this is the 
case. 
 Fifth, in Chapter 5 the results suggested that contemporary measures of IPR were 
associated with worse income inequality, while 15-year lagged measures of IPR were 
associated with improved income inequality. Future research should examine this 
difference to determine whether there is a short term increase in inequality following IPR 
reform, but a long term decrease. If this is the case, it has public policy implications for 
adopting stronger IPR, at least when it comes to income inequality. 
 Sixth, and finally, future research should supplement the Jordanian case by 
examining other countries, their process of IPR reform, political motivations, and 
institutional dynamics to see if the results from Jordan represent a pattern that holds in 
multiple countries. Additionally, further research within Jordan would provide insight 
into the true impact of IPR on health and education, whether increased drug prices 
eventually impact aggregate public health measures, and whether stronger copyright do 
increase the costs of educational inputs and ultimately harm education outcomes.  
Decisions about IPR reform and enforcement have powerful implications for 
countries at all levels of development. Answers to these questions will enrich our 
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understanding of the role intellectual property rights play in human development, 
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